



MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA



**2007/2008
STRATEGIC PANORAMA**

**SPANISH INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
REAL INSTITUTO ELCANO**



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INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

EDUARDO SERRA REXACH
Coordinator of the Working Group

For the fourth year running the Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos (IEEE) and the Real Instituto Elcano (RIE) have joined forces in a fresh edition of the *Strategic Panorama*, a publication which, since 1997, has focused on providing the broadest possible Spanish vision of the world situation. Once again we have attempted to report on new events, new situations and new perspectives, not forgetting elements inherited from previous periods, which afford the publication continuity.

Today, as ever, threats and risks coexist as part of the strategic panorama. While threats are distinguished by the existence of two subjects, threatener and threatened, the former harbouring, or at least displaying signs of, an intention to attack or damage our rights or interests, risks are characterised by not requiring an intention to harm or even the existence of two different subjects.

For some time now, risks have been an established part of assessments of different strategic landscapes; someone aptly described today's societies as «risk societies»—a fact that may seem paradoxical given that one of today's essential social goals is to achieve the maximum level of security possible. Consider our supplies (water, food, electrical energy, etc.) or the modern cyber-risks derived from our growing dependence on computer systems.

But in addition to this, industrial development first and technological development later have reached a point at which their limits are beginning to be questioned; this has been called sustainability—that is, their ability to continue their course in such a way as to avoid draining the resources that make them possible and without damaging our shared home: Earth.

Globalisation, by extending the systems pertaining to both industrial and technological development to large population masses, is increasing and accelerating these risks. The scarcity of natural resources, chiefly energy but increasingly water, and climate change are other risks that are commonly assessed in strategic studies.

Although some of these risks have been examined in previous editions of the *Strategic Panorama*, this year's edition concentrates on threats strictly speaking, specifically the most serious: international terrorism. It also analyses the appearance on the world scene of the emerging countries, another major risk.

Indisputably the greatest threat hovering over the world, especially the Western countries, stems from Islamist terrorism which aims no less than to subvert the international order by supplanting the hegemony of Western civilisation with religious fundamentalism.

The international nature of this terrorism (once again globalisation) and its possible alliance with Weapons of Mass Destruction (also products of development) make it particularly dangerous. Added to this is the potential connivance with this terrorism of rogue states, most of them resulting from the end of the Cold War, a period during which it was much more difficult for them to behave unpredictably, as all countries belonged to the orbit of one hegemon or the other (the United States or the Soviet Union). Whereas during the Cold War all the states in the world could be considered satellites of one power or the other, today many of those that are not in what we might call the Western orbit may become collaborators of international terrorism (training camps, havens, provision of material or information, etc.), and have therefore gone from being mere satellites (with an established orbit) to genuine meteorites (metaphor intended) whose trajectory is unforeseeable.

It is this radical Islamist terrorism that marks the new landscape that has emerged in the first half of the 21st century and, for the first time, is truly global. What is more, the emergence at a dizzy pace of new world powers which, together with the United States, will be leaders and prominent actors in less than twenty years, is the other major strategic event that defines the beginning of the current century. Their rise is leading to a shrinkage of the absolute weight of the West, particularly of Europe.

These two events which characterise the current international environment—international terrorism and the emergence of new powers—

provide the basis for structuring the 2007/2008 *Strategic Panorama*. The first five chapters of this edition are related in some way or another to international terrorism and are ordered in a sequence that we have attempted to infuse with a certain logic. While Chapter 1 concentrates on the nature of international terrorism, its players, scenes and most recent developments, the following chapter goes on to examine the situation in the Middle East, as could not be otherwise. For yet another year the region continues to be both cradle and victim of the most violent terrorism. From Iraq, whose prominent role acquired in 2004 has not diminished, to Afghanistan, which remains bogged down, to a nuclear Pakistan where uncertainty is growing following the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. The presence of Islamist terrorism has also heightened in the Maghreb (Chapter III), a region with its own economic, energy and demographic reality from which terrorism is rapidly stretching its tentacles towards Europe (Chapter IV). The Old Continent witnessed the appearance on the scene of Nicolas Sarkozy accompanied by great expectations, which he however is not succeeding in turning into realities. Relations with the United States have improved substantially, though a certain tension remains. This tension turns into discrepancy depending on the circumstances and can be clearly felt in the Atlantic Alliance (Chapter V), the only organisation that has proved, despite its past and present problems, to be a useful and reliable instrument. In contrast, the United Nations continues to be a forum for world debate and regrettably little more; the weakness of some of its positions, which protect certain situations with brazen immorality, is plunging the UN, its members and in particular the West into a relativism so absolute that we are unsure of the values we wish to defend. In this sea of uncertainty, new powers are emerging with force (Chapter VI) and have begun to vie with the United States and the Western nations in general.

Some elements have been left out of this year's edition of the *Panorama*. Such is the case of China and its increasingly prominent role on the international scene owing not only to its tremendous growth potential but also because the tiger awakened to compete internationally in all spheres, not only economically. This country will be analysed exclusively in the next edition, although the last chapter of the book devotes considerable attention to it. By then it will be possible to assess the results of the People's Republic of China's biggest marketing campaign: the Beijing Olympic Games. We will also wait until the next edition to analyse in detail the issue of immigration and migratory flows, one of the main topics of public debate in many countries. Two other

important issues, Latin America and the world energy scene, were examined in the previous *Strategic Panorama* and this year have given way to other questions.

It is also appropriate to stress, if only briefly, the events that have marked the past year, 2007. It began with Iraq and the United States' new strategy in the country as the focus of attention, and ended with the financial markets tottering as a result of the subprime crisis, the first signs of which were glimpsed in summer. In between we witnessed Afghanistan in a permanent state of war, albeit somewhat concealed behind the events in Iraq, its neighbour Pakistan with an uncertain future, and the novel and worrying unilateral declaration of independence of the Serbian province of Kosovo, which became a fact as the year turned. The appearance on the scene of Nicolas Sarkozy as France's new president, who earned the nicknames of *hurricane Sarkozy*, *hyperpresident* and *Sarko the American*, was the most significant event in Europe. Vladimir Putin also wished to stand out in 2007 both in his own country and in the world by making up for the foreign-policy losses the Russian Federation has suffered in recent years; energy dependence, Russia's joining the world Trade Organisation, the US missile shield in the Czech Republic and Poland, the announcement of the moratorium on compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and Russia's position on Kosovo and Iran have brought a breath of fresh air for those nostalgic for the Cold War. But the grand speeches delivered by the president—and next prime minister—are distracting attention away from the many domestic problems that beset the Russians; growing social inequality, corruption, continual state interference in economic life, the yet to be settled Chechen question, the powder keg of the northern Caucasus, the growing Islamic extremism of Russia's Muslim population—all these factors describe an unstable Russia, which is what we should truly fear.

Iran continued to provoke the international community in 2007 by developing its uranium enrichment programme, while North Korea took its first steps towards denuclearising the Pyongyang regime. Sub-Saharan Africa has yet to attract the necessary attention, while the Sudanese region of Darfur remains in the grip of the biggest humanitarian crisis in the world.

The year that has recently come to an end has also confirmed that Americans and Europeans still have different ways of thinking when it comes to international issues. We share the same threats, such as energy dependence, a possibly large-scale economic crisis and international

terrorism, but they are perceived more powerfully by the Americans. In contrast, what most worries Europeans, according to the *Transatlantic Trends* survey, is global warming. Europeans disagree widely with Americans as to the use of force in settling major world conflicts, and neither Angela Merkel nor Nicolas Sarkozy has managed to prevent European public opinion from regarding the United States' leadership with misgivings and from criticising US President George W. Bush's handling of affairs. Europe's diminishing ability to influence major international issues has also been confirmed. Although experts point out that transatlantic relations could improve following the 2008 elections, we will nonetheless have to wait as we witness unique and exceptional primary elections in the United States.

In most cases these events, which are so varied in nature, cannot be addressed from a single approach and without bearing in mind that they usually involve various elements of different natures. In a global and globalised age like the present, a threat can be a combination of economic, political, military, terrorist and criminal factors. In this international order in which the UN acts as its guarantor though not as an effective mechanism for maintaining it, there is an urgent need for an international system for preserving freedom and democracy in the world. This could perhaps be NATO, which has so far proved to be an effective weapon for fighting global threats. Why not reinvent the Atlantic Alliance so that rather than limiting it to being a forum for dialogue between the United States and Europe it becomes a meeting point for democracies, not only in the transatlantic area but throughout the world? It could address, in first place, the major threat of Islamic terrorism and its derivatives which, as stated earlier, characterise developments in the first years of the 21st century. However, the idea of NATO protecting freedom and democracy in the world is wishful thinking. We are aware that for the time being such a possibility is far from being realistic, but perhaps it is the way to a solution for a world that is crying out for world governance.

In chapter I, «Risks and threats of global terrorism», **Fernando Reinares** analyses the undisputable prominence of al-Qaeda and the powerful network of organisations linked to it either directly (its territorial entities or branches) or indirectly (terrorist organisations allied with or sharing the same interests as al-Qaeda), or even through what we might describe as a relationship of inducement (terrorist groups and organisations that are inspired by al-Qaeda, with which they maintain very diverse relationships, and make up a heterogeneous international

network). Fernando Reinares states that we should not overestimate the importance of these cells, as in recent years most al-Qaeda-related attacks have been perpetrated by the structure itself or by its regional branches and allied or like-minded organisations. These cells have sprung up particularly in the West, a fact which may explain why their significance has at times been played up. According to Reinares, this heterogeneousness gives rise to distorted perceptions of al-Qaeda and even to the belief that it no longer exists as an organisation but has become an ideology. Reinares stresses not only that al-Qaeda remains alive as an organisation but also that it has recovered previous capabilities; he judges this recovery to be «considerable», as is its leadership, which is located in northeast Pakistan.

The common denominator in this complicated web of global terrorism continues to be Jihadist Salafism, which aspires to establish a pan-Islamic caliphate. This entails toppling the regimes of a good many countries with mainly Muslim populations, in addition to other territories that were once under Islamic rule at some point in history. Fernando Reinares underlines the worrying fact that a significant portion of the world's Muslim population supports al-Qaeda, although this support has been progressively waning since 2002. It should not be forgotten that most victims of Jihadist attacks are Muslims.

Reinares goes on to examine the various scenes of today's global terrorism, considering that its operational epicentre has shifted from the Middle East (terrorist activity has declined considerably in Iraq with respect to earlier, extremely high levels of frequency and intensity thanks to the new counterinsurgency doctrines and tactics adopted by the US forces in the region) to Southern Asia (Afghanistan and Pakistan), where its organisational and ideological core is based.

In these areas, the Middle East and Southern Asia, attacks are very frequent (except in Iraq, as stated earlier) and the author analyses in detail their characteristics, frequency and intensity and relationship with other groups (such as warlords and opium growers in Afghanistan), as well as their consequences.

The author ends the chapter by stating categorically that Pakistan and Afghanistan are currently the main scene of global terrorism.

But global as it is, today's terrorism affects all regions of the world, though not to the same extent. The Maghreb is another area where Islamic

fundamentalist terrorism is significant. The focal point of the region is Algeria, where the former Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, previously affiliated with al-Qaeda (an indirect relationship), has now become its regional branch, changing its name to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (a direct relationship); it has likewise changed its modus operandi, and its actions are now regional in scope, posing an obvious danger to neighbouring regions (Europe) and enticing other terrorist groups of the Maghreb.

The last scene of Islamic terrorism analysed is Europe and the Sahel, which are inhabited by diverse groups and cells either affiliated to al-Qaeda (indirect relationship) or inspired by it (indirect relationship).

The threat hovering over Europe is particularly significant in the United Kingdom, where intense police work in response to busy terrorist activity has led to many arrests of individuals and the dismantling of groups. But it is not the only one: Spain, France and Italy, countries located close to the Maghreb, are likely targets for North African terrorist groups.

Fernando Reinares ends his chapter with a statement that is both surprising and worrying: «Spain currently seems more of an al-Qaeda target even than before the Madrid bombings of 11 March 2004». This statement should provide plenty of food for thought for many and is coherent with al-Qaeda's insistence on claiming al-Andalus, the Spanish territories once under Islamic rule, and violently winning them back. Together with Portugal, Spain is the only European Union country where an appeal can be made to defensive jihad on account of our historical past of Muslim domination. Such an appeal is accepted as a duty by more radical Islamists compared to offensive jihad, which is not considered an individual duty, and would affect European territory as a whole.

The future of the Middle East, which continues to be gripped by instability, remains at stake. **Ignacio Fuente Cobo** describes each of the particular circumstances of the region's countries in Chapter II. In January 2007 the US president, George W. Bush, announced a new strategy for Iraq under the command of the charismatic David Petraeus. Despite the pessimism that prevailed both in Iraq and among US troops, the general arrived with five more brigades—nearly 20,000 new troops—and new theories on how to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Petraeus followed the US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, of which he himself was one of the main authors. Following these rules, he moved troops off the forward operating bases and stationed them in towns

and villages where they have been taking charge of Iraqis' security. The US troops and the commander of the US forces in Iraq have proven to all those who no longer supported a solution and were calling for withdrawal that they are capable of rising to the occasion. However, even though the new strategy has borne fruit after a year, proving particularly successful in lowering violence statistics, it is premature to speak of an end in Iraq.

Afghanistan embodies the other war, that which is overshadowed by what goes on in Iraq and yet more than ever needs more money and further debate. To the Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists should be added the problem of drugs and the allies' unwillingness to fully involve themselves in military deployment, which is undermining ISAF's minor successes and organisational improvements. Very little headway has been made in significantly increasing troops and in unifying missions. Most European governments with troops in this distant country pay no heed to NATO's constant appeals for bigger contributions. According to Fuente Cobo, the allies are limiting sorties made by their contingents from bases as much as possible to prevent the unpopular possibility of fresh victims. In Afghanistan only five members are prepared to enter into combat: the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Denmark and the Netherlands together with Australia, which does not belong to NATO. All this entails an uneven distribution of risks and is consequently jeopardising the success of this UN mission under NATO's operational control. This, together with the fragility of President Hamid Karzai's government, added to an evident unwillingness to tackle the problematic issue of combating drug trafficking, has failed to improve the security situation in the country throughout 2007.

Neighbouring Pakistan, a refuge of the Taliban from where they destabilise and launch their attacks in Afghanistan, is tottering following the assassination of Benazir Bhutto days before the year ended. The attack once again underlined the need to nip the evils in the bud. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's president, has been an ally of the United States in fighting terrorism but has proved very ineffective in eradicating the ideological side, leaving untouched, among other things, the thousands of madrasahs that fuel hatred and violence. In Fuente Cobo's view, those who stand to gain the most from the current situation in Pakistan are the Jihadists, who will take advantage of the growing chaos to continue to roam freely, with the risk of the country becoming a failed state and the consequent danger that lack of control of its nuclear arsenal would pose to the international community.

Iran has yet to renounce its nuclear programme. Fuente Cobo examines the latest negotiations, the latest promises and the latest threats of the Teheran regime. The indecisiveness and disagreements of the Western group of negotiators has converted these talks into a long drawn-out, fruitless process. What is more, the question of whether or not to impose sanctions not only depends on securing the consent of the international community but on occasions runs into a well-known debate on the value and effectiveness of applying sanctions. Furthermore, the nuclear negotiations should not be separated from a global consideration of the positions, actions and relations that Iran maintains with the rest of the world. From the hostage crisis to the capture of the British marines to the funding of Hezbollah, threats to Israel, interference in Iraq and the recent war in Lebanon, Ignacio Fuente Cobo also explains the role of Syria in the turmoil-stricken Middle East, from its relationship with an Iran that wants to be nuclear to its more than controversial interference in Libya where a UN mission—with the participation of Spanish troops—has been deployed since the last Lebanon war. An added problem is Syria's systematic opposition to the United Nations' investigations into the assassination of Lebanon's former prime minister, Rafik Hariri; Damascus has been unable to put a stop to the investigation, while it insists on directing and conditioning Lebanese policy, as since Hariri's assassination various politicians and journalists have befallen the same fate. Syria should not forget that Europe (particularly France) and the United States regard Lebanese independence and the stabilisation of the new democratic regime as one of the most important goals in this far-reaching process of rebuilding the Middle East. The ever-present, entrenched Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the last issue addressed by Fuente Cobo. A few important events have modified the geopolitics of the conflict, particularly the violent clash between the Islamists of Hamas and the followers of al-Fatah, who are faithful to Mahmoud Abbas. The fratricidal battle waged in Gaza in 2007 has seriously deteriorated the situation, particularly that of the population living in the strip. Once again it is the international community that has had to commit billions of dollars to alleviating the critical situation of the Palestinians. But nor have their clashes and confrontations with Israel ceased. The US president, George W. Bush, attempted to revive the dormant Palestinian-Israeli peace talks by hosting the Annapolis conference. If expectations were ever high, the outcome of the events has considerably dashed hopes of achieving a lasting peace in the region for the time being.

Nor is the neighbouring Maghreb without its upheavals, some of them worrying, such as the growing presence of al-Qaeda and terrorist acts,

and others more optimistic and linked to the economic opportunities provided by globalisation. In Chapter III **Fidel Sendagorta** analyses the situation in this region, where local dynamics exist alongside a certain degree of permanence on the one hand and, on the other, new trends that stem from the region's progressive incorporation into the world. He begins by analysing the political situation in the five Maghreb states, three of which have held elections. The political discourse, the regimes' aims of renewing and bolstering their legitimacy through political liberalisation and acknowledgement of a certain pluralism, the improvement in human rights and freedom of the press do not entirely make for a full-fledged democratisation process with all its consequences. Mauritania is the exception in the Maghreb with its successful political liberalisation process which has nonetheless been overshadowed by a Jihadist offensive—a coup de théâtre that led to the cancellation of the Paris-Dakar rally, dealing a harsh blow to its international image. In Algeria the affiliation of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) with al-Qaeda points to a worrying outlook indeed.

Morocco and Algeria, which are characterised by their ambiguity in certain fundamental issues of governance, continue to mistrust and vie with each other, a fact which is not conducive to the desired regional integration. In Sendagorta's view, energy could be the most appropriate field for overcoming differences. The entry into service of the new MEDGAZ gas pipeline, which will bring Algerian natural gas directly to Spain, could increase available supply and lead Morocco to purchase Algerian gas. The policies are not very favourable, but gas is, after all, the only product that legally crosses the closed border between the two countries. The relationship between Morocco and Algeria is also a key to understanding the Western Sahara dispute. According to Sendagorta, the current situation of the territory is conducive to maintenance of the status quo, which is not satisfactory to either of the parties but is less costly for both than a possible solution contrary to their interests.

Economic trends in the region point to insufficient economic growth that has so far proved incapable of creating the necessary jobs for the millions of young people born in these countries. Over the next few years the Maghreb countries should take advantage of the opportunities provided by the demographic transition ushered in by the significant reduction in the fertility rate. Fresh opportunities are also arising from the dynamics of globalisation, such as a rise in hydrocarbon prices, increased energy security and significant impetus to foreign investment. The Gulf

states have become the leading investors in the Mediterranean region (36%), ahead of the United States (31%) and the European Union itself (25%). China's growing presence in the Maghreb in recent years has also been spectacular. With an average annual increase in trade of 40 per cent, China has become Algeria's third biggest supplier after France and the United States.

Lastly, Sendagorta opens a debate on European policies towards the Mediterranean and supports the idea that Eastern Europe should progressively be replaced by the Maghreb as a low-cost platform for European companies under expansion. He takes a southward glance, with President Nicolas Sarkozy's recent initiative to create a Union for the Mediterranean as a backdrop. It is worth considering that one of the most intelligent policies for ensuring a stable future for Europe would be to progressively incorporate the Maghreb into Western standards of life, thereby shifting Europe's southern frontier from the Mediterranean to the Sahara desert and countering the stimulus to terrorism that the cocktail of poverty, demographic explosion and unemployment entails.

Ignacio Torreblanca, who analyses the challenges faced by the European Union following the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in Chapter IV, considers that France's return to the European and international scene has been long awaited. However, it is appropriate to gauge the figure of the country's new president, whose political vision is almost inseparable from his personal leadership. In his approach to European interests he generally fails to seek consensus among the EU partners beforehand. He has triggered controversy over Turkey's accession, imposed a Mediterranean Union, demanded a Comité des Sages and set in motion unilaterally a review of the European Security Strategy, in Torreblanca's opinion undermining the compatibility between European and national interests and giving priority to the latter (France's) over the former.

But we should also recognise the merits of Mr Sarkozy and the duo he and Angela Merkel make up, which was essential in steering the EU out of the constitutional quagmire and settling the crisis, as well as improving transatlantic relations. Both belong to the new generation of European leaders who still have a long way to go in dealing with an outlook that is unclear indeed. It remains to be seen whether the renewal Europe's leadership has undergone in recent years will give rise to a team capable of providing the European project with an impetus comparable to that of the eighties.

Europe will have to push itself in order to address global challenges and endogenous differences, which predict a future marked by insecurities and hesitations. However, according to Torreblanca, the new treaty provides the instruments, flexibility and integration potential necessary for states to progress in coordinating policies on monetary and fiscal matters, energy and climate change, the area of freedom, security and justice and defence. The text equips Europe with a very powerful instrument in all these areas; whether or not the most is made of it will depend on the new leaders, on Mrs Merkel and Mr Sarkozy, and the disdainful Mr Brown. Spain and Italy, the two other big states, which always support and facilitate integration initiatives but rarely initiate them, ought to aim to play a role in this effort.

Europe remains incapable of making the most of its resources and harnessing its potential. It is not succeeding in gaining acceptance for its principles and points of view in major multilateral institutions, despite having three seats on the Security Council and being the world's biggest trade bloc. Torreblanca asks why Europe cannot act on its own interests, asserting them where possible, as the United States does, and why there are so many limitations that prevent Europeans from contributing sufficient resources to missions like that of Afghanistan or in the heart of Africa, for example.

Europe's periphery is a reflection of some European problems. On the one hand, Europe is finding it difficult to hit on the keys to a post-enlargement policy that should be debated in coming years. On the other, Russia has become a factor that is driving a wedge between Member States, while the EU is playing a mediocre role with respect to Kosovo, Serbia and Bosnia. We are furthermore currently witnessing the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo, the consequences of which remain to be seen, while Europe has committed itself to guaranteeing peace and the rule of law in the new country through a civilian mission.

Kosovo undoubtedly ushered in a new phase for the Atlantic Alliance. NATO adopted its latest Strategic Concept in 1999, amid the Kosovo campaign, an action that did not precisely enshrine the principle of self-defence of the NATO Treaty. In Chapter V of the Strategic Panorama Admiral **Fernando del Pozo** offers us a vision of a new strategic concept for the Alliance. Much water has flowed under the bridge since Kosovo: from the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States, the subsequent Madrid and London bombings and the initial attempts to build a European

Security and Defence Identity to the mission in which NATO is bogged down in Afghanistan.

The changes that have taken place since the adoption of the organisation's last Strategic Concept are undoubtedly sufficiently significant to justify the drafting of a new document. But not only the strategic landscape has changed—so has the Alliance itself. It has taken in new allies, made substantial progress in the Partnership for Peace programme and given impetus to the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Russia-NATO Council. However, there is a sensation of fatigue and even sluggishness on the part of the allies.

Everyone agrees that the most important endeavour ever undertaken, in which NATO is currently engaged—the mission in Afghanistan—will be a determining factor in the organisation's future. In view of the indefinite time span of the mission, and having dismissed the possibility of negotiating a new Treaty, the admiral believes that NATO should not postpone the debate on the Strategic Concept, as the Alliance is likely to always have some mission under way. The question Madeleine Albright posed to Colin Powell when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, «So why do we have this wonderful big, shiny army if we never want to use it?», had a clear impact on NATO. Now, in order for the Alliance to continue to be useful, its structure needs to be adapted to the new missions, environments and global challenges that require a security response. A new sound, far-reaching document is needed that takes into account the new variables derived from the new strategic landscape, lays solid foundations for the organisation's relationship with the EU, clarifies the dilemma between common defence and peacekeeping operations, and reinterprets the clause on collective defence. All in all, a document that allows today's problems to be addressed, while defining precisely how much can be expected from allied solidarity; and—why not—that facilitates seeking a formula for combining legality and efficiency in this global and globalised world. Lastly, **Fernando del Pozo** underlines that Spain should join the group of nations that lead the movement to launch a new Strategic Concept, as this is a great opportunity for demonstrating its commitment to the Alliance. In exchange, Spain runs the risk of having to commit to the new requirements of force size and quality. These forces should be agile and expeditionary, with the sound support of strategic transport and means of command, control and communication, all of which requires firm economic underpinning.

Such a NATO would play a useful role in settling and addressing the problems and threats that are swamping the world, where the weight of the West, with Europe dwindling and the USA as undisputable hegemon, shares prominence more than ever with the new rising powers. In the last chapter of the *Strategic Panorama*, **Emilio Lamo de Espinosa** analyses the changes on the world chessboard—who is current leader, who could be, who is a power and who has the potential.

Immersed as we are in a colossal change in the world landscape as the result of a process with manifold causes and demographic, political, economic and technological aspects, Lamo de Espinosa begins by analysing the appearance on the scene of the emerging countries, the so-called BRICs and a few others, particularly the People's Republic of China and India. The former produces hardware, that is products, and the second software, programmes. They are countries with history, ancient civilisations and cultures, have been active and innovative over the centuries and never went to sleep. With their emergence, the whole world is therefore adjusting to the distribution of power and wealth that existed prior to the Industrial Revolution and Europe's large-scale expansion throughout the world; and these emerging countries are simply re-occupying the place they always had. This statement is highly significant as it assumes that in globalisation we are heading for a fairer world than that of 50 years ago when 80 per cent of its territory and 80 per cent of its population were controlled by European powers. It marks, argues Lamo de Espinosa, the end of an abnormality, even though Europe was the chief beneficiary. China and India are notable for their GDP, exports, energy consumption, foreign currency reserves and contribution to world growth—no less than two-thirds. And they possess excellent universities, are investing increasingly in R&D and have multinationals capable of competing in the world marketplace.

After going back into the past and exploring the present of the emerging powers, Lamo de Espinosa takes a look at the future through two essential components, demography and economy, to ascertain whether the emergence of these huge economies, their pace of growth and contribution to world growth are sustainable in time. These emerging countries' middle class will triple to 1.2 billion, and their demand for scant resources will continue to grow. In ten years the BRIC countries have tripled their consumption of steel, aluminium and copper. China alone is the biggest consumer of copper, tin, zinc, platinum, steel and iron and one of the biggest importers of aluminium, lead, nickel and gold; it accounts

for one-third of the increase in world demand for crude oil and is the second largest consumer in the world after the USA. This and other problems call for global governance and management, a task that regrettably, as Lamo de Espinosa points out, falls to the United Nations. It continues to be a poorly-equipped instrument that lacks the sufficient force to back its resolutions. It requires a radical reform that should equip it to perform this world governance, but attempts at transforming the organisation have so far failed. Meanwhile, only Europeans appear to have any confidence in the discredited UN. According to Lamo de Espinosa, the USA—the «indispensable nation» and «locomotive at the head of mankind»—and China, on account of its huge size, will compete for world leadership, flanked by Russia, still a debatable candidate, and India, which lies halfway between East and West. These are followed by the rest of the prominent players, among them the European Union, which is regarded as an international actor only by Europeans themselves and whose significance will depend largely on whether it proves capable of overcoming its current crisis and speaking and acting unitarily. As Emilio Lamo de Espinosa sees it, today more than ever the world is in need of governance and this requires will and a direction; it needs an alliance of free and democratic countries that, combining legitimacy and efficiency, make possible world governance, which perhaps for the first time in the history of mankind is an unavoidable need.

In conclusion, the reader has in front of him the strategic vision of 2007 from a Spanish point of view, expressed by specialists who are highly qualified in their respective fields. We have aimed to provide an objective vision of the major problems that concern us; this year, as I stated at the beginning, we have concentrated on the main threat that we all suffer —international terrorism of radical Islamic origin—and the risk of the new actors who have made an appearance on the global scene, the emerging countries. I believe the reader will find an apt description of the current situation and also interesting contributions that may be worthy of subsequent studies.

We will be pleased if the reader goes away with this impression.

CHAPTER ONE

RISKS AND THREATS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM

RISKS AND THREATS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM

FERNANDO REINARES NESTARES

To speak of the risks and threats global terrorism poses today is tantamount to speaking of the challenges that violence linked in some way to al-Qaeda poses to countries' national security and the stability of the international order. But this terrorist structure is currently part of a much broader array of individual and collective actors that includes both its own territorial extensions and the groups and organisations that are aligned with it. Altogether they make up the web of global terrorism. Their terrorist activities vary markedly in frequency and intensity depending on the various settings where they are carried out, where interesting differences can likewise be found in the modalities and procedures adopted. These variations and differences are not only observed when distinguishing between the Jihadist terrorism practiced in or outside the Islamic world but are also found within this world, depending on whether or not it occurs in areas of widespread armed conflict. But what makes up the web of global terrorism? What are the main scenarios and expressions of this phenomenon?

THE WEB OF GLOBAL TERRORISM

For some years now we have frequently been hearing or reading, as if an irrefutable fact, that al-Qaeda no longer exists. It is claimed that the terrorist structure that emerged two decades ago has ceased to be an organisation and has become an ideology or has ceased to be an organisation and has become a movement. It is likewise claimed that Jihadist terrorism as a whole has evolved into amorphous and independent entities; and that, as a result, the threat inherent in this phenomenon no longer stems from al-Qaeda but from independent local

groups or self-constituted cells with a precarious internal structure, if not described as lacking in organisation, which attempt to emulate it and make up a dispersed network of leaderless international terrorism. A few well known doctrinarians of the global Jihad even support a model of subversion that is in keeping with this interpretation.

But this is not exactly the case. Certainly, those arguments spur us to examine a series of recent changes that al-Qaeda would appear to have undergone. Indeed, it is now part of a broader and more diversified group of actors who, despite constituting a sector that is more heterogeneous than is often assumed, share the same basic ideas. But at the same time these arguments are vague and give rise to considerable misunderstandings that may, in turn, distort our perception of the current web of global terrorism and the state of its original core. They can likewise distort our assessments of the challenges to national security or world peace inherent in this phenomenon that is so unusually widespread both within and outside the Islamic world.

Al-Qaeda, continuity and transformation

The fact is that al-Qaeda continues to exist, though it has undergone transformations in recent years—specifically, after losing the haven it enjoyed under the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, between the mid 1990s, when its main members returned to the country after spending some time under the protection of the Sudanese authorities, and autumn 2001. At this point US troops invaded the country, with the consent of the international community, reacting with military means to the attacks committed weeks earlier in New York and Washington. This, as is well known, was Operation Enduring Freedom. Until then this terrorist structure possessed an extensive infrastructure in Afghanistan, including camps for ideological indoctrination and training in the use of weapons and explosives. Tens of thousands of radicalised Muslims of greatly varying provenance passed through these camps.

Once these installations were destroyed and a great many of its members killed, captured or forced to flee, al-Qaeda was badly weakened as the result of such a sizeable loss of human and material resources. But it subsequently managed to re-constitute itself on the other side of the border, specifically in the tribal areas of northeast Pakistan and, by extension, the adjoining territories of Afghanistan. It is probably there where its leaders expected that, having provoked the United States and

after US troops entered Afghanistan, masses of Muslims would mobilise in support of Osama bin Laden and his allies throughout the Islamic world. This did not happen but nor did al-Qaeda disappear. Rather, it transformed itself, forced by the new circumstances under which it had to operate.

But this is not all. Al-Qaeda has shown signs of great resilience and an equally striking ability to adapt to a rapidly changing environment, as it has regenerated itself as a terrorist structure and its current organisational structure may be considered relatively robust. Even though a substantial number of its leaders have been arrested or killed since 2002, particularly but not solely in Southern Asia and the Middle East, its leadership core has been rebuilt on various occasions, especially the ten members of the consultative council or *Majlis al-Shura*, is largely based along Pakistan's border with Afghanistan, and includes Osama bin Laden and the second in the hierarchy, Ayman al-Zawahiri. They are no doubt accompanied in this area by other prominent subordinate commanders and below them between several hundred or even a few thousand members.

Al-Qaeda furthermore has small groupings and cells with operational potential and a notable list of agents and collaborators outside the area where its new operational base is currently located. Specifically, it has such elements in Central and Southeast Asia, the Middle East and the Gulf region, East Africa and the Northern Caucasus, for example. The presence of prominent members of the structure in these regions is due largely to the fact that many dispersed following the loss of their Afghan haven at the end of 2001 and partly to the fact that people trained at al-Qaeda's camps in Afghanistan in the second half of the 1990s reside there. During 2006 and 2007, individuals of such characteristics were arrested or killed in countries like Russia, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen and Kenya.

Indeed, in recent years al-Qaeda has been making up for its new status as remnant of the terrorist structure that existed before 11 September through an extraordinary propaganda campaign conducted through satellite television channels and, above all, over the internet. It is therefore making its influence felt both in countries with chiefly Muslim populations and in communities of that faith in other parts of the world, particularly the West. This does not mean that al-Qaeda has ceased to be an organisation and has become an ideology, as is so often claimed. It is a terrorist organisation that is now greatly recovered and, in the meantime, has optimised its symbolic assets, paying particular attention to ideological production and reproduction, as a reference for itself, for other components

belonging to the global terrorist network and, of course, for its population of reference.

Although al-Qaeda's operational capabilities are probably not what they once were, everything seems to indicate that they have made a considerable recovery. Its leaders remain focused on financing and recruitment tasks, on training followers from very diverse background at the new training camps it has established in the Pakistani territories of northern Waziristan, and on expanding its presence, consolidating alliances and spreading related networks transnationally. But these same leaders also continue to be centred on planning attacks in and outside the tribal areas of Pakistan and the adjacent areas of Afghanistan. In these areas, for which al-Qaeda has a specific operational command, they often act in conjunction with the Taliban, foreign Jihadist groups and even a few warlords who have offered their services, in addition to home-grown terrorist groups in the case of attacks perpetrated in other provinces of Pakistan.

Elsewhere, beyond this conflictive setting, al-Qaeda appears to exercise much more limited control over the planning and execution of attacks, though it has another command for external operations and continues to aspire to perpetrate a few spectacular attacks, particularly but not exclusively against Western targets. However, since 11 September, different episodes have been observed in which the terrorist structure's involvement went beyond mere instigation. These include the attacks committed in April 2002 on the Tunisian island of Djerba, in November that same year in Mombassa, in the same month but in 2003 in Istanbul and in July 2005 in London, in addition to other failed attempts. Perhaps also those of 11 March 2004 in Madrid, an issue that has yet to be settled in my opinion. Depending on the case, al-Qaeda's role may consist either of providing individuals under its immediate control to perpetrate a particular attack, or of involving others belonging to its own territorial extensions or to related groups and organisations which, in turn, are able to mobilise local ad hoc networks to fulfil its aims.

Al-Qaeda's territorial extensions

The fact is that al-Qaeda has reacted to its splintering, on the one hand, by attempting to establish its own territorial extensions and, on the other, by devoting special attention to fostering relations with a number of related groups and organisations in various countries or regions of the Islamic world. These territorial extensions may originate from al-Qaeda itself and

be coordinated by prominent members dispersed in specific geopolitical areas but in contact with the central leadership core. This was how the so-called al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula emerged; founded by Yusuf al-Ayiri, it began its terrorist campaign in 2003 with a number of attacks in Saudi Arabia, Osama bin Laden's country of birth. In other cases, al-Qaeda's leaders have managed to establish territorial extensions through mutually convenient agreements with associated groups that are national or regional in scope. These alliances show how the terrorist structure came up against serious limitations when attempting to develop its extensions in areas where a prominent Islamist armed organisation already operated. At the same time, these arrangements help strengthen it as a terrorist structure, by expanding its operational scope geographically.

This is how the al-Qaeda organisation of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers (Qaida al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidain) was established in Iraq in autumn 2004, through one of these mutually convenient agreements. Such was the name adopted by Unity of God and Jihad (Tawhid wal-Jihad), a group that had existed since the previous year and had been very active, led by Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Al-Zarqawi became the leader of al-Qaeda's established Iraqi branch until his death in an operation conducted by US troops in June 2006. He was replaced by Abu Ayub al-Masri, also known as Abu Hamza al-Muhayir, with the express approval of Osama bin Laden—a fact which, together with his Egyptian nationality, attests to the sway held by al-Qaeda's central leadership over its Iraqi extension. By then this extension had brought together a number of armed Jihadist groups who established the so-called Islamic State of Iraq in October that year. This umbrella organisation portrays itself to the country's Sunni Arab population as an alternative to the official authorities.

More recently, at the beginning of 2007, and in a different though not so distant environment, what is now known as the al-Qaeda organisation in the Islamic Maghreb sprang up as the result of a merger announced a few months earlier between al-Qaeda and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). The latter, which is Algerian in origin and split off from the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in the late 1990s, had progressively internationalised both its discourse and its actions, promoting the establishment of related cells and networks in other North African countries and even committing terrorist actions further southwards in countries crossed by the vast strip of Sahel desert. Its conversion into al-Qaeda's territorial extension in the Maghreb was preceded by close ties with al-Qaeda's Iraqi extension. This new North African regional extension

is now probably bringing together under a sole leadership, ultimately dependent on al-Qaeda's core leadership, Jihadist elements located in the region's various countries and their respective diasporas based outside it.

We may assume that contact between the al-Qaeda leaders and those of these territorial extensions, among which should also be mentioned an emerging al-Qaeda organisation in the Malayan Archipelago, is direct and regular. It also seems plausible to think that this contact involves, among other issues, modes and procedures of executing attacks and selecting targets as part of terrorist campaigns. This is not incompatible with a degree of operational autonomy, which most likely varies from extension to extension and depends on each particular case, and does not prevent possible clashes emerging between the global strategic vision upheld by the central al-Qaeda organisation and the tactical decisions adopted by the leaders of the territorial extensions, as indeed occurred between Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in relation to the course of the terrorist Jihad in Iraq. However, even if there are divergences of this kind between the core leadership of al-Qaeda and the emirs or chiefs of the territorial extensions, it is possible that the latter actually belong to it given the incorporation into al-Qaeda of the group they previously led and the personal significance they have acquired.

Related groups and organisations

What is more, since losing its Afghan safe haven and resettling further eastwards in the adjacent tribal areas of Pakistan, al-Qaeda has also attempted to adapt to the changing circumstances by paying special attention to fostering relations with a number of like-minded groups and organisations that in principle operate with greater autonomy than al-Qaeda's regional extensions. In fact, by February 1998 there were already a few organisations formally affiliated to al-Qaeda in the framework of the so-called World Front for the Jihad against Jews and Crusaders, in whose formation al-Qaeda was instrumental. But was not until later, at the turn of the century, that they increased both in number and in relative importance within the group of actors that make up the web of global terror, acquiring operational priority among the various components. These groups and organisations differ greatly in size, degree of internal structuring, composition of their members and operational scope.

The nature of these groups and organisations' relationships with al-Qaeda also varies. For example, many of their leaders have sworn loyalty

to Osama bin Laden—often publicly announcing this over the internet—but it is generally sufficient for them to have expressly adopted the doctrine of the terrorist structure led by bin Laden and to justify and even emulate its characteristic methods. But the ties of association are usually expressed in some variable combination of factors, such as, for example, the presence of individuals who combine leadership functions and the existence of personal ties between al-Qaeda leaders and those in charge of the related groups, the provision of economic and financial resources in one direction or the other, mutual assistance in the indoctrination or training of individuals in the usual tactics of Jihadist terrorism and even collaboration in planning and executing attacks.

The groups and organisations related directly or indirectly to al-Qaeda do not generally act under the specific command and control of al-Qaeda's core leadership, though their operations tend to be conducted in accordance with the general guidelines provided by Osama bin Laden and, in particular, by Ayman al-Zawahiri. The latter two generally have less sway over the leaders of these related groups than over those of al-Qaeda's own territorial extensions, though this is not always the case. Throughout 2006 and 2007, terrorist acts were attributed to a number of organisations linked to al-Qaeda, particular that of the Taliban. There has been a connection between al-Qaeda and the Taliban since the 1990s, when Osama bin Laden and his followers were forced to leave Sudan, where they had established themselves several years earlier, and moved back into Afghanistan, where the radical Islamists were about to take over government. In 1998, Osama bin Laden even pledged his loyalty to the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, whom he described as «our chief».

Ayman al-Zawahiri has hailed Mullah Omar as a spiritual guide for all the individual and collective actors involved in the global Jihad. It is particularly telling that the person who has been considered the most prominent of the Afghan Taliban leaders, known as Mullah Dadullah—who was killed in May 2007 during an operation conducted jointly by NATO and the Afghan army—reiterated the ties between his movement and the terrorist structure led by Osama bin Laden in a video disseminated in January. Three months later, the same Taliban leader, who was praised in June that year in a video by al-Qaeda's leader in Afghanistan, Abu Yahya al-Libi, told Arab television channel al-Jazeera that his people communicated with Jihadists in Iraq over the internet and explained: «we and al-Qaeda are one. If we are preparing to attack, it is al-Qaeda's preparation. And if al-Qaeda does so, then it is our preparation».

However, during those same two years, other groups and organisations related to al-Qaeda carried out numerous terrorist activities such as, for example: the Pakistani neo-Taliban known as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Taliban Force of Pakistan); Lashkar-e-Toiba (Army of the Pure) in India; Abu Sayyaf (Bearers of the Sword) in the Philippines; Jemaah Islamiya (Islamic Assembly) in Indonesia and the whole of Southeast Asia; Jund al-Sham (Army of Greater Syria) in Syria and other surrounding countries; first Asbat al-Ansar (League of the Followers) and then Fatah al-Islam (Conquest of Islam) in Lebanon; the Union of Islamic Courts and Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen (Youth Mujahideen Movement) in Somalia; the various groups belonging to the so-called Islamic State of Iraq created by al-Qaeda's extension in that country, where Ansar al-Sunna (Defenders of the Tradition) also operates. This concise list no longer includes the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, which became known as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb at the beginning of 2007.

Furthermore, during that same period—that is, 2006-2007—members of many of the aforementioned al-Qaeda-related groups and organisations and others also affiliated to it such as the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement in the People's Republic of China and a few Central Asian countries, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Jhangvi Army) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (Soldiers of Muhammad) in Pakistan, Harakat ul-Mujahideen (Movement of Mujahideen) in that same country and India, Harakat ul-Jihad Islami (Movement of Islamic Jihad) in Bangladesh and the so-called Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the closely related Islamic Jihad Group, among others, were arrested or killed. To these lists should be added several groups that have been active in recent years but so far have not been mentioned, such as the Moroccan Combatant Islamic Group, the Tunisian Combatant Islamic Group and, in another part of the world, the Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs. It is likewise significant that, in addition to forging closer ties with twenty or so active armed Jihadist groups, al-Qaeda has recently managed to absorb the Libyan Combatant Islamic Group and co-opt a fraction of the Egyptian Jemaah Islamiya.

Self-constituted cells and social bases

Certainly, al-Qaeda, in addition to having a few territorial extensions and strengthening links with a good number of groups and organisations, has inspired the establishment and development of small groups and cells that lack, at least initially, formal or informal ties with any of these other

components of today's web of global terrorism in many parts of the world, though especially in Western societies. However, these small groups and cells which set themselves up influenced by the ends and means advocated by the core of al-Qaeda may eventually establish links with other collective actors involved in the global terrorist network, which in principle would boost their operational capabilities and possibility of involvement in staging an attack. However, these self-constituted networks and cells must not be confused with those which, dormant or otherwise, are under the direct command of al-Qaeda, its territorial extensions or related groups and organisations.

Nor should we overestimate their importance at the expense of the other components of the global terrorist network. It should not be forgotten that the vast majority of the al-Qaeda-related attacks perpetrated in the past six years are the work of the terrorist structure itself and, above all, of its regional extensions and like-minded groups and organisations. And the collective actors belonging to these three components of the transnational web of Jihadist terrorism are generally notable for their significant degree of organisational structure entailing related rules of conduct, an internal distribution of roles, a hierarchy of members and recognised leadership. This does not fit in with the idea of a disorganised global terrorism based on small independent groups, cells and networks that lack leadership. Local actors of this kind are part of the international terrorist web, but by no means can this part be regarded as the whole. Or even as its most salient component.

Al-Qaeda, its territorial extensions and the groups and organisations related to that terrorist structure, and also the small groups and cells set up under its influence altogether form a heterogeneous but defined international network. It is the web of global terrorism, whose founding core and permanent reference is al-Qaeda. A web that is evolving as the result of endogenous or exogenous factors and whose components are interconnected in very different ways and can vary over time in relative importance. The specific entities corresponding to each of these components may vary in number, as some disappear and others join or are combined through mergers and takeovers. Each of the collective actors involved may therefore alter its own characteristics and the nature of its relationship with al-Qaeda.

Today's web of global terrorism shares the same ideology. The fact that, on the one hand, this common ideology is the so-called Jihadist

Salafism and, on the other, the components of this international terrorist network have spread across much of the world—not of course with the same presence or the same activity, but in consonance with the shared aspiration of bringing about social and political changes on a planetary scale—explains why it is referred to as a global Jihadist movement. As for its goals, this movement seeks to establish a pan-Islamic caliphate that would entail toppling the current regimes of countries with mainly Muslim populations and recovering all the territories once under Islamic control, so that the ultimate aims of the global agenda, shared by the different components of the terrorist network related in some way to al-Qaeda, are compatible with others that are national or regional in scope.

As with any other form of terrorism, particularly in the absence of state sponsorship of this phenomenon, as in this case (though not so in that of other Islamist terrorist groups), the survival of al-Qaeda and its territorial extensions and the various related groups and organisations or self-constituted local networks and cells that are also part of the global Jihadist movement largely depends on their ability to mobilise the necessary human and economic resources. Although resources can be, and indeed are, transferred between the various collective actors that make up this international terrorist network, the reproduction of each of them and of the movement of the global Jihad as a whole is largely conditioned by the attitudes of the population of reference, namely Muslims living in and outside the Islamic world. It is their population of reference which provides them with radicalised individuals and the funding that allows them to reproduce.

In this respect it is disturbing, at the least, to find that al-Qaeda and the violence related directly or indirectly to this terrorist structure currently enjoys a more than significant degree of popular support in countries whose populations are mainly Muslim, although this degree varies markedly depending on the case, just as there are sizeable variations between Muslim communities established in Europe, where differences between nations are not insignificant. It is a genuine Jihadist sub-culture that crosses boundaries and underpins the web of global terrorism. However, it is true that the aforementioned percentages generally show a progressive decline since 2002. This may be largely due to the fact that the great majority of victims of al-Qaeda-related terrorism are precisely Muslims, and also probably to how certain religious authorities with influence over large portions of the Islamic world are responding to this violence. Nonetheless, considerable sectors of the Islamic world continue to display notable ambivalence towards terrorism on account of the

distinction—which is literal but accepted by many—between terrorism that is justifiable and that which is viewed as reprehensible.

CURRENT SCENARIOS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM

The risks and threats posed by both al-Qaeda and the international terrorist network to which it has given rise are not evenly distributed throughout the planet. In some countries or areas of intense conflict such as Afghanistan in Southern Asia and Iraq in the Middle East, attacks linked to the global Jihad movement are a very frequent reality that is spreading to a few bordering areas, such as Pakistan in the case of the former. Al-Qaeda-related terrorist activities are also frequent in Algeria, in the Maghreb region. And this global terrorism is relatively frequent in a good many other countries located in the vast strip of land that stretches from Northwest Africa to the archipelagos of Southeast Asia. In Western societies, terrorist activities related directly or indirectly to al-Qaeda are episodic, though they can differ in some aspects as to the manner in which they are staged—typically spectacular—from those perpetrated in conflict zones and other nearby environments.

In 2007 the operational epicentre of global terrorism appears to have shifted from the Middle East to Southern Asia, where its organisational and particularly ideological core was already largely located. It so happens that over this past year attacks linked to al-Qaeda's territorial extension in Iraq have lessened considerably, though the phenomenon in general has decreased more than appreciably. Meanwhile, Taliban violence has continued to increase in Afghanistan, spreading across much of the country, while Jihadist terrorism has heightened in Pakistan. All these developments hold implications for the respective regions where these particularly hard hit countries are located. At the same time, the risks and threats of global terrorism continue to affect the north and east of Africa and, partly by extension, Europe, although certain European countries may be regarded as more concerned by the problem, such as Spain.

Afghanistan, Pakistan and the rest of Asia

Afghanistan continues to witness an increase in the violent activities of the Taliban and, in particular, of terrorist activities, especially since the escalation begun in 2006. Throughout 2007, these radical Islamists perpetrated no less than a thousand acts of terrorism, around 15 per cent

of the total insurgent attacks reported. For this purpose they have several thousand permanent militiamen and hundreds more temporary activists. They aspire to seize power again and their expectations are favoured both by this ability to mobilise people and by the country's disastrous political and socioeconomic situation—a situation that the Taliban aim to worsen to their own benefit, by hindering the already poor execution of government tasks, hampering national construction initiatives, exacerbating the security problems that are ravaging Afghan society and trying to impose their control over broad sectors of the population.

A brief description of Taliban terrorism, based on a study conducted at the Real Instituto Elcano on incidents reported between January and June 2007, gives an idea of the scope, characteristics and incidence of this violence. Throughout this period, these attacks averaged some 80 per month. However, there were notable seasonal variations, so that this figure rose in the months when the climate was milder and dropped when it was colder, although the agricultural cycle is another variable that influences insurgent activity in Afghanistan. It was furthermore reported that the Taliban had extended their terrorist activities across much of the country, specifically to 26 of the 34 provinces into which it is administratively divided.

Nearly 60 per cent of these attacks were committed in only seven adjoining provinces located to the south and east, along the border with Pakistan. This location largely explains why terrorist incidents are concentrated in this part of Afghanistan and even why they are spreading from here into other parts of the country. This is because the Taliban roam freely in the bordering tribal areas of Pakistan, as occurs in both the north and south of Waziristan; the intervention of the Islamabad authorities has yet to yield appreciable results. Thirty-one percent of all the Taliban terrorist acts perpetrated in the first six months of 2007 took place in the provinces of Helmand and Kandahar, in the southernmost part of Afghanistan, in almost equal proportions.

The provinces where this violence is especially marked are thus located, above all, in the territory controlled by Regional Commands South and East of the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF. The latter, as is known, was set up at the end of 2001 by a resolution of the United Nations Security Council to deploy in Kabul and the surrounding areas, but since 2003, under NATO's authority, it has been active throughout Afghanistan. ISAF currently has some 45,000 troops from 40 nations, including Spain. Approximately 43 per cent of the attacks were perpetrated in the area

assigned to Regional Command South, compared to 41 per cent in that of Regional Command East. On the contrary, in Herat and Badghis, where most of the Spanish military contingent is located, the frequency of Taliban terrorism was much lower, accounting for merely 5 per cent of the total number of attacks reported. Even so, soldier Idoia Rodríguez Buján was killed by a road mine in Shindand in February 2007. In September a bomb blast near Farah killed soldiers Germán Pérez Burgos and Stanley Mera Vera, and the Afghan interpreter accompanying them.

Overall, only 11 per cent of Taliban terrorist acts occurred, during the first half of the year, in the area under Military Command West which, in addition to Herat and Badghis, includes the Afghan provinces of Farah and Ghor, where Spanish, Italian, US and Lithuanian soldiers are stationed. A small fraction of Spanish military is stationed in the province of Kabul, where the indicators of frequency of terrorist activity did not surpass those of Herat and Badghis, at least during the six months examined. However, since the capital city, where the ISAF headquarters are, is located in this province, and given its relative closeness to Pakistan, terrorist threats and risks may be considered comparatively higher.

Almost half the Taliban terrorist acts reported in Afghanistan, 48 per cent to be precise, took place in provinces where over 1,000 hectares of farmland are given over to opium cultivation. More interesting still is the fact that as many as 41 per cent of all these attacks occurred precisely in provinces that devote over 10,000 hectares to growing this crop. It may be deduced from the foregoing that there is indeed a relationship between the incidence of Taliban terrorism and the extension of opium cultivation—the more opium the more terrorism. This may be because the Taliban engage in terrorist activities particularly frequently in areas where the profits from opium cultivation provide them with financing and particularly favourable conditions for commanding effective social control of the greatly impoverished population in certain rural areas.

Taliban terrorism is a violence adapted to the country's demographic characteristics and relief, and attacks are launched mainly on local roads and pathways, although also in defined rural population centres and, to a lesser extent, in urban areas. The usual methods employed are explosive devices and, somewhat less commonly, firearms; this is not surprising considering that the Afghan radical Islamists have adapted their insurgency to the peculiarities of the landscape that characterises their country. Most of the attacks perpetrated by the Taliban are simple and do

not constitute multiple incidents or chain events. Although kidnappings accounted for a very tiny percentage of the total terrorist acts recorded between January and June 2007, a few received considerable public airing and secured the Taliban ransom money, and can therefore be expected to continue if the opportunity arises.

The proportion of suicide attacks in Afghanistan stands at around 16 per cent of all Taliban acts of terrorism. They are generally bloodier and more indiscriminate than other incidents. In any case, these statistics point to a growing trend. Only one suicide attack was recorded in 2003 and a mere half a dozen in 2004; however the number rose to around 25 in 2005 and was well over 100 in 2006. It is quite possible that over 150 such attacks were perpetrated in 2007 and their frequency is far from waning in the short term. This pattern, together with the use of makeshift explosive devices on roads and the practice of taking foreign hostages, among other innovations such as the dissemination of propaganda over the internet, points to an «Iraqisation» of the Afghan conflict. That is, a shift towards tactics previously used by Jihadist groups and organisations in Iraq. It even suggests the involvement in Taliban terrorism of al-Qaeda-related elements from other countries, as appears to have been the case in some terrorist acts.

Nearly 70 per cent of the acts of terrorism perpetrated by the Taliban last year—extrapolating from the total number reported during the first half of the year—were directed at military or police targets, as well as other governmental targets. Indeed, it is more than significant that approximately the same proportion—that is at least seven out of every ten cases—are Afghan and not foreign targets. Nearly 13 per cent of attacks were aimed at United Nations facilities or personnel, whereas only 5 per cent of the targets were American and a very small 2 per cent were Canadian and British. During the first six months of 2007, Spanish targets accounted for 0.4 per cent of all attacks perpetrated by the Taliban in Afghanistan.

The average number of people killed and wounded per Taliban attack was 1.7 and 2.9 respectively. This terrorist activity is therefore not characterised by a high death toll, although particularly bloody incidents are not unusual. At any rate, the frequency of attacks reported in the country is chalking up a great many deaths and casualties. It is most illustrative that 37 per cent of those killed in the first six months of 2007 were police and 27 per cent military. However, 36 per cent were civilians. Indeed, the Taliban are implementing a programme of social control that includes systematically intimidating the Afghan population. Added to this

is the fact that they would have managed to entice a few sectors of society whose expectations of improved living conditions have been dashed. The Taliban are attempting to turn this circumstance to their advantage, together with the US bombings that cause multiple victims among people not involved with the insurgency.

In short, Taliban terrorism is currently a well developed phenomenon that is common and intense enough to contribute to making political stabilisation of Afghanistan impossible in the short term and to hinder substantially its already difficult social cohesion. But it has also become a serious threat to the multinational military contingents deployed there. This violence is fairly conventional as to modes and procedures, though the frequency of the attacks is leading to a large aggregate number of deaths and casualties. But an analysis of their targets and victims reveals that the Taliban are not only engaged in a campaign against the presence of foreign soldiers in the country, but rather in a strategy to regain their influence over the population and, accordingly, power.

If this were to happen, or if they were to gain control of a critical portion of Afghan territory, it would have major consequences for the future of global terrorism given their close ties to al-Qaeda. Suffice it to recall that the plan to blow up more than ten commercial aircraft flying on routes from British airports to US cities, thwarted by the British police in August 2006, was directed by Abu Ubayda al-Masri, an al-Qaeda leader in the Afghan province of Kunar. But it should be remembered that the current dynamics of the Taliban insurgency and the fact that members of this terrorist structure roam freely in Afghanistan cannot be understood without the safe enclave they have established in the tribal areas of Pakistan, where state authority is practically non-existent and the local neo-Taliban have forged close alliances in a conglomerate that brings together dozens of armed groups based in these tribal districts and is capable of mobilising over 30,000 activists under the leadership of Baitullah Mesud.

Pakistan is the ideological, organisational and largely the operational epicentre of today's global terrorism. Al-Qaeda resettled there at the end of 2001 and, like dozens of other similar groups of varying provenance in the Islamic world, has managed to establish a new safe haven chiefly in the remote region known as the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) to the northwest of the country, where several of its associated organisations operate and a host of Koranic schools are based that contribute to spreading the doctrine of fanaticism of which Jihadist

terrorism is an expression. Even in 2006—and this was no novelty with respect to previous years—numerous Jihadist terrorist acts were reported on Pakistani soil and by 2007, these attacks had were in the hundreds, increasing with the wave of violence begun that summer, and showed no signs of waning at the beginning of 2008. The episodes of this wave include the assassination attempt of December 2007 that claimed the life of the country's former prime minister and then candidate, Benazir Bhutto. Afghanistan and Pakistan together, along with Iraq in the Middle East, are currently the main scenarios of global terrorism.

Some of the al-Qaeda-related groups based in Pakistan and along the border with Afghanistan are also a threat to other nations in the region like India, where their terrorist activity, albeit less frequent, is nonetheless systematic and sustained. We might recall the involvement of Lashkar-e-Toiba in the attacks of 11 July 2006 that killed nearly 200 people in Bombay. Similarly, the aforementioned Pakistani terrorist organisations have ties with terrorist groups whose activities are becoming a growing problem, for example, for Bangladesh. The tribal areas of Pakistan are also home to organisations whose agenda is more focused on Central Asia, such as those of Uzbek origin. As for Southeast Asia, the problem of Jihadist terrorism continues, although the situation seems somewhat less pressing than it was until 2005. Bordering on Afghanistan and Pakistan is part of the Chinese region of Xingjian, located to the west of the country and inhabited largely by Muslims—the Uyghur minority, a focal point of the terrorist menace related to the so-called Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement that is linked to al-Qaeda. This threat is particularly significant to the People's Republic of China, bearing in mind that Beijing is hosting the Olympic Games in 2008.

Iraq, the Middle East and the Gulf region

By the beginning of 2007 terrorist acts related to al-Qaeda had attained an extraordinary frequency and intensity. The territorial extension of this terrorist structure, that is, the so-called al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers, like the lesser groups and organisations that are also part of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq, and Ansar al-Sunna, had become particularly prominent actors—it could even be said the most salient of all those involved in armed insurgency campaigns conducted as part of the widespread conflict that has been preventing the country's stabilisation since the military invasion in March 2003 by an international coalition led by the United States. Prominent among the members of these terrorist groups were those that are foreign in origin, chiefly Saudi Arabian and Libyan.

But just how frequent and intense were these Jihadist terrorist attacks? In January 2007 alone the so-called Islamic State of Iraq claimed responsibility for at least 600 attacks and Ansar al-Sunna for a further 200, meaning that over 800 terrorist acts were attributed to entities related in some way to al-Qaeda. A quantitative study of 150 of these incidents conducted at the Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos, which shows that they probably account for between one-third and one-quarter of the real total of terrorist attacks committed that month related in some way to the terrorist structure, provides interesting information on where, how and against whom these acts of violence were carried out.

It is interesting, for example, to note that nearly half of all these terrorist activities took place in the province of Baghdad. Al Anbar, Niniveh and Diyala were the other three hardest hit by the attacks, as two of these provinces are adjacent to that of Baghdad. What is more, all the incidents reported took place in only seven of the 18 provinces into which Iraq is divided administratively, though altogether those that were scenarios of al-Qaeda-related Jihadist terrorism are inhabited by slightly more than half the population. But the al-Qaeda-related terrorist activities reported in the country that month were mainly conducted, and still are, in provinces where, despite their mixed ethno-religious composition, most of the Sunni Arabs are concentrated and where the Islamic State of Iraq is being presented as an alternative to the official authorities.

The incidence of al-Qaeda-related terrorism in Iraq was particularly high in three of the five divisions for military deployment established by the multinational force present in the country since its occupation in February 2003 and subsequently authorised by Resolution 1546, approved by the United Nations Security Council in June 2004. At the beginning of 2007, this multinational force consisted of some 150,000 soldiers, mainly from the United States though supplemented by much smaller contingents sent by over 20 countries, including ten European states. Practically all these attacks took place in military areas assigned to Multinational Division Baghdad, Multinational Division North and Multinational Force West, all three under US command. On the contrary, hardly any aforementioned acts of Jihadist terrorism were witnessed in the other two, Multinational Division Central South and Multinational Division South East. The former is under Polish military control, while the latter is commanded by Britons and Australians.

Furthermore, the al-Qaeda-related terrorism practiced in Iraq appeared to have adapted itself to the characteristics of a society in which seven out

of ten people live in urban environments. The fact is that, also in the case of Jihadist terrorism, attacks are generally focused on a few major Iraqi cities—specifically Baghdad, Mosul, Ramadi and Baquba, which account for 30 per cent of the entire Iraqi population, suffered over 80 per cent of these Jihadist attacks. Therefore, contrary to what is occurring in Afghanistan, Jihadist terrorism in Iraq is apparently imperceptible in rural areas, although perhaps cases where it was not possible to specify the location of the attack—such as those occurring on local roads or near unidentified population centres—may correspond to this type of habitat.

Nearly half the terrorist attacks perpetrated in Iraq by groups and organisations belonging to the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and by Ansar al-Sunna involved detonating explosive devices, according to the aforementioned sample of incidents reported in January 2007, whereas slightly more than one-third involved firearms. It was found that no more than 11 per cent of episodes were acts of suicide terrorism and nor were multiple attacks common. Therefore, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, we are dealing with a type of terrorism that is fairly conventional in its modus operandi. Nonetheless, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, the leader of al-Qaeda's Iraqi extension, stated in September 2006 that he was in favour of using «unconventional bombs, whether biological or dirty, as they call them [sic]» in what he also describes as «the battlefields of Jihad».

In the month in question, the attacks perpetrated by entities related to al-Qaeda claimed between 900 and 1,400 lives in Iraq. As many as 80 per cent of these episodes killed between one and five people, although there were much more lethal attacks. The targets were mainly Iraqi military or police facilities and personnel, government offices and the civilian population in general. Western targets, specifically American, were secondary. These attacks killed and wounded mainly Iraqis, many of them Shias but also Sunnis. No more than one-quarter of the targets and victims were American. Therefore, it may be said that the strategy of the groups and organisations responsible for Jihadist terrorism is focused less on opposing the US military contingent deployed in Iraq than on gaining control of much of Iraqi territory and society.

In the view of both al-Qaeda in Iraq and the actors linked to this terrorist structure, attacking Americans legitimates their activities in the country as a defensive Jihad. It was the invasion of the country by an international military coalition under US command that made it possible for al-Qaeda to secure a widespread presence in the area and make it the

preferred theatre of operations for global terrorism. Attacks on Shias are aimed at exacerbating ethno-religious cleavages and fostering sectarian confrontation, making short- and medium-term political normalisation impossible. Lastly, attacks against Sunni Arabs are seen as serving to exercise effective social control over the segment of Iraqi society that the terrorists regard as their population of reference. In other words, attacks aimed at different targets serve different yet complementary purposes for the groups and organisations linked to al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Given this state of affairs and the absence of internal and regional arrangements to provide Iraq with the necessary stability, it seemed evident that withdrawal of the multinational forces currently serving in the country, the vast majority of whom are American, would have provided or would provide the al-Qaeda-related groups and organisations active in the country with excellent opportunities to carry their strategies forward. It is true that they would be deprived of targets for attacks which secure them support and enable them to mobilise resources both inside and outside the country. At the same time, it is plausible to think that they would benefit from portraying an eventual withdrawal of US troops as an achievement of their own action against foreign troops and would have an excellent opportunity to have consolidated the Islamic State of Iraq. Such developments would by no means be without security implications for other countries in the area or implications of terrorist threats for Western societies in general and European societies in particular.

But the frequency of al-Qaeda-related terrorism plummeted in Iraq from the first quarter of 2007 to the end of the year, as a result not of the withdrawal of the armed forces of the international coalition but, on the contrary, of the implementation of a new counterinsurgency programme adopted by the US military commands, which furthermore entailed bolstering the contingent of soldiers deployed in the country. The decline in Jihadist violence in the country and the resulting weakening of the groups and organisations that practice it are also due in part to other important factors, such as the development of a movement against the Iraqi branch of al-Qaeda among the Sunni Arab population, on whom it was beginning to impose its strict conception of the Islamic creed in rules of public behaviour; the actions of the still largely incipient national security forces; and the involvement, sometimes as calculated as it is versatile, of the bordering countries in areas such as surveillance of cross-border movements and the containment of sectarian clashes.

Even so, the terrorist activities related to al-Qaeda continue to be recurrent in Iraq and, despite their recent considerable decline in frequency and intensity, do not look set to come to a halt in the short term. The groups and organisations that engage in this Jihadist terrorism still retain substantial operational capabilities in a security environment that continues to be highly delicate for the country as a whole, whose social fabric is hanging in shreds, which is unable to meet its population's basic necessities and has four millions of displaced people inside and outside Iraqi territory. But an eventual success of the insurgent strategy of the local agents of global terrorism, which is now less likely than it seemed in late 2006 and early 2007, would be conducive to spreading the phenomenon to other countries of the region whose regimes were and are the focus of attention of al-Qaeda, such as, for example, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, some of which are already suffering attacks committed by the Iraqi extension of the terrorist structure. But global terrorism's most ambitious plans have failed in these countries, although the incidents that continue to be staged in the Middle East and the Gulf attest to the extent of its networks in the region.

In Saudi Arabia, following the attacks perpetrated by al-Qaeda in the Arabian peninsula between 2003 and 2006, the country's authorities made numerous arrests which, so it seems, prevented subsequent bloody incidents and largely dismantled it. This may explain why its activities have shifted towards other neighbouring countries such as Yemen, where eight Spanish tourists died in July 2007 in a suicide attack for which responsibility was subsequently claimed by al-Qaeda's extension in that region. In Egypt, the problem of Jihadist terrorist likewise seems to be relatively in check as a result of the no less extraordinary security measures adopted, but although it is not a menace to the continuity of the current regime, nor can we rule out episodes like the extremely bloody Sinai bombings of 2004 and 2005 and even in the early months of 2006, directed chiefly against targets related to the tourist sector that is so essential to the country's economy.

Nor have the risks and threats of global terrorism related directly or indirectly to al-Qaeda ceased for other countries in the region like Jordan and Syria. And certainly not for Lebanon, where the military contingents deployed to the UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) mission will continue to be a favourite target of the groups that perpetrate such violence. It should be remembered that in June 2007, a car bomb attack on Spanish troops in the country killed six soldiers who were performing their duties as blue helmets. However, a cause for particular concern that

is closely linked to the country's situation is al-Qaeda's penetration or growing influence among predisposed sectors of the Palestinian population, as evidenced in 2007 by the incidents related to Fatah al-Islam in a refugee camp located to the north of Lebanon's disintegrated territory and earlier incidents involving a few other Jihadist groups aligned with Osama bin Laden and the global terrorist network of which he is charismatic leader. Whatever the case, given the multinational and multiethnic nature of this web, it would not be surprising if there were not only Palestinians but also Saudi Arabians, Syrians and Tunisians among the nearly two hundred armed members of Fatah al-Islam.

From Algeria to the North and East Africa

Until not long ago al-Qaeda had a few affiliated groups in the Maghreb and a certain number of networks and cells that were clearly under its influence. But since the beginning of 2007, it has had a regional extension for this part of North Africa, established from the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), formerly affiliated with al-Qaeda, whose initially Algerian agenda had become progressively internationalised until it coincided in practice with that of the global Jihad movement as a whole. After Ayman al-Zawahiri announced the merger of the GSPC with al-Qaeda on 11 September 2006, the leaders of the former decided at the onset of the following year to call themselves al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Qaida al-Yihad fi Bilad al Maghrib al-Islami), not without first obtaining the express authorisation of Osama bin Laden.

The change of name and gradual but visible conversion into the central body of a regional extension of al-Qaeda marks the culmination of a process that has led the GSPC from armed insurgency in the confines of Algeria for more than eight years to the adoption of a regional pan-Islamic agenda. Even so, prior to its merger with al-Qaeda, this progressive internationalisation observed in the GSPC's discourse had limited operational consequences, even though the group played an active part in mobilising human and material resources for the Iraqi extension of this terrorist structure. Until then, however, the attacks perpetrated by the Algerian armed organisation usually took place in its country of origin, with the stated aim of establishing a severe Islamist regime, and its most frequent targets were therefore state institutions and national security agencies.

Immediately after the GSPC's conversion into a regional extension of al-Qaeda for North Africa, it began to display changes in its modus

operandi. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) claimed responsibility for its first attack in February 2007, in this case the almost simultaneous explosion of seven vehicle bombs in two towns in eastern Algeria, killing eight people and wounding thirty. Shortly afterwards, in March, members of the aforementioned organisation carried out an attack on a bus belonging to a Russian energy company by exploding a roadside bomb that killed one Russian employee and three Algerians. A communiqué issued by AQIM and dated two days later referred to the organisation's target as «Russian infidels», going on to state that «we dedicate this modest conquest to our Muslim brothers in Chechnya, victims of the misfortunes, violence and killings of the criminal government of Putin with the support of the Russian people».

But the particular hallmark of al-Qaeda became even more evident in the serial suicide attacks perpetrated in Algiers on 11 April 2007 by its Maghreb extension. Three vehicles planted with explosive devices, driven by terrorists willing to lose their lives, exploded by the government building, the nearby Interpol headquarters and other police facilities in the east of the capital. The GSPC had not previously perpetrated a suicide attack, but did so only three months after changing its name to AQIM, killing 30 or so people and wounding some two hundred. Suicide bombings were not part of the usual repertoire of Islamist terrorism in this North African country. However, in a video broadcast on a Qatari television channel in May, AQIM's leader warned that these would no longer be isolated events: «we have decided to adopt the style of martyrdom operations in the confrontation with our enemies from now on». A further attack whose style and results were markedly characteristic of al-Qaeda was staged months later, on 11 December 2007.

We should therefore expect a long-drawn out though intermittent campaign of suicide bombings from AQIM, both in Algeria and possibly in other countries of the region, and even on European soil. The April 2007 blasts in Algiers were the most serious terrorist incident witnessed in that part of the world since the Casablanca bombings of May 2003. But a similar disaster would have struck that same Moroccan city, had an attempt not been thwarted to perpetrated a series of suicide bombings in port facilities and hotels, among other targets, possibly coinciding with the attacks in the neighbouring country. A day before the Algiers bombings, three Moroccan terrorists decided to detonate explosives worn strapped to their bodies following a police raid in Casablanca and a fourth was killed. They were linked to another who

had committed suicide following a skirmish in a neighbourhood internet café in order to avoid being arrested.

Suicide terrorism tends to cause numerous victims among bystanders, a fact which could be negatively influencing AQIM's public image and triggering a controversy among its population of reference. The organisation has been stressing, through proclamations disseminated over the internet, that Muslims are not their target: «know that your Mujahideen brothers are doing all they can to prevent the bloodshed of Muslims and are taking all precautions in their attacks», reads one dated April 2007. Nearly a month later, in an audiovisual recording, the emir of this extension of al-Qaeda gave instructions for preventing being caught in an attack: «Muslims should stay away from governmental offices and in particular those related to security [...] and should not mix with apostates and public authorities, staying away from places where foreigners are present, whether these be diplomats, businessmen or tourists».

Another video recorded by the emir of AQIM, Abu Musab Abdelwadud, in June 2007, stated that the organisation «was created to praise God's word and the Koranic state and to liberate the peoples of the Maghreb from the grip of corrupt leaders, tyrants and traitors, rebuilding society on the basis of justice, religion and morality, which will lead to a spiritual, geographical and political union, putting an end to division and differences». After listing its objectives for the whole of the Maghreb, it went on to state that «the unity of the Mujahideen of the Islamic Maghreb with those of the East beneath a single standard and a single emir constitutes an important historical initiative whereby the Mujahideen have achieved something of great strategic interest which the West fears, and its consequences can be determining factors with a view to the future combat between the West and Islam».

Therefore, the rhetoric of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb points to a plan of action that is primarily regional in scope, but set in the context of the strategy of the global Jihad led by al-Qaeda. This would imply, on the one hand, that it has its sights set on all the current North African regimes, whose leaders it criticises mercilessly, and on the other, that the societies of the Maghreb countries are its population of reference. However, in another communiqué, this one dated February 2007, the terrorist organisation defined what it calls its «true enemies» as «the alliance of evil of Jews, crusades and their slaves the apostates and those who aid them», drawing attention to the takfir-oriented and anti-Western aspects of its ideology. This latter facet holds implications for foreign citizens and

interests, particularly Americans and Europeans, around the Western Mediterranean.

Although al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb continues to focus its attacks on Algerian institutions, particularly law enforcement agencies and the army, the transformation of the GSPC into al-Qaeda's North African extension entails a greater threat of Jihadist violence for other targets in the same country of origin, the countries in the region as a whole and others located to its south or north—not only as the organisation led by Osama bin Laden's decision-making core acquires a more significant role in the development of the global Jihad around the Western Mediterranean, but also as the new pan-Maghreb organisation manages to absorb or amalgamate together neo-Salafist groups and networks that also operate in this environment.

It is quite possible that AQIM is attracting former members of other terrorist groups in the same geographic area that are smaller and less organisationally sound than the GSPC, but equally committed to the global Jihad movement. Before merging with al-Qaeda, the GSPC had encouraged the establishment of terrorist cells and networks throughout practically the whole of North Africa. In 2005 it had begun to indoctrinate and train both in and outside Algeria numerous individuals recruited from countries of the region and from Europe. Those who graduated from the training camps were subsequently sent to Iraq, joined cells belonging to the organisation in Algeria or returned to the places where they had been recruited. Various minor groups that were in contact with the GSPC or subsequent AQIM have been dismantled in Morocco and Tunisia since the end of 2006. The individuals of Algerian and Moroccan, Tunisian or Libyan origin arrested in Algeria in the past two years basically attest to the extremists' mobilisation potential in the region.

It is therefore more than plausible to think that al-Qaeda's new regional extension is bringing together around a central core consisting basically of what was once the GSPC, if not absorbing, existing Jihadist terrorist groups and networks in the region, many of which were previously linked to the Algerian armed organisation. This development would appear to be shaping a North African web of international terrorism that is particularly well equipped to prepare and execute attacks related to the global Jihad movement in general and to al-Qaeda in particular. It should not be forgotten that the level of terrorist threat in the area remains high and is unlikely to drop in the short and medium term, and will particularly affect

Algeria itself and Morocco, though the situation in other countries of the region should not be underestimated. It remains to be seen whether al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb will succeed in realising its potential as a actor of regional scope, although there are signs that this will be the case, including some recent arrests and terrorist activities observed in the region, which even led to the cancellation of the famous car rally that has been taking place for years and ends in the Senegalese capital Dakar.

Indeed, before becoming AQIM, the GSPC had managed to establish a significant presence in the Sahel strip from Mauritania to Niger, where it had a certain infrastructure for training in warfare and terrorism, although on a somewhat limited scale and with mobile facilities instead of permanent camps, but located in areas such as northern Mali, where the country's authorities' control over the territory is frankly precarious. It was also in contact with other armed groups of the region, local tribal entities and even arms trafficking networks. Lastly, the establishment of an extension in the Maghreb may be considered to have secured al-Qaeda much more explicit influence over the North African Jihadist networks as a whole that have been spreading across various European countries since the 1990s, especially but not exclusively in those located along the continent's West Mediterranean border.

In view of the foregoing, we cannot rule out the possibility that, while AQIM is taking shape as a terrorist threat that is regional in scope, extending its operational activities southwards, it will also engage in relations with Jihadist groups and organisations that operate in East African countries, particularly—but not only—in connection with the conflict affecting Somalia, with respect to which al-Qaeda's leadership has repeatedly appealed for the involvement of foreign combatants. A good number of the leaders of the Union of Islamic Courts, which had seized power until the Ethiopian armed forces and a so-called Somali transition government forced them to abandon Mogadishu in December 2006, had held command positions in Al-Itihaad al-Islami and therefore maintained ties with the central leadership of al-Qaeda.

Al-Qaeda found a relatively safe enclave for its own East African branch, presumably directed by an individual of Sudanese origin, amid the anarchy and chaos that grip Somalia, under the protection of the aforementioned Union of Islamic Courts. But the terrorist structure increased its presence at the end of 2006 by incorporating followers of Osama bin Laden from different countries with mainly Muslim populations

and even from the Somali diaspora based in a few European countries. They thus joined the components of Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen, the al-Qaeda-related group that is currently more active in the area—a fact which leads us to expect sustained terrorist activity there, albeit in principle less frequent and intense than in other conflict areas like Afghanistan and Iraq. At any rate, it is a global terrorism that is also located in Somalia and poses a threat to other nearby countries, including Kenya and Tanzania, which suffered attacks from al-Qaeda in summer 1998.

Al-Qaeda, global terrorism and Europe

The threat that international terrorism currently poses to the institutions and inhabitants of the European Union continues to stem directly, to a by no means insignificant extent, from al-Qaeda. However, altogether its affiliate groups and organisations, al-Qaeda-inspired local cells, and even variable combinations of these components of the current web of global terrorism may possibly be a greater menace. On the one hand, this may be deduced from the communiqués issued by Osama bin Laden since the mid 1990s, very particularly in November 2007 and March 2008, and from the much more numerous statements issued by Ayman al-Zawahiri. These messages contain a general threat to European societies as a whole, as they belong to the Western world and because their heads of government are portrayed by the leaders of the global Jihad as allies of the United States. But threats are often specific for a number of European countries and are declared for those expressly mentioned as targets.

These and other statements, such as those referring to the caricatures of Mahomet in the case of Denmark, may certainly stimulate the perpetration of attacks in European countries or against people or interests of those nationalities but located outside them, by al-Qaeda-linked groups and organisations or independent cells inspired by its ends and procedures. In this respect, al-Qaeda's leaders may be considered to be acting as instigators of terrorist acts against European institutions and populations by particular actors of the global Jihadist movement. First, by defining European society as a whole as a constituting part of the Western world, which is portrayed by al-Qaeda leaders as enemy of the Islamic nation. Secondly, by mentioning specific countries on the basis of their history, more recent events or having sent troops to conflict zones (such as Afghanistan, Iraq or Lebanon). In an assessment of terrorist risk this is equivalent to pointing out targets.

The threat that al-Qaeda continues to pose to European institutions and societies is not only indirect but also direct. That is, it relates to the involvement of its leaders and members in planning, facilitating or executing attacks on targets located in this geopolitical area or closely linked to it but beyond its outer borders. This was occurring even before 11 September—a fact that often tends to be forgotten—and has continued to occur since then, as evidenced by some of the incidents witnessed on European soil since that date. Everything indicates that al-Qaeda is still attempting to perpetrate a major terrorist attack, possibly catastrophic or even unconventional, in Europe, just as it has attempted and is attempting to do again in North America, although it is currently reckoned that the threat levels of al-Qaeda and its web of global terrorism are now comparatively somewhat higher in Europe than in the United States.

It is possible that al-Qaeda's current difficulties in perpetrating attacks directly in the European Union, with an involvement that goes beyond endorsing them or taking part in their planning, explain its possible collaboration with associated local or regional entities possessing an infrastructure and activists in the territory in question, as is the case of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and other South Asian networks that could be mobilised, particularly those related to the Pakistani neo-Taliban and other Jihadist entities based in the same area. This does not mean to say that the core organisation of global terrorism does not enjoy a presence in Europe, perhaps through a web of intermediaries or go-betweens that act as entrepreneurs or facilitators when it comes to staging specific operations. Al-Qaeda has become decentralised since the end of 2001 but there are signs that suggest it is becoming regionalised; indeed, its leaders' determination to establish territorial extensions is obvious, and we therefore cannot rule out this not also occurring in Europe. One of the reliable messages claiming responsibility for the 7 July 2005 attacks in London expressly mentions an al-Qaeda organisation for Jihad in Europe.

In Western Europe, the threat posed by al-Qaeda is particularly significant in the United Kingdom, where there is evidence that a worrying and even growing number of Jihadist individuals and networks maintain close ties with the decision-making core of the terrorist structure in South Asia, specifically Pakistan. Even the director general of the UK's security intelligence service known as MI5, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, revealed to a meeting of a small group of academics in London in November 2006 that her agency was aware of at least 30 plots to perpetrate attacks on British soil and that the most serious aspect of this

threat stemmed from «resilient networks, some directed from al-Qaeda in Pakistan, some more loosely inspired by it, planning attacks including mass casualty suicide attacks in the United Kingdom». However, the fact that al-Qaeda does not have the same ability to penetrate other European countries does not lower the threat to the continent as a whole.

The restructuring of the North African networks of Jihadist terrorism is heightening the risk for European citizens and interests not only in the Maghreb countries but also on their own soil. Over the past few years, cells linked to GSPC have been detected and dismantled in European countries and will now be linked to al-Qaeda's new North African extension. Individuals related to these networks have been arrested in Southern European countries like France, Spain and Italy since the beginning of 2007. It is appropriate to recall that in a video recording made by Abu Musab Abdel Wadud and dated May 2007, the emir of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb stated that: «we are going to step up our actions and broaden our geographical radius of action, and in order to confirm this promise, we have decided from now on to employ the method of suicide operations as a strategy». Lest there should be any doubt as to whom he was referring, he added in this same communiqué, as a warning to non-Muslim foreigners in North Africa, «be careful of your own peoples of origin, as they will be a target and will be persecuted».

In short, al-Qaeda, as the founding nucleus and permanent reference of the global Jihad movement as a whole, continues to pose a threat to European societies and polities. This terrorist threat is at times indirect and at times direct, but always real. Al-Qaeda can instigate the perpetration of attacks on European institutions and citizens by other individual agents or collective actors of Jihadist terrorism, particularly with its territorial extensions or related organisations that have succeeded in penetrating European societies. However, it is equally possible for it to be operationally involved in executing a large-scale terrorist attack, something that also appears to have happened. And it is likewise reasonable to expect that al-Qaeda may also combine its own capabilities with those of other local or regional components of its same global terrorist network in order to plan and perpetrate a particular incident or campaign of terrorist attacks in the European Union.

But the menace of al-Qaeda and global terrorism does not affect the various European countries equally, just as neither the groups and organisations associated with that terrorist structure nor the independent cells inspired by its ideology pose a uniform threat. If terrorism linked

directly to al-Qaeda is currently more of a concern in the United Kingdom than in any other EU country, this does not mean to say that the threat posed by that terrorist structure to the European Union as a whole is at all insignificant. In 2007 alone, plans to commit attacks were thwarted in the United Kingdom, where one nonetheless occurred in the Scottish city of Glasgow, Germany and Denmark. But many West European nations have vast communities of first-generation immigrants from largely Muslim countries or their descendents, which are undergoing Jihadist radicalisation processes and can give rise to self-constituted local cells or collaborate with terrorists from abroad.

The type of terrorist incidents in whose planning or execution al-Qaeda can be most plausibly expected to be involved in some way and may occur in any European country in the short or medium term ranges predictably from multiple attacks against relatively unprotected targets using explosive devices that are fairly quick and uncomplicated to prepare but can cause a large number of deaths to unconventional attacks, not to mention highly spectacular and even catastrophic attacks at targets with tight security measures but of great symbolic importance. Al-Qaeda will carry on attempting to lay its hands on chemical and radiological elements and the risk of these being used in terrorist attacks within the European Union, although statistically unlikely, is not insignificant and is growing over time. However, it is more plausible to think that the targets of the next attack perpetrated in the Europe would be commercial aviation or public transportation in general, not to mention critical infrastructures, places that draw large crowds and public buildings.

In this sense, Spain currently seems more of an al-Qaeda target even than before the Madrid bombings of 11 March 2004, to judge by the direct and indirect mentions of our nation as a target of the global terrorism waged by Osama bin Laden and, above all, Ayman al-Zawahiri. It is likely that Spain is more of a target for international terrorism than it has ever been, and the related indicators suggest that this is by no means a short-lived situation, although these risks and threats are shared with some other neighbouring European countries. Ayman al-Zawahiri's repeated mentions of the violent reconquest of al-Andalus as part of a new pan-Islamic caliphate, extending his rhetoric to the discourse of al-Qaeda's new Maghreb extension, amounts to us becoming a quasi-permanent target of the individual and collective actors belonging to the multinational networks of the global Jihad as a whole.

Spain, together with Portugal, is the only European Union territory where, owing to its historical past of Muslim domination and the inherent timelessness of neo-Salafist thought, an appeal can be made to defensive Jihad, which is always more easily accepted as an individual duty by the most radical Islamists and not just to offensive Jihad, which would apply to Europe as a whole but is not considered by neosalafist fanatics an individual religious duty. This in itself obliges us to rethink the menace that international terrorism currently poses to our country and entails more precise indications, such as the presence of Spanish soldiers in Muslim territories, regardless of the nature of their mission, and the definition of Ceuta and Melilla as a conflict zone. What is more, the threat that current international terrorism poses to Spanish citizens and interests especially in, but also outside, the country, has increased as a result of the aforementioned restructuring of the North African networks belonging to the global Jihadist movement and the possible synergy that the emergence of AQIM affords this web as a whole.

It should not be forgotten that since the 11 March 2004 attacks in Madrid, which killed 191 people and wounded well over 1,500, and the suicide bombing in Leganés, which caused another death, over 300 suspects of Jihadist terrorism-related crimes have been arrested in Spain, most of them first-generation male immigrants aged between twenty and forty and hailing chiefly, though not only, from countries like Morocco and Algeria. And the fact the large number of Algerians among the people arrested and convicted in Spain in connection with crimes related to Jihadist terrorism is disproportionate to the percentage of immigrants of this nationality living in Spain is significant, as they come from the country where the GSPC emerged and, following the transformation of the latter, AQIM has its operational base. But the menace has also heightened as a result of the penetration of groups and organisations sharing this same ideology among the Pakistani diaspora which, in Spain, is concentrated mainly in Catalonia, although there are significant groups in a few other regions.

These and other circumstances could have consequences for national security in the short, medium and long term, by bringing about changes in the modus operandi of possible future acts of international terrorism; indeed, the perpetration of suicide bombings or attacks on highly symbolic targets equipped with considerable security measures is now a more plausible reality than it was two or three years ago. This does not mean that we should dismiss the possibility of unforeseeable operations

conducted by self-constituted independent cells, whose repertory of actions could range from individual killings to the use of makeshift explosive devices against unprotected targets. But the danger of attacks of this kind related to al-Qaeda or any other component of the current web of global terrorism exists for Spain and for other neighbouring West European countries, where it is associated both with endogenous factors—that is, violent radicalisation of Muslim communities living there—and exogenous factors, specifically the evolution of global terrorism in countries with mainly Muslim populations.

CONCLUSION

Al-Qaeda continues to exist. It has compensated for its reduction in size by disseminating propaganda, but it is not merely an ideology. It has compensated for its fragmentation by establishing territorial extensions and closer ties with similar groups and organisations, but it has not dissolved into the diversified global Jihadist movement. It has compensated for its operational restrictions by contributing to the activities of these other collective actors who nowadays perpetrate the vast majority of attacks attributable to global terrorism, but has a new haven and renewed capabilities. Of course, we should not underestimate the challenge of apparently independent small local groups and cells, particularly in Western societies, but we should not take this part to be the whole or forget that al-Qaeda has not ceased to exist and that most of the attacks related directly or indirectly to this terrorist structure are nowadays the work of its territorial extensions or of groups and organisations related to it.

The risks and threats of current global terrorism are usually associated with highly lethal attacks perpetrated by suicide bombers which can seriously disrupt political life or the social order. Certainly, this has been the preferred, though not the only, type of terrorist attack executed in Western countries since 11 September 2001. And we may be sure that al-Qaeda will carry on attempting to stage new, highly spectacular attacks. However, the frequency of this terrorism related directly or indirectly to al-Qaeda is very low in those countries. Nonetheless, attacks of this kind that have taken place and whose repetition is feared, not without grounds, are also perpetrated in countries with mainly Muslim populations, against both foreign and local targets. The difference is that, in the latter contexts, they are combined with incidents that are fairly more conventional as to modus

operandi and are less lethal with respect to victimisation patterns, but occur much more frequently.

There are particular scenarios, such as Afghanistan and, by extension, the neighbouring Pakistan in Southern Asia, and Iraq in the Middle East, where terrorist activity linked to al-Qaeda and its transnationalised network is very frequent and intense. These environments also coincide with the ideological, organisational and operational epicentres of global terrorism, although the axis of gravity has shifted to the former. In a few other parts of the Islamic world attacks associated with this phenomenon are becoming less frequent, though their intensity ranges from medium to increasingly high, such as the case of Algeria in North Africa. In Western societies Jihadist terrorism is episodic, but generally highly lethal. It is in these societies where the possibility of unconventional attacks involving the use of chemical or radiological components is particularly plausible, although the statistical probability of this happening remains very low.

The risks and threats that global terrorism poses to the Western nations as a whole is very closely linked to its evolution outside these countries, in the Islamic world as a whole and particularly in the so-called conflict zones. In addition to the inherent danger of local cells or self-constituted networks emerging in Western societies, the threats that al-Qaeda-related terrorism poses to open societies and liberal democracies continue to originate largely from the geographical scenario constituted by Afghanistan and Pakistan on the one hand, and Iraq on the other, though we should not play down the importance of other nearer environments that are interconnected with these main ones. The tribal areas of Pakistan adjacent to Afghan territory are currently the most important safe haven, not only of al-Qaeda, but of the web of global terrorism. Future developments in the Iraqi conflict may likewise produce a surplus of militants potentially able to move to other theatres, including Europe and, therefore, Spain. What is more, in these latter two cases an assessment of risks and threats requires examining both the processes of radicalisation and recruitment within the Muslim communities themselves and the development of the global Jihad in North African countries.

CHAPTER TWO

THE MIDDLE EAST PUZZLE: SCENARIOS AND RESPONSES

THE MIDDLE EAST PUZZLE: SCENARIOS AND RESPONSES

IGNACIO FUENTE COBO

INTRODUCTION

The Middle East continued to be the world's most conflictive, most volatile and probably most dangerous region in 2007. It may be said that many things have happened in the region during the year. Latent and actual armed conflicts, terrorist actions, political instability, regional struggles and the geopolitical game played by the powers have continued to cast a dark shadow over developments in the region.

During the year, we witnessed an intense debate in international organisations such as NATO and the United Nations on the situation in Afghanistan after seven years of war and on the extent of the international community's commitment to this tormented country. All this took place at a time when extremist violence appeared to wreak havoc among the population, placing previous years' stabilisation efforts at risk. Iraq saw the famous «surge», a temporary increase in US troop strength, regarded as the United States' last strategy for putting an end to sectarian violence and facilitating a staggered withdrawal of its troops. Its apparent success is opening up prospects of new scenarios of action, including the possibility of maintaining US military presence beyond the stabilisation period.

Iran is carrying on its dangerous «cat and mouse» game with the international community in connection with its nuclear programme, and the true intentions of the ayatollahs' regime remain unclear; its president, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, has continued to show himself to be extraordinarily combative in his wishes to destroy the state of Israel. The so-called New Intelligence Estimate presented by 16 US intelligence agencies in December, stating that Iran would have halted its nuclear

programme in 2003 and would not have resumed it since then, has raised new questions about the strategy to be followed.

As for Syria, the events of 2007 indicate that this country remains one of the key pieces in the Middle East puzzle, especially as regards stability in Lebanon and the Palestinian peace process. Its active participation in the designation of the new Lebanese president and its agreement to take part in the peace process begun at Annapolis make it worthwhile to analyse at length to what extent Syria is willing to return to the Lebanon it abandoned in 2005 and to achieve stable peace with its Israeli neighbours.

Lastly, in Palestine, two events of far-reaching significance that occurred during the year have altered the geopolitics of the conflict. The first was the seizure of power in Gaza by the radical group Hamas following the battle in June 2007, which divided the territory hitherto controlled by the Palestinian National Authority into two: the Gaza strip, now controlled by Hamas, and the West Bank, which the Palestinian National Authority continues to govern. The other event was the peace conference held in the US city of Annapolis on 27 November 2007, during which the Israeli prime minister, Ehud Olmert, and the rais of the Palestinian National Authority, Mahmud Abbas, undertook to address all the issues over which they are divided in a roadmap designed to end with a permanent agreement by the end of 2008.

This chapter basically sets out to provide an overview, from a Spanish perspective, of the current situation and possible developments of the various conflicts and most significant crisis situations identified in the vast geographical region that stretches from Beirut to Kabul and encompasses Tel Aviv, Damascus and Baghdad. It likewise analyses the efforts of the international community and regional actors to mediate in, or contribute to settling, the various crises, from diplomats to the different military interventions (UNIFIL, ISAF, etc). In view of the current situation, we should ask ourselves what options and what perspectives may be envisioned in the different scenarios. Particular attention will be given to studying the role of the armed forces, bearing in mind that the military component is but a part of the common effort.

IS VICTORY IN AFGHANISTAN POSSIBLE?

In Resolution 1368 (2001) stemming from the terrorist attacks of 11 September, the UN Security Council expressed its readiness to «take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks [of 11 September 2001],

and to combat all forms of terrorism». This resolution afforded the necessary legitimacy to the US intervention in Afghanistan. In the early stages, under the multinational operation called Enduring Freedom (OEF), the United States, with the help of a coalition of tribes dubbed the «Northern Alliance», achieved major successes including the toppling of the Taliban regime of Mullah Omar, the military occupation of the country and the establishment of a provisional government in Kabul. Since then the situation has progressively deteriorated, and became particularly worrying in 2007, when violence spread across the entire country. In this connection, it may be stated that the international military operations have not been as successful as expected in their chief goal of guaranteeing the security of the population in order to create an environment conducive to the exercise of the essential functions of a state and to economic development. Although Afghanistan currently has a theoretically representative government, the Afghan population has not yet experienced many of the economic and social advantages derived from what has been termed a stabilisation period. The Afghan ambassador to Washington, Said Jawad, summed up the situation perfectly in August when he stated that "It was state-building on the cheap, it was a duct tape approach. It was fixing things that were broken, not a strategic approach». (1)

It should be borne in mind that, with a view to preventing a power vacuum during the interim period, UN Security Council Resolution 1386, which was unanimously approved, lent legitimacy to the efforts to deploy a multinational peace force to provide Kabul with protection. Pursuant to the previous resolution and to the subsequent 1413 and 1444, the United Nations called on NATO to assume command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to be deployed in support of the Afghan Transitional Administration. In August 2003, the Atlantic Alliance thus assumed command of ISAF, which was initially limited to Kabul and the surrounding area, although in October that same year the UN Security Council gave authorisation for it to be extended progressively to the rest of the country. After three earlier stages in which NATO expanded across the north, west and south of the country, NATO has been responsible for the whole Afghan territory since October 2006, when the fourth period of eastward expansion began.

It may be said that ISAF, as a military tool for developing NATO's operational strategy in Afghanistan, is designed to assist the Afghan

(1) See *Afganistán sufre el año más violento desde la guerra*. EL PAIS, 26 December 2007.

government by creating the necessary security environment for it to perform its action throughout the country. For this purpose it has involved itself in two fairly generic areas of action that the Alliance considers complementary: stability and security. For the first, NATO retrieved from the old manuals dating from the period of the European empires a strategy aimed at territorial control from the moment it began to deploy across Afghan territory its Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) which, resembling the old colonial forts, were designed to act as catalysts in repairing both civil society and the government institutions. The underlying idea behind these PRTs is very simple: local cooperation with NATO forces and, accordingly, with the central government, along with major economic investments in order to improve the population's standard of living and foster prosperity.

To complement this effort, the capability of the military forces deployed as part of these teams was to be variable but always suited to countering the risks associated with the mission, which were initially termed—using one of those euphemisms of which NATO is so fond—Opposing Militant Forces (OMFs). The latter were chiefly comprised of Taliban elements and members of terrorist groups that supported al-Qaeda, which would be the main threat to the completion of the so-called process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). «Warlords», members of criminal organisations and drug traffickers were, however, left out, provided they did not oppose ISAF's stabilising efforts.

However, if we were to make a provisional assessment of the international intervention, we would find very uneven results. On the political plane, the so-called «Bonn process» has achieved certain successes in expanding the government action to the whole country, security-sector reforms, training and equipping the Afghan National Army and national police with skills, (2) reforms in the field of justice and in combating drug trafficking. In these fields international involvement has been implemented through leading nations in each of the aforementioned areas (G-8 countries), or, more visibly, through the deployment of the enlarged and reinforced ISAF.

However, in the field of security and in the military aspects of the stabilisation process, the assessment is less positive. First, the conflict was

(2) So far 35,000 soldiers and officers have been trained, half the number envisaged. The aim is to train 70,000 by 2010. As for bolstering the Afghan security forces—one of the current priorities—it is being attempted to increase the national police force from 62,000 to 82,000 officers.

initially addressed as the antithesis to the traditional concept of war. In Afghanistan it was decided from the outset, following the so-called «Rumsfeld military doctrine», to conduct a «minimalist» military activity that is now requiring a growing stabilisation effort. The initial lack of a sufficient number of soldiers ruined the possibilities of a resounding victory and prevented the capture of the main rebel leaders, including Bin Laden. A very high price is currently being paid for this serious error in the strategic approach and operational design. Whereas in 2002 only 4,000 or so US soldiers were searching for Bin Laden in the Tora Bora mountains, by 2007 there were over 26,000, 15,000 of them under the umbrella of ISAF—a much greater percentage increase than in Iraq. Likewise, while ISAF initially had only 8,000 men when it began to deploy in Kabul in 2003, by the beginning of 2008 it consisted of 43,000 troops from 39 countries, five times more in scarcely four years (3). All in all, the number of Western forces has multiplied by more than nine since the start of the invasion, yet this increase has failed to bring about a substantial improvement in the security situation.

One of the main causes of this situation is determined by the co-existence in Afghanistan of two opposing strategies: one favoured by ISAF, under the NATO mandate and consisting mainly of European soldiers; and the American strategy of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Accordingly, whereas ISAF has focused on security and reconstruction missions in support of the Kabul central authority, OEF has centred on counterinsurgency and antiterrorist tasks in order to destroy al-Qaeda's network and prevent the resurgence of terrorism, garnering support from the «warlords», many of whom oppose the Kabul government.

The past few years have seen a worrying disparity in the strategic objectives of the two missions and in the definition of the nature and manner of combating the enemy. Whereas the enemy was initially the Taliban and al-Qaeda elements, these have gradually been joined by a group of «local warlords» who are becoming progressively disillusioned with their cooperation in combating terrorism in the framework of OEF, although this cooperation—given the insufficient number of US soldiers deployed—was considered essential by the military authorities. The policy of subcontracting labour-intensive tasks from the warlords in charge of powerful militia to maintain order in large parts of the country and prevent

(3) Of the 43,000 soldiers, over one-third are North American, and together those from United States, the United Kingdom and Canada account for over half. The other half is composed of troops from 37 nations.

the Taliban from returning has turned out to have unforeseen consequences that are counterproductive to stabilisation.

The first—and probably unintentional—consequence of this policy is the conversion of Afghanistan into an amalgam of more or less autonomous provinces whose loyalty towards the central government is constantly questioned owing to the precarious territorial balance of power and the benefits it yields the local chiefs. Cooperation with the Coalition authorities is becoming increasingly less efficient, more risky and less profitable for the tribal chiefs than supporting the reconstituted Taliban forces. Tactical errors such as the controversial «collateral damage» inflicted by the military actions of the international forces have contributed to undermining the population's confidence in its own authorities and in the security the international forces provide them. At the same time, in accordance with a premeditated division of the military tasks, the European ISAF forces deployed in Afghanistan are finding it increasingly difficult to engage in the least risky tasks and those that meet with the greatest acceptance of the Afghan public, namely reconstruction in the «pacified» areas of the country, beginning with the capital.

Furthermore, what we might call the «Iraq effect» has begun to be perceived in Afghanistan during 2007. The terrorist groups are starting to use more and more suicide terrorists against the army and police and also against NATO military personnel—a development which recalls the tactics used by the Sunni extremists associated with al-Qaeda in Iraq in recent years. Whereas in 2006 kamikazes with little training would blow themselves up before getting near their targets—killing or injuring more civilians than Afghan soldiers or members of the international forces—since June 2007 the suicide bombers have proven to be more effective, and now rarely miss their targets.

Similarly, the Taliban are displaying greater skills in the art of conventional warfare. They are increasingly capable of organising large military formations and of controlling vast territories for long periods. The southern province of Helmand has become the centre of gravity of the fundamentalist initiative and has seen a 60-per cent increase in attacks against the allied forces in 2007. Their methods have also improved considerably in the tactical field. The most recent battles, such as that of Musa Qala lasting from 7 to 12 December, (4) attest to their progress in beating methodical retreats with

(4) See *Afganistán, Victoire en trope-l'oeil pour les Alliés*. COURIER INTERNATIONAL 20 Décembre 2006.

very few losses and in dispersal without leaving any traces. Unlike in previous years, in 2007 the Islamist combatants appear to have adopted a coherent strategy consisting of avoiding becoming involved in defensive battles likely to cause them a large number of losses. If they are incapable of retaining a territory, they prefer to retreat and disperse and wait until the circumstances are favourable before engaging in combat.

An added problem of this complex scenario is the worrying and lucrative drug trade on which the local warlords and the population itself have progressively focused their attention. In recent years, opium growing has gradually spread from province to province, with spectacular increases in both the production and extension of these crops. It is currently estimated that over 30 per cent of Afghan farmers grow opium poppies and that these crops increased by 60 per cent in 2006. If the province of Helmand alone—precisely one of the Taliban's strongholds—could be considered the second largest opium producer in the world, the rest of the country would be the largest. Despite this scenario and the fact that numerous reports issued by the NATO authorities and international observers have pointed out the risks of accepting that Afghanistan has become the producer of 93 per cent of the world's heroin, the allied nations have preferred to avoid committing themselves to any kind of antinarcotics operations in 2007, on the understanding that such a responsibility would entail unacceptable levels of risks for their troops and should therefore fall to the ineffective Afghan government. (5)

But the problem of drugs lies not only in its social and political impact on the Western consumer countries (6)—precisely the same ones that contribute their forces to ISAF—but also in its direct operational impact on the ground, as it is the Taliban guerrilla's chief source of financing. While in 2006 opium cultivation brought estimated profits of over two billion euros, approximately 600 million went to the producers and a part that is difficult to estimate but significant in any case ended up in the hands of the Taliban. It is therefore not surprising that the radical Islamists have become firm supporters of opium production—a turnaround in the policy of eradication they pursued during their years in government.

This has given rise to a vicious circle in which the more drug is grown, the more money goes to the Taliban guerrilla to buy more and better arms,

(5) See 2007, *El año más sangriento para Afganistán*. ABC 17 December 2007.

(6) See Sophie Hohmann, *Le Narcotráfico en Asie Centrale: enjeux géopolitiques et répercussions sociales*. La Revue Internationale et Stratégique no. 64. Hiver 2006/2007.

as a result of which the insurgency becomes more active and dangerous. But in addition, in the current situation any plans to eradicate these crops without offering the producers real alternatives would only increase their sympathies towards the Taliban. It is therefore not surprising that in February, President Karzi's government should have opposed fumigating the crops, given the intense popular opposition such a measure could have triggered.

In order to overcome this situation of growing insecurity and put an end to the paradox of divergent strategic objectives, the Alliance's authorities appear to have reached the conclusion that it is essential to modify their strategy by gradually integrating the ISAF and Enduring Freedom (OEF) in order to achieve greater effectiveness and synergy. Although, military wise, it makes fairly good sense to completely unify the two operations, this has nonetheless so far been limited to greater coordination and convergence through the establishment of a common chain of command, which is an excessively prudent although politically more acceptable solution. Responsibility for antiterrorism continues to fall to the US authorities of OEF, though ISAF forces could be involved in actions of this kind, which are now called «robust security and stabilisation missions». It is thus recognised that the distinction between antiterrorist missions and stabilisation missions is irrelevant now that the expansion of the insurgency has converted all the forces deployed in Afghanistan, whether ISAF or OEF, into its targets.

And so, despite the many objections raised by the nations (the famous caveats) regarding why, where, when and how to use their own national forces and the allies' misgivings about providing the additional capabilities required to reinforce the expansion of the operation, in 2007 the allied authorities have made major improvements in unifying their command structures and accepting sufficiently permissive combat rules as to successively address the increased risks. At the same time, in 2007 ISAF's mission has been slightly reinforced and greater importance attached to stabilisation aspects aimed at facilitating the action of the Afghan government throughout the whole country. In this connection, various initiatives have been set in motion designed to instruct and equip the Afghan army and police in order to enhance their capabilities and afford them greater autonomy in conducting their territorial control missions.

Despite these organisational improvements, very little headway has been made in significantly increasing military assets and unifying missions, given that most European governments with troops in the country are

reluctant to boost their contribution and are limiting their contingents' sorties from their bases as much as possible in order to minimise the unpopular possibility of fresh victims. In Afghanistan only five members are prepared for combat: the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Denmark and Holland, along with Australia, which does not belong to the Alliance. This entails an uneven distribution of risks and a different lack of will that is endangering the success of the mission.

Basically, it may be said that the combination of a weak government with serious errors in the planning of strategic objectives, an obvious unwillingness to intervene in the problematic field of combating drug trafficking and a paltry reconstruction effort has caused the security vacuum to expand during 2007, preventing economic development, hindering crop diversification and fostering the spread of the insurgency. (7) Indeed, the authority and legitimacy of President Hamid Karzai's government do not extend much further than the boundaries of Kabul.

This deterioration in the situation is further exacerbated by the establishment of Taliban safe bases in the tribal areas of Pakistan and in the province of Baluchistan. The leaders of al-Qaeda and other Afghan Islamist groups have taken advantage of the Americans' inability to operate militarily in these border areas and the connivance of Islamabad to re-establish much of the logistical base it possessed in Afghanistan, enlisting the support of local Pashtun tribes. Pakistan has become not only a rear-guard area from which to operate in Afghanistan, but also the scene of a new regional war. While Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf, who is being increasingly questioned, is at loggerheads with the country's legal and judicial system, the opposition politicians, the independent media and civil society in general, an Islamic emirate directed by Afghan and Pakistani Taliban is taking root in the tribal areas and is gaining more and more ground, (8) becoming a threat both to Afghanistan and to Pakistan's own internal stability. The assassination of Benazir Bhutto on 27 December 2007 has heightened the risk of the Afghan conflict eventually extending to Pakistan on account of the current instability. The danger—which could be aggravated in the event of American or allied intervention in the country—is that Pakistan could end up being converted into one or

(7) Terrorist actions such as the attack of 6 November that killed 70 people, among them 59 schoolchildren, in the province of Baghlan in north Afghanistan are examples of this increase in violence.

(8) See Barnett R. Rubin. *Afghanistan at Dangerous 'Tipping Point'*. www.cfr.org/publication/11620/rubin.html?breadcrumb=%2Fbios%2F115%2Fdr_barnett_r_rubin.

several failed states with the consequent menace to the international community: lack of control over its nuclear arsenal. (9)

Defining how to change the adverse equation Afghanistan has become is the main challenge the international community and forces will face over the next few years and will require national governments and public opinion to come to terms with the need for the Alliance forces to be deployed in this difficult, remote and dangerous territory for a long time. Even so, it is an exaggeration to think that Afghanistan is irremediably lost. Very significant progress has been made in 2007 in developing and stabilising the country. There are currently more than five million children who attend school regularly; vast areas are now mine free and can be used for productive development; the press is relatively free; and roads, particularly in the north, have reached a semi-European standard.

But some important successes have also been achieved in the military field. The battle of Musa Qala in the southern province of Helmand in December ended in a clear victory for the international forces and their Afghan allies, boosting their combat morale and proving that the insurgents can be defeated by military means. The Taliban have been expelled from a large part of the south of the country—something that seemed impossible only a few months ago. The events of recent months likewise seem to bear out the fact that, although the loose-knit organisation al-Qaeda has sufficient volunteers to commit suicide attacks, it is nonetheless finding it increasingly difficult to recruit international combatants willing to engage in traditional combat, especially since the death in May of Mullah Dadullah, its commander in chief. Indeed, most of the people taken prisoner or killed during the military offensives of 2007 are Afghan or Pakistani Pashtuns, many of them recruited in the tribal areas of the north of Waziristan, a region located to the west of Pakistan. These partial successes are reflected in the opinion polls that indicate that in 32 of the 34 Afghan provinces over 80 per cent of the population is optimistic about the future. (10)

It may be said that there is much at stake in Afghanistan at a time when the Alliance has already crossed its «Rubicon» and the commitments undertaken by the nations are preventing them turning back lest this be

(9) This possibility has been conveyed to the news agency United Press by the father of modern Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, considered one of the most influential political leaders in Asia.

(10) See Khaled Hossein, *Don't Give up on Afghanistan*. *Newsweek*, 17 December 2007.

interpreted as defeat. Over 6,000 people, including 225 soldiers belonging to ISAF, (11) were killed in Afghanistan in 2007, the bloodiest year since the war began. This increase in violence, which has now spread from the south and east of the country to the north and west, necessarily requires an integrated and realistic approach to priorities, a better definition of the level of the international community's ambition in Afghanistan and recognition that the solution cannot be exclusively military. For this purpose it would be advisable to retrieve old skills and practices that were so in vogue and so effective in the colonial period, based on a better knowledge and understanding of the country's realities—including its traditional tribal structures—greater capacity for negotiation with all the actors, including the Taliban elements, and greater integration of military, diplomatic, economic and political efforts.

As the EU representative in Kabul, Spaniard Francesc Vendrell, pointed out, «So far we knew there were various Pashtun tribes. But as we believed that the situation would eventually become normalised, we did not think it necessary to understand the tribal system». Achieving this will require risky decisions to be made on fresh deployments of international forces (12) in order to bring them up to the «required level», to quote the Secretary General of the Atlantic Alliance, in a mission that will involve increasingly less reconstruction and peacekeeping and more classical counterinsurgency and peace imposition. Basically, as Admiral Terán Elices pointed out in last year's edition of the *Strategic Panorama*, (13) only a bold strategy based on an «integrated approach» that coordinates, harmonises and integrates the various civilian and military instruments of both national and international power will be able to prevent Afghanistan being doomed to becoming a new Iraq, albeit more remote, more tricky and more dangerous.

NEW SANCTIONS FOR IRAN?

The report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) submitted to the United Nations Security Council at the end of November by its

(11) The Spanish contingent deployed to the west of Afghanistan in the Herat area has suffered 23 losses, including four soldiers, in 2007.

(12) The most immediate necessities appear to be limited to sending three infantry battalions, 20 helicopters and 3,500 military instructors.

(13) See José María Terán Elices, *The transformation of security and defence structures vis-à-vis the new strategic landscape*. STRATEGIC PANORAMA 2006/2007. Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos.

director general, Egyptian Mohamed El Baradei, on Iran's controversial nuclear programme confirmed that Iran now has 3,000 uranium-enrichment centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear power plant. If its enrichment capacity continues to grow at this pace, Iran could be capable of producing an atomic bomb in little more than a year. After complaining that Iran's cooperation had been «reactive rather than proactive», the report went on to conclude that the Agency «is not in a position to provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran», since the country continues to deny the inspectors access to installations other than those it officially recognises. (14)

This is not the first time that the Security Council confirmed that the Iranian authorities were continuing to fail to comply with the international mandate requiring them to submit to international supervision their uranium-enrichment programme, which was suspected of possibly being used to build nuclear weapons. Resolution 1737, adopted in December 2006, ordered all member states to abstain from the «supply, sale or transfer [...] of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related [...] activities or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems». Subsequently, in March 2007, the Council, in an attempt to nip the Iranian nuclear and missile problem in the bud, adopted resolution 1747 prohibiting relations with the state bank Sepah and with a further 28 organisations linked to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, which is regarded as the main source of support of the ayatollahs' regime.

And so, up until the end of 2007, Europeans and Americans have presented jointly and obtained the approval of two rounds of sanctions at the Security Council pursuant to chapter VII of the UN Charter and article 41 of the latter. This may be considered a success bearing in mind that Russia and China, two permanent council members, maintain close trade relations with Iran and that their view of the Iranian issue differs substantially from that of the West. The fact that both Europeans and Americans have expressed their willingness to approve new rounds of sanctions at the Security Council, as long as Iran continues to provide "partial answers" about its nuclear programme, indicates that sanctions

(14) IAEA. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran. 23 November 2007. /www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-58.pdf

have become the key element that partners both sides of the Atlantic regard as the only concerted, effective and credible strategy with respect to Iran. The idea is to secure a similar achievement with Iran as with North Korea when it agreed to cancel its nuclear weapons programme after the United States froze Korean current accounts with American banks and blacklisted Asian banks such as Delta Asia, which held in deposit funds belonging to North Korean political and military leaders.

Nonetheless, the case of Iran is not as simple. Sanctions basically pose two problems: the first is the practical application of new sanctions truly capable of forcing the Iranian authorities to comply with the international mandate. The ease with which the Iranian regime has paid no heed to the sanctions imposed so far indicates that something similar may happen in future, at least as long as the current president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad continues in power and retains the support of the revolution leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Indeed, the replacement of the Iranian negotiator Ali Lariyani, considered a moderate, by Saeed Jalili who is much more radical and closer to the belligerent tendencies of the current president, would appear to bear this out. What is more, with the price of oil at nearly 100 dollars per barrel, the Iranian government will always find an easy way round the sanctions, as occurred in the past during the years of the «oil for food» programme.

A second problem that is difficult to solve when it comes to imposing sanctions is the need to secure the international community's consent. Although some European leaders have repeatedly stated that economic sanctions are a fundamental element of the efforts to ensure that Teheran halts the construction of nuclear installations capable of enriching uranium, few doubt the existence of certain «red lines» as to international will. The European Union with its 27 states is Iran's biggest trading partner (Iran conducted 27.8 per cent of its trade with the EU in 2006), while Russia has recently signed very important trade agreements with Iran, such as to build the first nuclear plant at Buser. As for China, the sanctions have not prevented the countries signing new gas and oil supply agreements.

It may therefore be said that the economic reality limits the precise scope of any new sanctions. The contradictory statements issued in this

(15) Whereas France's President Sarkozy considers it necessary to impose additional sanctions «even without the support of Russia and China», Germany's Chancellor Merkel is more in favour of using «diplomatic methods».

connection by a few European leaders (16) reflect the widespread scepticism in Europe as to the United States' intentions and opposition to initiating actions that could cause the crisis to escalate. To this should be added the sensibilities of Russia and China, which are reluctant to adopt what they see as a policy that springs from «America's unilateral vision», preferring to confine the crisis to the diplomatic field. (16) Indeed, these two countries are the most belligerent, albeit for different reasons, in their opposition to fresh sanctions. Russia would have found in the Iranian crisis a good reason for extending to the energy field its current dispute with the United States in areas such as missile defence and Kosovo. For its part China, whose economy needs Iranian resources in order to ensure its development, would be totally against a progressive process of sanctions that could lead to economic chaos in the sensitive Middle East region. (17) In fact it is the country that has most firmly opposed the possibility of imposing a complete prohibition or simply restrictions on Iran's petrol imports, which are precisely the true bottleneck of the Iranian economy.

It is interesting how Iran, the world's biggest oil producer, needs to import petrol and derivatives owing to the disastrous state of its refineries. It is therefore no exaggeration to state that any import-restricting action affecting this critical point in Iran's productive system would choke its economy and have a direct and immediate impact on its political authorities. The problem is that this impact would also be felt by the Iranian population, whom the international community attempts to spare the more perverse effects of the regime of sanctions. It is therefore doubtful that sufficient consensus could be reached on this point.

To the difficulty of reaching consensus should be added the reaction triggered by the US New Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of November 2007, (18) which concludes «with high confidence» that Iran halted its nuclear programme in 2003 when it was made public, and has not resumed it since then. At the same time, the report estimates that the earliest date Iran could build a nuclear weapon would by no means be the end of 2009, though it recognises that such a possibility «is very remote». The report, which brings together the conclusions drawn by 16 US intelligence agencies, has stormed in like a bull in a china shop amid a presidential campaign in which the

(16) See TIME magazine, 26 November 2006.

(17) In December the Chinese oil company SINOPEC, the second largest in the country, signed a two billion-dollar contract with the Iranians to exploit the Yadavaran oilfield located in the province of Khuzestan, with estimated reserves of some 18.3 billion barrels.

(18) See NIE *Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities*. www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf en

possibility of launching a preventive attack on Iran before it manages to gain nuclear weapons is being debated. By vastly diminishing the possible Iranian nuclear threat, the intelligence services have dealt a harsh blow to those who advocated destroying Iran's nuclear installations using military means. At the same time, it has strengthened the position of those in favour of sanctions, as it would appear to indicate that their deterrent effect has been successful.

In the opinion of the report's authors, President Ahmadinejad, «guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than by a rush to a weapon», is using the nuclear crisis to strengthen his voter base, which is especially important given the poor results in the local elections held in 2006. At the same time, he is probably seeking to counter the growing malaise caused by the country's difficult economic situation by appealing to the energy nationalism and technological pride of his compatriots in an Iran in which the right to run a civilian nuclear programme is a matter of consensus among the various parties. (19)

Whatever the case, accurate or otherwise, this report should be taken with great caution given the US intelligence agencies' far from brilliant earlier assessments of the region. Under such circumstances, the proposals of the IAEA's director to allow limited uranium enrichment under the strict supervision of the agency—a suggestion so far repeatedly rejected by the US authorities—is particularly important. However, we should consider positive the fact that the United States continues to express publicly that its preferred option continues to be diplomacy, even if it does not rule out other alternatives for preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons.

PROGRESS IN IRAQ?

On 10 January 2007, the US president, George Bush, announced a major change in his political and military strategy in Iraq in his State of the Nation address suggestively entitled «*The new way forward*». The president spoke of a new strategy in Iraq aimed at helping the Iraqis to «*stop the sectarian violence in its capital*» and stated that «*the most urgent priority for success in Iraq is security, especially in Baghdad*». With the Iraqis in the lead, American troops should, therefore, focus on securing «*neighborhoods that had been cleared of terrorists and insurgents*» (20). This new approach required the

(19) See Ray Takeyh. *Time for Detente with Iran*. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. March/April 2007.

(20) See *The New Way Forward in Iraq*. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html.

additional deployment of 20,000 soldiers, the famous «surge», beginning in February, with the aim of their being fully operational by July, and marked a rejection of the conclusions of the so-called «Baker Report» considered by many to be the United States' only possible exit strategy in Iraq.

The early retirement of General John Abizaid as commander of the US Central Command and the replacement of General George Casey by General David Petraeus as commander in chief of the US forces in Iraq bore out this conceptual change in the United States' counterinsurgency strategy. Whereas generals Abizaid and Casey had held that US military presence on the ground created more resistance than it was capable of neutralising and favoured handing combat operations over to the Iraqi units as soon as possible, General Petraeus upheld the classical idea that, if conventional counter-guerrilla tactics were used, the US forces would still have a chance to at least gain the time needed for the various Iraqi forces to achieve long-lasting agreements, overcoming their political differences.

And so, in accordance with this operational concept, it was decided that most of the new troops—five combat brigades—be deployed to the city of Baghdad and engaged in two difficult military operations, the effectiveness of which was much doubted. However, to almost everyone's surprise, these operations, called Fardh al-Qanon (also known as Operation Law and Order or Baghdad Security Plan) and Operation Phantom Thunder, directed against terrorist groups and the more extremist elements in both Baghdad and the rest of the country, proved much more successful than expected.

The operational plan was based on the so-called «Petraeus doctrine» developed during the general's stay at Fort Leavenworth US Army Combined Arms Center. Its essential difference with respect to previous doctrines lay in the manner of deploying the forces. Instead of stationing the troops at five major military bases from which they would depart to conduct patrols in motorised columns and return after completing their task, the idea was to achieve clearly identified objectives. The first was to eliminate the Sunni insurgent elements and Shia militias by acting successively in each of the nine «Security Districts» into which the capital was divided. Having cleaned up a particular zone, it was then essential to maintain a permanent presence of US forces on the ground, reinforced by Iraqi troops, by establishing interlinked military posts. The aim was thus to set up a security network that would be impenetrable to enemy reactions.

The third phase would begin after security had been fully achieved in a particular district, at which point responsibility for security would be handed over to the Iraqi forces, leaving the Americans free to tackle the next district but with sufficient reaction capacity to be able to return to the transferred area should the security situation deteriorate.

The success of the plan was evident by November, as sectarian violence had diminished notably. (21) Whereas at the start of the operation in mid February, less than 20 per cent of Baghdad was under the Coalition's control, by August this percentage was up to 40. That month may be considered a genuine turning point in the counterinsurgency battle in view of two significant events. The first was the decision of the Shia militia known as the Mahdi Army to call a ceasefire. The second was the going over to the other side of a large number of Sunni combatants who, weary of the atrocities committed by al-Qaeda terrorists in their areas, chose to forge an alliance of circumstance with the Coalition forces. And so, despite very considerable losses in terms of material and lives, (22) by November the number of attacks had decreased by 55 per cent and the number of dead found in Baghdad's streets from 30 to six. In view of these encouraging figures, it was decided to end the operation on 23 November.

Nevertheless, the positive official statistics do not mean that the operation can be considered a complete success. Despite what was achieved, part of the southern area of the city still remained in al-Qaeda's hands in December. For its part, the Mahdi Army continued to control the Shia district of Sadr City with a fist of iron. Therefore, the end of the operation did not amount to the end of the insurgency—only a decline. (23) A resurgence of extremist attacks has even been witnessed in recent months in the regions located to the north of Baghdad, where al-Qaeda combatants appear to be making a huge effort to establish new havens and regroup their forces with a view to continuing their attacks.

(21) Iraq's prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, recognised that «*the decrease in violence in the capital is a sign of declining sectarian bloodshed*».

(22) All in all, some 7,500 civilians died during the operation, together with more than 1,200 insurgents, nearly 100 suicide terrorists and over 800 Coalition members, including at least 321 US soldiers. At the same time, more than 1,000 US soldiers were wounded during the operation. The intensity of the fighting during the operation is reflected in the fact that at least four of the victims were Coalition generals.

(23) As proven by the fact that a day before it officially ended a bomb exploded in a local market killing at least 15 people.

Nor should it be forgotten that what is being sold as a major success of the «surge» strategy—the decline in the appalling butchery witnessed in Baghdad and other cities—is in fact a reflection of the triumph of the «ethnic cleansing strategy» being implemented by the various groups. Urban areas formerly made up of a mixture of Sunni and Shia in Baghdad, Mosul, Basra and Kirkuk are increasingly becoming strongholds of one ethnic group or the other. Indeed, Baghdad's population was nearly 70 per cent Sunni before the war; the figures are now reversed, and the Shia currently account for 70 per cent of the population, while the Sunni are reduced to an urban wedge in the west and a few small pockets, increasingly under siege, in other areas. It should likewise be pointed out that only traces remain of the earlier prosperous Christian community.

Although the US forces have been successful in recruiting thousands of Sunni insurgents to fight the al-Qaeda Jihadists, very little has been done to demobilise the Shia militias responsible for most of the killings. It is even foreseeable that militias like the Mahdi Army are waiting for the announced reduction in US troops to resume their pogroms against the Sunni. Furthermore, the political success of managing to persuade several of the leading sheiks of Sunni tribes of the province of Anbar to the west of Baghdad to pool their forces with those of the Coalition—considered to be the key to the military achievements in the Sunni areas—could turn against the Americans if the Sunni decide to use the arms recently supplied to them against their Shia compatriots. It can be said that what has been becoming gradually clearer since 2007 is a slow and progressive shift from an international to an internal conflict that is, however, no less violent and the foreseeable outlook is therefore that the Iraqis will end up fighting against each other.

In any event, there is no doubt that the improvement in the military situation has provided the US administration with important breathing space and a sufficient time cushion to hand over responsibility for the final decision on the withdrawal of its troops to the next presidency. In this connection, although it is stressed that the United States will maintain its commitment not to leave the Iraqis «to their own devices», the force reduction so loudly clamoured for by public opinion has begun. Indeed, 24 November, the day the «surge» ended, saw the announcement of the repatriation from the province of Diyala, where their presence was no longer considered necessary, of the first 5,000 soldiers belonging to the First Cavalry Division. Following in the United States' footsteps, in December the British forces handed over control of the city and province

of Basra to the Iraqi army, as a result of which its forces will be reduced to fewer than 2,000 in spring 2008. (24)

By the time the current presidential term ends in January 2009, the United States will have reduced its military presence to 100,000 soldiers from the 160,000 stationed in the country at the height of the «surge» in summer 2007. However, no matter how quickly repatriation occurs, and even if the most optimistic forecasts are fulfilled, the United States will have to keep a substantial military force in the country for a long period in order to protect its geostrategic interests. As General Petraeus pointed out, «There's nobody in uniform who's doing victory dances in the end zone». (25)

One of the problems that remains unsolved is the thorny issue of the Kurds. For over 15 years the Kurds of northern Iraq have attained a high degree of autonomy, which they are not willing to relinquish. Since the first Gulf War, the United States has been protecting them from all kinds of attacks, both from the Iraqi Arabs and from their Turkish neighbours. However, the military operations initiated in the first months of 2008 by the Turkish army, against the enclaves of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in the autonomous region known as Iraqi Kurdistan, are triggering a dangerous increase in tension in the area. (26) The fact that the Americans are displaying a generously understanding attitude towards the attacks on the PKK bases and are merely asking Ankara to make these attacks as short and precise as possible points to the inability of the US forces to control the PKK guerrilla that operates in Turkey from its safe havens in Iraq.

The United States' lack of action in this connection is raising suspicions that the Turkish military operations, which are having a very negative effect on Ankara's international credit, are not going to be limited to specific antiterrorist actions in northern Iraq, but are in fact intended as a cover for a much more ambitious political agenda whose ultimate goal is to prevent the Kurds controlling the oil-producing region of Kirkuk, which Turkey has been claiming since it was incorporated into Iraq in 1921.

(24) Substantial military assets will thus be freed, 2,000 of which will be deployed in southern Afghanistan starting in spring 2008. See David Loyn. *The new Great Game*. THE NEW STATESMAN. 13 December 2007.

(25) See Bobby Ghosh. *Hold the Cheers*, TIME 24 December 2007.

(26) The PKK, which has been engaged in an armed offensive against the Turkish government since 1984, is regarded as a rebel and terrorist organisation by Ankara, Washington and the European Union. Its demands for the creation of a Kurdish state in Turkey have caused some 37,000 deaths.

In this context, the only reasonable manner of preparing the Turkish forces for any attempted large-scale invasion that could transform the relatively calm region of Kurdistan into a new scene of violence and chaos involves the long-term permanence of US forces in the area, at one or several bases. This US commitment to provide protection, which looks set to be achieved in the future, judging by the statements made by all the US candidates for the coming elections, would help solve the problem of the control of the city of Kirkuk, which is claimed by Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen, and for which a referendum to decide its future is expected to be held in 2008. The Kurds might therefore agree to the referendum being called off or postponed sine die in exchange for guarantees from the United States and the Iraqi central government of the maintenance of its autonomy, the prevention of Turkish attacks and greater control over the exploitation of oilfields located on Kurdish soil.

Another problem yet to be resolved is the distribution of political power and parliamentary collaboration mechanisms among Shia, Kurds and Sunni in order to prevent the country becoming permanently fragmented into tribal territories engaged in constant disputes. Unfortunately, a valuable period of relative military calm that could be used to initiate a real reconciliation between the Shia majority and Sunni groups is being wasted.

This fragmentation has become particularly accentuated among the Shia, who have split into three main groups (27) that are engaged in open confrontation in some regions. US support for the Dawa party and ISCIR in their fight against the Mahdi Army is an indication of how difficult it will be to demobilise the Shia militia that have been granted a de facto quasi-state security function in recent years. In these political aspects nobody doubts Iran's decisive influence over Iraq's Shia majority and their political leaders. It remains to be seen whether Iran is willing to play the stabilising role President Ahmadinejad has mentioned on several occasions or, on the contrary, whether it prefers to play an anti-American card by encouraging Shia insurgency and keeping Iraq in the grip of chaos. The answer to this question will probably depend on developments in the talks on Iran's nuclear programme and on Iran's own political tensions.

(27) The Dawa party to which belong the current prime minister, Nuri Al-Maliki, the Iraqi Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution (ISCIR) with close ties to Iran, and the cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army which has the largest number of followers.

IS SYRIA A STABILITY FACTOR IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

Syria has continued to be one of the fundamental pieces in the Middle East puzzle in 2007, especially as regards stability in Lebanon and the peace process in Palestine. With respect to Lebanon, it should be remembered that the crisis between the Syrian and Lebanese authorities came to a head after the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005. This triggered the withdrawal of Syrian occupation forces from Lebanese territory after intense international pressure and mass demonstrations. Since then the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad has been using various methods to preserve its influence in the country, whose sovereignty it continues to consider it owns.

The first of these methods was to help maintain Lebanon in a permanent state of internal violence, resorting when deemed necessary to selective assassinations of political authorities opposed to Syria's presence. (28) The assassination on 12 December 2007 of General François El Hajj, the army chief of operations and right-hand man of the presidential candidate, another Maronite general Michel Sleiman, commander in chief of the armed forces, should be interpreted as an example of this logic of violence, as an act whereby the Damascus authorities intended to prove they were still «the real force on the ground». (29) The negotiations conducted by General Sleiman, until only recently regarded as a friend of Syria, with the «14 March» anti-Syrian opposition alliance, would have deeply irked the Damascus authorities and shattered Damascus's confidence in the leaders of the Lebanese armed forces. Syria would not be willing to accept as a Lebanese president a military man capable of thwarting its growing infiltration among the Lebanese general officers.

The wish to convert Lebanon into a scene of pseudo-civil war, where assassinations are part of everyday life, should be regarded more than a strategy as a tactic aimed at bringing to power a president subject to Damascus's will. (30) The idea would be to achieve a sort of exclusive right

(28) Such as the assassination of the anti-Syrian member of parliament, Antoine Ghamem, who was killed by a car bomb in a street of Beirut in the Christian area on 21 September 2007.

(29) Its success in the battle against Salafist terrorists of Fatah Al Islam entrenched in the Palestinian refugee camps of Nahr el Bared at the beginning of year had made it a dangerous adversary for Syrian interests.

(30) On 24 November 2007, President Emile Lahoud stepped down from his post, and after two months of negotiations parliament failed in its fourth attempt to choose a successor, despite the appeals of the United Nations and Arab League secretaries general and the intermediation of the foreign ministries of Spain, France and Italy.

over Lebanon's political designs and developments, but without the need for this to be accompanied by a deployment of troops. Some events, such as the fighting triggered by an enigmatic al-Qaeda-inspired terrorist group, Fatal-al-Islam, at the Nahr-al-Bared refugee camp from 19 May to 2 September 2007, favoured Syria's aims of maintaining Lebanon in the grip of violence.

One of Syria's greatest errors in this connection is precisely to have earned the enmity of nearly all its potential allies in the country. Its main and sole support continues to be Hezbollah, the Shia bastion in southern Lebanon. However, although Hezbollah is still an important military force and may possibly have rebuilt its operational structures following the war with Israel in summer 2006, the fact is that its influence outside the Shia community is very limited. What is more, time has shown that what was ostensibly announced as a victory of Hezbollah has ended up being much more favourable to Israel than was initially thought. Its militias are currently located over 12 miles from the borders; its rockets have ceased to fall on Galilee; and they have not even been capable of preventing the deployment in the south of four Lebanese army brigades in support of the renewed UNIFIL-2. (31) Under such circumstances, although Hezbollah continues to dominate political life in southern Lebanon, it is becoming increasingly clear that it is not currently in a position to achieve military victory should it choose to unleash a fresh direct confrontation with Israel.

Furthermore, as a collateral consequence of the war, the Shia organisation has come to be perceived by the majority of Lebanese Sunni, Druze and Christians as a sort of fifth column at the service of Syria and Iran. This situation has badly damaged relations with the population at national level, as the goal towards which Hezbollah had worked hard in recent years—to present itself as the national leader in defending Lebanese sovereignty from the Israeli aggressor—was shattered.

In the Lebanese labyrinth, it is therefore hardly surprising that the increasingly influential Sunni community is the most firmly opposed to Syria returning to the Lebanese political scene in any way, as this would reinforce its Shia rivals. Indeed, it was probably Syria's fear of a rise of the Sunni political forces that triggered the assassination of Mr Hariri in 2005. Similarly, the reaction largely promoted by the Sunni at both local and

(31) UNIFIL-2 has a division-size headquarters and two sector headquarters—East and West—commanded by Spain and Italy respectively, each with four battalions. It also has a tactical reserve, an air component equipped with helicopters, six engineers units and three hospitals; all in all nearly 14,000 military and 1,000 civilians.

regional levels was the main factor that sparked the withdrawal of the Syrian forces from Lebanon, just as it was the diplomacy of the Sunni Prime Minister, Fouad Siniora, which made it possible for the Lebanese army to deploy in the south of the country, despite Hezbollah's opposition.

It is therefore surprising that a good many Maronite Christians, headed by their leader, General Michel Aoun, continue to harbour such hostility towards any kind of agreement with the Sunni political forces, whom they still accuse of «not being sufficiently Lebanese». Interestingly, the same can be said of the Druze minority, whose leader, Walid Jumblatt, a systematic detractor of the Syrians, has refrained from condemning the most significant recent attacks attributed to the intervention of Damascus. All this would appear to indicate that Lebanese policy has progressively changed during 2007, and that those who were considered enemies of the Syrians a few months ago are not necessarily enemies now. A new environment now appears to be taking shape in which the Sunni political forces have become the enemy to be defeated by everyone else.

An added problem to this complicated situation stems from Syria's systematic opposition to the investigation carried out by the United Nations prior to the establishment of an international tribunal to judge Mr Hariri's assassination. The fact that the Commissioner of the International Independent Investigation Commission—Belgian Serge Brammertz—did not manage to cite any names in his report attests to the difficulties the process is experiencing. Without anyone to press charges against, the trial could end in a legal limbo. It would therefore not be surprising if the international community were to prefer to follow the «Libyan precedent» and settle for incriminating low-ranking Syrian officials, exonerating the regime and President Assad from blame.

Nonetheless, Syria's lack of cooperation could end up being counterproductive to its aims. It should not be forgotten that it was precisely Syria's intransigence that spurred the United Nations to have recourse to Chapter VII of the Charter as grounds for setting up an international tribunal. It is now highly unlikely that the Damascus authorities will manipulate this tribunal, as any attempt to do so could create a political momentum that the Syrian authorities would be incapable of controlling.

Basically, what remains of the so-called «cedar revolution» (32) is now mortally wounded in the sense that with its main leaders assassinated or

(32) The civilian protest movement that followed the assassination of the former prime minister, Rafic Hariri.

banished from the political scene, the anti-Syrian majority comprised of Lebanese genuinely interested in maintaining independence without external interference is becoming increasingly disoriented and divided. Amid such chaos, it would not be surprising if Syria were eventually successful, provided that impatience, which amounts to acknowledgement of its own limitations, does not spur its authorities to commit further errors.

Should Damascus achieve its aims, a future pro-Syrian government would have serious implications for the United Nations Interim Force deployed in southern Lebanon (UNIFIL), which would find itself up against a new reality should the new government prove incapable or unwilling to support its activities or guarantee its security. A scenario in which Hezbollah could resume its activities with Syrian support to the south and north of the River Litani, defying UN Security Council Resolution 1701, would place the 7,000 members of the international force in a very delicate situation. The fact that the UN secretary general did not publish the «rules of engagement» of these international troops until the beginning of October 2006, several months after their deployment, together with the hesitation displayed by the international community about deployment in the area and the missions to be performed by the troops, raise reasonable doubts about the extent to which the forces of the United Nations and the nations that contribute troops would be willing to make use of force to «protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers and [...] to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence», as laid down in its mandate. (33)

A second element of what we might call the Syrian factor springs from the country's involvement in the war with Israel. On 6 September 2007, Israeli planes attacked installations on Syrian territory, which Israeli and US intelligence believed to house part of a nuclear reactor. (34) The attack confirmed that Israel is prepared to react preventively to put an end to any nuclear project Damascus could be developing with Iranian and North Korean support. What is more, with this blow Israel was anticipating what it would consider to be a sort of «Plan B» in the event of a military clash with Iran: the destruction of any Syrian installation likely to be running a

(33) Resolution 1701 passed by all the members of the UN Security Council in August 2006 put an end to the armed clash between Hezbollah and Israel. The resolution calls for increasing the international troops of UNFIL to 15,000.

(34) See NEW YORK TIMES, 13 October 2007.

nuclear programme would deprive Iran of the possibility of using its ally as an alternative if its own installations were attacked.

The lack of a military response to this premeditated attack by Israel would seem to confirm that Syria is much weaker than its authorities would have the world believe. The fact that Israel has not been condemned for its attack by the United Nations would appear to demonstrate the weakness of Syria's political position and reveals a certain amount of consent on the part of the international community, including the Arab countries, towards the Israeli intervention. If Syria has been supplying arms to Hezbollah in Lebanon and to Hamas in Gaza, it is because it lacks sufficient capacity to cause Israel any military harm.

This context explains why Syria agreed to take part in the recent peace conference held at Annapolis in the state of Maryland (USA). Fear of becoming completely isolated from the rest of the Arab world that is fearful of Iran's nuclear development may be considered the main factor that has contributed to undermining Syria's close strategic alliance with Iran. The possibility that the rest of the Arab countries and even the Palestinians may reach some kind of agreement with Israel is sparking fears among the Syrian authorities that, should this happen, Israel would have no incentive to reach a peace agreement, particularly if this involved returning the Golan Heights, which have been occupied since the war of 1967. It is therefore not surprising that Syria currently appears willing to resume the peace talks at the point they were broken off in 2000. Syria would even agree to the negotiations encompassing its relations with Iran. In return, they should include the Golan Heights. All in all, it seems that the Syrian authorities are prepared to resume the peace process. However, what remains to be seen in the near future is if this also means they are willing to achieve real peace.

PALESTINE: ON THE ROAD TO PEACE?

The year 2007 has witnessed significant changes in Palestine's situation which are bringing about changes in the geopolitics of the conflict. The clash between Hamas' radicals and the police forces loyal to the president of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), Mahmoud Abbas, resurged with great virulence in Gaza in December 2006. The so-called «battle of Gaza», which had been brewing ever since Hamas won the legislative elections in January 2006, was waged from 7 to 15 June

2007. It consisted a series of actions and reactions from both sides (35) ending in the victory of Hamas. On 12 June 2007 hundreds of Hamas militants attacked the positions of their Fatah rivals after giving them two hours to abandon them. The following day they seized control of the security forces' headquarters controlled by Fatah, while systematically mopping up the adjacent buildings where Fatah's marksmen had been positioned. On 14 October they occupied the Khan Younis headquarters of the Preventive Security Service, which was supplied with weapons by the United States and considered the chief symbol of the National Authority. (36) That same afternoon the Hamas militias occupied the Rafah checkpoint at the Egyptian border, while members of the European Union mission in charge of supervising border traffic retreated to the Israeli city of Ashkelon for security reasons. By 15 June the entire Gaza strip was in the hands of the Hamas Islamists. (37)

The political consequences of this fratricidal struggle were immediately felt: the territory hitherto controlled by the Palestinian National Authority became divided, de facto, into two entities: the Gaza strip under the military occupation of Hamas; and the West Bank, which continued to be governed by the Palestinian National Authority. Fearing the spread of Islamism, the international community, including the European Union, the United States and Israel, chose to support President Abbas, who found himself forced to dissolve his government and declare a state of emergency, which meant governing by decree. During this time over 6,000 Palestinians had to flee to Egypt.

From the religious viewpoint, the main consequence was the imposition of Islamic law in Gaza and the creation of a military branch of the radical group Jihadia Salafiya, which is widely established throughout this territory, in order to supervise compliance with Islamist rules. Christians were one of the religious groups to come off the worst from this change of power. As the leader of Jihadia Salafiya, Sheik Abu Saquer, pointed out, «I expect our Christian neighbours to understand that the new

(35) On 10 June Hamas militants captured several members of Fatah and threw one of them, Mohamed Sweirki, an officer of the elite presidential guard, off the roof of the highest building in Gaza. In retaliation, Fatah militants killed the radical imam of Gaza's largest mosque, Mohamed Al-Rifati, and hurled a Hamas militant from a 12-story building.

(36) Its leader Mohamed Dahlan was held to collaborate with the Israelis and was therefore hated by the Gaza Islamists.

(37) According to the ICRC, over 550 people were wounded and at least 118 killed during the fighting that broke out that that week.

Hamas rule means real changes. They must be ready for Islamic rule if they want to live in peace in Gaza». (38)

But Hamas' victory has also had important military repercussions. First, the occupation of Gaza has provided Hamas with huge quantities of light arms and a few armoured vehicles that the USA, Egypt and Jordan had supplied to the PNA. However, this military bolstering does not mean that it has monopolised the use of force in Gaza. Nearly 400,000 weapons still remain beyond its control, in the hands of the various clans and paramilitary groups that fight against Israel. (39)

But in addition, control over Gaza has provided the terrorists of Hamas and other related groups with a territorial base from which to continue their attacks against Israel without hindrance from the forces of the PNA, which is much more inclined to yield to international pressure to prevent terrorist actions being launched against Israel from Palestinian territory. In May 2007, Israel called off the ceasefire in force in Gaza until then owing to the constant infringements of the Palestinian groups, and since then its air force has been striking Hamas' structures and eliminating its militants involved in terrorist actions. Hamas, for its part, has carried on firing hundreds of homemade Kassam rockets and mortar shells at some 40 neighbouring communities in southern Israel. Although these are primitive and fairly ineffective weapons, the chief effect is psychological: the aim is to cause the 190,000 Israelis living within this radius to feel that the sword of Damocles is hovering over their heads for fear one will fall on their homes, schools or workplaces.

Although these inhabitants are pressing the Israeli government very heavily to invade Gaza and «do away with the terrorists», (40) there are several reasons for not adopting a radical measure of this kind. The first is that the Tsahal, the Israeli army, although powerless to prevent these attacks, does not seem willing to tackle a large-scale invasion that would claim an unpredictable number of victims and besides, would fail to put a complete stop to them. The second consideration is the humanitarian crisis that could erupt among the million and a half Palestinians who inhabit the 330 square metres of Gaza in the event of widespread clashes

(38) This threat was issued two days after Hamas seized power. At the same time a Christian church and school were attacked.

(39) Among them the *Islamic Jihad*, which is very closely linked to Hamas and the *Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades* nominally affiliated with the main faction of Fatah led by Mahmud Abbas.

(40) See EL PAIS, 24 December 2007.

between the Tsahal forces and Hamas militiamen—a risk that the Israeli government is unwilling to run at a time when the international community is particularly sensitised to the situation of the Palestinians. Lastly, the Israeli government is not prepared to waste the important strategic trump card provided by the current rift between the Palestinian political forces, which an invasion of Gaza would no doubt help close. An Israeli occupation of Gaza, even temporary, would chiefly benefit President Abbas, since the destruction of the political and military structures of his rivals, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, by the Israeli forces would enable him, sooner rather than later, to regain control of Gaza for a small price and accordingly resume his strategic goal of creating a Palestinian state based on this territory together with the West Bank, where the PNA's headquarters are.

The response of the Israeli government, which has declared on many occasions that its «armed forces are at war with the Palestinian militias of the Gaza strip», was to intensify specific military operations directed against the terrorist groups who operate from there. Following this logic, it should be noted that the stepping up of attacks in 2007 has provided Israel with a few tactical advantages. The first is the elimination of numerous Islamist militiamen, including Jihad's leader, Mayad Harazin, who was killed in an air strike in December. The second is that greater international awareness of the rocket attacks against Israel has provided its government with sufficient political leeway and time to continue with its plans to extend the Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank, contrary to the spirit of the recent peace conference at Annapolis. (41) Lastly, the Israeli government has felt strong enough to continue with its policy of selective killings, rejecting the proposal of the Gaza Islamist leader, Ismail Haniya, regarded as a moderate among radicals, to negotiate a truce.

What lies behind Mr Olmert's categorical no to Mr Haniya and the physical elimination of the most radical elements of Hamas is probably a certain hope that Hamas' current situation of military, political and diplomatic weakness will force it to give up its armed fight and recognise Israel. However this is highly unlikely bearing in mind that in mid December, on the 20th anniversary of Hamas' founding, over 300,000 militants and supporters together with their leader, Mr Haniya, proclaimed

(41) On 3 December, Israel revealed its plans to extend the West Bank settlements of Maa-lé HaJamisha and Har Jomá, by building 740 new apartments.

amid an ocean of green Islamic flags that «we will never recognise the State of Israel».

In addition to the seizure of Gaza by the Hamas militias, the other major event that has significantly influenced the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in 2007 is the aforementioned peace conference that was held in the US city of Annapolis on 27 November 2007 and attended by Israel's Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and the PNA's rais Mahmud Abbas. The conference was staged in the framework of the peace process and representatives of China, Russia, the United Nations, the European Union and the Arab League also took part, in addition to the Palestinian and Israeli foreign ministers, Salam Fallad and Tzipi Livni. During the conference the Israeli prime minister and the Palestinian leader undertook to discuss all the issues over which they are divided in a roadmap that is designed to end with a permanent agreement before 2008 is out. The most complex issues in this respect are: the creation of a Palestinian state; control over Jerusalem and its future status; the return of the Palestinian refugees; and the future of the Jewish settlements. The Arab states, for their part, are calling for Israel to withdraw from the territories occupied in 1967.

One consequence of Annapolis was witnessed in Paris on 17 December at the donor conference attended by 87 countries and international organisations, which pledged to contribute some 5.15 billion dollars over the next three years to aid the Palestinians. This fund-raising effort, considered the most ambitious in over a decade, should be directed at helping the Palestinians create their own secure, feasible and peaceful state and at promoting fresh peace talks with Israel.

Although its achievements may be defined as still very limited, the prospect of the talks continuing in the future has kindled fresh hopes about the peace process and has caused the Palestinian issue to return to the centre stage of international concerns after over seven years of stagnation. For the PNA, Annapolis marked a significant success as it enabled it to break out of its international isolation. The triumph of the logic of negotiation over the logic of confrontation has defeated Israel's argument that talks were not possible because there was no Palestinian interlocutor, and has reinforced the moderate camp. At the same time, the Palestinians are wondering whether the US administration will keep its promise of resuming the process outlined by the famous Roadmap envisaging the creation of a Palestinian state based on the principle of sharing the territory with Israel.

For the Israeli government, the question that remains after Annapolis is to determine if the Arab regimes, including Syria, are willing to accept a peace process that would allow Israel to preserve most of the advantages secured in decades of war victories and not laid down in Resolution 181 passed by the Security Council on 29 November 1947. For others it is to ascertain to what extent the goal of this summit goes beyond simply demonstrating the existence of a common Arab-Israeli front promoted by the United States, vis-à-vis Iran. In any event, today as in the past, issues as important as the future of the Jewish settlements, the return of refugees, the delimitation of frontiers and above all, the final status of Jerusalem continue to be highly controversial questions on which there are no prospects of agreement.

CONCLUSIONS

We may conclude this chapter very much as we began, by stating that the Middle East has been the most conflictive region in the world in 2007 and is highly likely to continue to be in 2008.

In Afghanistan the security situation has deteriorated somewhat, though it has not reached the disastrous levels predicted by some analysts at the start of the year. Even so, a few successes have been achieved in the field of military operations and moderate progress has been made in reconstruction and stability. As a result, 2008 should see the consolidation of the military effort, maintaining the initiative in operations and, following the experience in Iraq, bolstering the capacity to hold on to territory once the Taliban are expelled from the occupied areas. This will probably require the sending of more combat troops and the lifting of the restrictions on the areas and circumstances in which the Alliance forces should be prepared to act, including obstacles to deployment in the conflictive southern provinces, which are precisely where the most intense fighting is being waged. This military effort should be integrated with a civilian effort that is more firmly committed to aspects of the fight against drug trafficking and to strengthening governance. This would ensure recognition that security and development are two sides of the same coin, and that one cannot exist without the other. In short, it is essential to maintain the international community's commitment in Afghanistan and achieve greater strategic coherence with respect to goals and means, and a more determined effort in eradicating the cultivation of opium, fighting poverty and

boosting development in order to prevent Afghanistan being doomed inevitably to a future of chaos, instability and poverty.

In Iran the only possible realistic strategy at present is to continue to exert diplomatic pressure and step up the sanctions in measures that can be assumed by the powers who sit on the Security Council, in the hope they are sufficient to urge the Iranian authorities to agree to the requirements of the IAEA. At the same time, it is advisable to cease to fuel the Iranian president's aggressive nationalism so that it cannot be used as a catalyst for guaranteeing his political survival. It should not be forgotten that the Americans' and Europeans' best allies for isolating Iran are the Iranians themselves. However, if these measures prove insufficient and Iran continues to equip its plant at Natanz with uranium centrifuges that could be used to produce nuclear weapons, the international community will have to address the question of what to do in the coming months.

With respect to Iraq, the main event of 2007 may be considered the «surge». The situation has improved from the military viewpoint, although it is early days yet to tell whether the decision to temporarily increase the number of soldiers may be regarded as the definite turning point in the situation or whether this change is simply a fluke. The fact that none of the candidates for the future US presidency has agreed to commit to fully repatriating the troops by 2013 points to the advisability of this measure and appears to indicate the country's increasing determination to remain in Iraq, even when violence reaches tolerable levels. What remains to be answered is if, at the end, when they leave, the Americans will have been capable of leaving behind a united, federal and democratic Iraq. In any event, in 2008 we will be able to see whether Iraq is headed for permanent fragmentation or whether, on the contrary, Shia, Kurds and Sunni will be capable of keeping the country united and agreeing on the degree of autonomy of the provinces.

As for Syria, it is very possible that the current situation of uncertainty in Lebanon will end up leading the international powers and the Arab countries themselves to question whether the best solution would not be to place the country under Syrian control again. The most realistic scenario would then be for Syria to use the rift in Lebanese society to attempt to return to Lebanon in 2008. Similarly, Syria now appears willing to pick up the peace talks with Israel from where they were left off in 2000. These negotiations would include the extent of its relations with Iran, and, as a counterpart, the Golan Heights. In short, it seems that the Syrian

authorities agree on resuming the peace process, though only the next few months will tell if this means they are also willing to achieve peace.

Lastly, as for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, it will be difficult to believe that the process launched at Annapolis will be able to bring about radical changes in the situation in 2007. Future tasks include issues as complicated as establishing the borders of the future Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza strip, and the thorny problem of deciding who is entitled to the political sovereignty of Jerusalem, where the Palestinians aspire to establish their capital. Similarly, Israelis and Palestinians will need to negotiate the future of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and in the lands of Jerusalem that Israel annexed after the war of 1967, the future of the over four million Palestinian refugees from the war of 1948, the necessary guarantees of security and the distribution of the scant water resources between the two states. Nonetheless, viewed from a historical perspective, the mere fact that Israelis and Palestinians should have agreed to resume talks based on the former's acceptance of the existence of a Palestinian state and the latter's acceptance of the right of existence of the state of Israel with secure frontiers in itself amounts to considerable progress with respect to the impasse of the past seven years. In any event, it will be internal Palestinian and Israeli affairs and the United States' willingness to commit itself that will determine whether or not it is possible to make significant headway within a reasonable period of time.

CHAPTER THREE

THE MAGHREB: OLD DILEMMAS AND NEW CHALLENGES

THE MAGHREB: OLD DILEMMAS AND NEW CHALLENGES

FIDEL SENDAGORTA

INTRODUCTION

An analysis of the situation in the Maghreb as a whole shows that certain dynamics witnessed in the countries of the region over the past decades are continuing to unfold. The first is the survival of different regimes that are nonetheless seeking means of renewing and enhancing their legitimacy through various channels: political liberalisation and recognition of a certain amount of pluralism in some cases; emphasis on economic improvements and an improved standard of living in others; and public gestures of religious fervour in nearly all of them. The second is rivalry between Algeria and Morocco as a key to understanding many of the developments in the relations between the region's countries, with the Western Sahara dispute as the centrepiece of this competition. The third is lack of sufficient economic growth to create the jobs needed to cater to the millions of young people born when the birth rates peaked in those countries two decades ago, since when they have tended to slow down.

To these local factors must be added the dynamics created by new forces generated by globalisation. First of all, the considerable increase in hydrocarbon prices and the rise of energy security to the top of the international agenda have had far-reaching effects on the region. On the one hand, the region has aroused growing interest among other international actors seeking to diversify their sources and ensure their supply. On the other, the trend towards greater liberalisation of foreign investments, begun in Algeria in the past years, is now steering towards greater state control. Second, international interest in the opportunities the region could offer has grown, not only in the energy sector but also in other areas. This greater attention has come from the Gulf States, China and the United States rather

than the European companies which, in relative terms, have shown less confidence in the region's potential. Third, not only have the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat's (GSPC) connections with al-Qaeda led to the intensification of terrorism in the region, but this terrorism has furthermore been linked to the global objectives of international Jihadism. Fourth, the discreet but increasingly evident about-turn in US foreign policy over the past two years has resulted in a clear easing of pressure to speed up democratic progress in the Arab world and, accordingly, in the Maghreb. Fifth, the countries of the region, which are the sources of much European immigration, have also become countries of transit for migratory flows from sub-Saharan Africa, which in turn has been conducive to the beginning of tripartite cooperation with Europe.

This chapter basically sets out to analyse the interplay between these local factors that display a greater degree of permanence and the new trends stemming from the region's progressive incorporation into the globalisation system.

THE LIMITS OF POLITICAL LIBERALISATION

In 2007 the political scene in three of the five Maghreb states was dominated by the holding of elections—legislative in the case of Algeria and Morocco and presidential in Mauritania.

In both Algeria and Morocco the elections were characterised by a low turnout: 35 per cent in Algeria (the lowest recorded for elections since 1982) and 37 per cent in Morocco. In both cases the high abstention rate reveals the disinterest and scepticism of the electorate, particularly the youngest portion, about their real ability to influence the country's political direction through their votes, given the evident fact of the scant power wielded by the Parliament in both these countries.

Apart from this similarity between both elections, it is not possible to identify common features in the two processes, which need to be analysed case by case.

The elections of 7 September in Morocco took place with an appreciable degree of transparency compared to previous polls. This was reported by the 52 international observers present at elections in this country for the first time.

As for results, the government coalition formed by Istiqlal, RNI, USFP and PPS achieved a relative majority of 146 out of 325 seats and has the

backing of the independent parliamentary group promoted by El Himma, which has very close links to the monarchy. The king appointed as prime minister Abbas al-Fassi, the leader of Istiqlal, the party with the most seats in the new parliament, in a ploy to strengthen the legitimacy of the parties, which were resentful about the choice of an independent in the previous term. The Popular Movement has gone over to the opposition together with the Constitutional Union and the Islamist PJD, whose results failed to meet the expectations raised in previous months by certain surveys that hailed it as the victor at the polls. Even so, it is the party with the largest number of votes and, as such, the main opposition force. At this point it is appropriate to provide an overview of the Islamist parties and movements in Morocco.

The ideological influence of the Justice and Development Party is on the same wavelength as the Muslim Brothers, being derived either directly from the founders of this movement or more closely from the Nahda party of Tunisia, one of the first Islamist parties to accept the democratic framework. Its political discourse is focused on democratising the country, combating corruption, and moralising practices and customs (clothing, separation of sexes on beaches, restrictions on alcohol, etc.). Some members of the PJD's economic team have a modernising outlook that does not shun the requirements and opportunities of globalisation. However, the promotion of tourism as one of the country's sectors with the greatest potential clashes with this moralising doctrine referred to above.

A salient feature of their position on foreign policy is criticism of the Israeli occupation of Palestine and the United States' presence in Iraq. However, there is a policy of opening up towards the outside world, especially to the Western countries that are Morocco's main partners: France, Spain and the United States. Its goals are to boost their international profile by conveying a moderate image that dispels any confusion with radical Islamism. Another aim of this foreign presence is to develop their links with Moroccan immigrants overseas, whose number is over three million.

The PJD, with 47 seats on the Chamber of Representatives, is, as stated earlier, the main opposition force. It furthermore presides over 16 town councils and has representatives on regional, provincial and municipal councils.

The PJD has a twin association, the Unity and Reform Movement (MUR). The MUR, which publishes a daily newspaper in Arabic, *Attajdid*, shares roles with the party. While one operates in the strictly political

environment, the MUR centres on preaching and displays a very belligerent attitude with respect to moral issues.

Unlike the PJD, Justice and Charity is a religious and social movement which, despite having a clearly political dimension, has never applied to be registered as a political party. It is widely established in the major towns and cities and is structured around some 700 associations covering areas as varied as health, education, sports, universities, culture and politics. Its founder, Sheikh Yassine, is a former schoolteacher who belonged to the Sufi brotherhood of Abou Chichia until 1972. However, Sufism has continued to be a spiritual reference in this movement, together with other ideological influences such as the doctrine of Khomeini and the Iranian revolution. Although the movement has always rejected violence, its failure to recognise the king as Commander of the Faithful has earned it the hostility of the regime, whose attitude towards it is a combination of repression and watchful tolerance.

As for this movement's position with respect to democracy, Sheikh Yassine has evolved from considering it a Western-conceived heresy in the early eighties, when he defended the establishment of an Islamic society through revolution, to acknowledging in his latest book the importance of democracy as a procedure for managing social conflicts. In this connection he points out the instruments of democracy that Muslims may use without fear of going against faith: the polls, separation of powers, freedom of expression and pluralism. However, he states that in an Islamic regime power may only be exercised by those «who possess the essential virtues of a true Muslim».

Although the international opening up of Justice and Charity is much more limited than that of the PJD, Nadia Yassine, the sheikh's daughter and unofficial spokesperson of the movement, is a frequent guest in the European and North American university circuit and her trial for allegedly insulting the king was criticised by the State Department itself.

In Algeria the legislative elections of May 2007 have brought changes in the relative weight of the parties in both the government coalition and the opposition. A salient feature of the so-called presidential majority is the poor results of the FLN, which has lost 63 seats and now has 136 instead of its previous 199 deputies. In contrast, its partners have improved their results: the RND (secular) has gained 15 seats and currently holds 62, whereas the MSP (moderate Islamists) obtained a further 13 deputies bringing the total up to 51. As for the opposition, the Workers' Party (26

deputies, five more than in the previous elections), Saïd Sadi's Rally for Culture and Democracy (19 deputies compared to none at all in the 2002 elections, in which it did not take part), and the Algerian National Front (15 seats, up seven from the previous elections). In contrast, the MRN or *Islah*, a moderate Islamist party, was dealt a major blow as it lost 40 of the 43 seats it had secured in 2002. For its part, the third legally established Islamist party, *Nahda*, achieved five seats up from one.

The overall result is a notable decrease in the number of seats attributable to Islamist parties, both in the government coalition and in the opposition, which have lost 23 between the three of them. Even so, the most significant factor in relation to this political sector was President Bouteflika's wish to turn the page on the national tragedy of the 90s, which ended with 150,000 dead and 6,000 missing as a result of the clashes between the security forces and Islamist guerrillas. During his second term, which ends in 2009, Mr Bouteflika has attempted to promote normalisation by adopting the «Charter for peace and national reconciliation», approved in a referendum, and a policy of including moderate Islamism which, while not going so far as to legalise the FIS, has encouraged the participation of the aforementioned Islamist political parties and even the election as prime minister of Abdelazir Beljaldem, who hails from the wing of the FLN that is closest to political Islam.

As for the ideological framework of the legalised Islamist parties—MSP, *Islah* and *Nahda*—all three accept the Constitution and claim to be in favour of democracy. Although what they would do were they to achieve an electoral majority one day remains a mystery, for the time being they have all revised their idea of an Islamic state and the imposition of the Sharia by the ruling power. According to their recent doctrine, the state should function by applying a framework of Islamic principles, but this is subject to interpretation and accordingly may be adapted to the circumstances. They also accept pluralism and freedom of religion, although they remain firmly convinced of the need to punish apostasy.

In both Morocco and Algeria, the effort made by the regimes to incorporate moderate Islamists into the political system has been repaid by the doctrinal evolution of the latter, who are now more willing to accept the game rules and shed their former anti-system profile. However, this ideological evolution continues to display what the Carnegie Endowment terms «grey areas»—that is, ambiguity continues to characterise their positions on certain issues fundamental to governance, such as

enforcement of Islamic law, political pluralism, civil rights, the status of women and religious minorities.

In any case, in these and other Arab countries the question of political opening is indissolubly linked to the participation of the Islamist parties. Their inclusion, although limited, stems from the need for the regimes to boost their legitimacy by broadening their social support base. In the case of Algeria, we have seen how this operation was conducted in the context of the need to close wounds and put an end to a grim chapter of civil strife. In Morocco the regime wants to repeat with the Islamists the strategy of co-opting that succeeded in incorporating the left into the existing political framework.

However, the liberalising measures undertaken, whether to accept a more structured opposition, as in Algeria, or to significantly improve the human rights situation and freedom of the press, as in Morocco, do not quite fall within the context of a democratisation process with all its consequences which can eventually regulate the distribution of power. When certain sectors of the PJD in Morocco are committed to a constitutional reform to abolish article 19—which enshrines the king's religious authority as Commander of the Faithful—misgivings about such a change will not only be expressed by the monarch but also by the secular political parties that do not wish the monarchy to lose this source of religious legitimisation to the Islamists. The religious issue is thus a key factor in the debate on reassigning the king's powers to parliament.

In Algeria the regime's newfound willingness to accept an opposition by no means affects the core of power, the distribution of which continues to be the cause of a constant give and take among the civil sectors close to the presidency of the republic and senior army chiefs. This tension could heighten over the coming months if President Bouteflika, despite his ill health, were to confirm his intention of reforming the constitution in order to opt for a third mandate starting in 2009.

The Islamists in the opposition in both countries, in turn, are complaining that parliament's lack of real power is undermining the legitimacy of the parties in the eyes of the voters, fuelling on the one hand abstention and, on the other, a shift to more radical Islamist options.

All in all, it is still too soon to know whether the regimes' efforts to co-opt the Islamist parties will end up prevailing over the calculations of the latter, who have decided today that playing by the rules of the system

brings them benefits but could choose other options tomorrow, depending on the circumstances.

Very few novelties were witnessed in domestic politics in Tunisia and Libya in 2007. In Tunisia no changes are expected towards greater political liberalisation while President Ben Ali remains in power and everything indicates that he will secure his fifth consecutive mandate in 2009. Censorship is strict and many people are convicted of opinion-related offences, while the activities of the prestigious Tunisian Human Rights League have been systematically limited over the past years. To mark the World Summit on the Information Society in November 2005, the 18 October movement was established with the participation of intellectuals, human rights activists, opposition parties and people linked to the Islamist Ennahda party, which has operated clandestinely since the early 90s. However, the regime's determination to prevent the activities of the Islamists, even the moderate strain, has resulted in the emergence of a clear tendency towards the re-Islamisation of society, which is visible in the increase in the wearing of veils and beards and in the influxes of visitors to mosques in what is the region's most secular country. The authorities reacted unceremoniously by forbidding veils to be worn in public places at the end of 2006. However, the social malaise triggered by this measure has recently led it to be annulled by an administrative tribunal, which ruled the prohibiting law unconstitutional.

As for Libya, the major event of 2007 was the release of the five Bulgarian nurses and Palestinian doctor who had been sentenced to death on charges of infecting children with blood contaminated with the AIDS virus. This decision, which was facilitated spectacularly by President Sarkozy and his then wife Cecilia, has paved the way for Libya's return to the international scene and the normalisation of the country's relations with the European Union and the United States. Colonel Gadaffi's recent visits to France and Spain have marked a first step in this direction. However, this external progress has had no influence on domestic matters. After Colonel Gadaffi's nearly four decades of absolute power, the issue of succession is gaining greater prominence and also emerging as a potential destabilising factor in what is a very personalistic regime. The most likely hypothesis is that the leader will be succeeded by one of his sons, and at present Saif al Islam seems the best placed. Saif al Islam, who makes no effort to conceal his pro-reform ideas, has lent his support to the reformist sectors of the regime led by the previous prime minister, Shukri Ghanem, vis-à-vis the so-called old guard. The struggle between the two groups

reached crisis point in February 2006 with the Benghazi revolt, which was triggered by the publication in Denmark of caricatures of the Prophet and degenerated into an open confrontation between the population and security forces. The significant impact of these repressive measures on the population led to the dismissal of Prime Minister Ghanem, who was replaced by the more conservative Al-Mahroudi.

In Mauritania, the visible erosion of President Taya's regime, exacerbated by the Jihadist attack of June 2005 on the Lemgheity military base, resulting in 15 deaths, led to a coup d'état that August in which the power was seized by Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall, who announced his intention to steer the country towards democratisation. The transition was carried out in less than two years; a new Constitution was adopted by referendum in 2006; and municipal, legislative and finally presidential elections were called in 2007. The latter was won by Sidi Ould Cheikh Abadallahi, who presented himself as the candidate of continuity. However, this successful process of political liberalisation, which has few precedents in the Arab world, has been clouded over by the Jihadist offensive of December 2007 in which four French tourists and three military were killed in two consecutive attacks. These episodes of violence and the perceived fragility of a regime that is taking its first steps raise fears in some quarters about the future continuity of this notable political experiment.

Whatever the case, Mauritania's fast political progress is more of an exception than the norm in the Maghreb region as a whole. As we have seen, the desire—in the countries that have displayed such a wish—to introduce changes from above, which was always more modernising than democratising, is reaching certain limits beyond which it will not progress for fear of losing control over the reform process. Furthermore, external pressure in favour of democratisation has notably decreased over the past year as a result of the silent shift made by US foreign policy towards a much more long-term view of political changes in its Arab allies. The combination of these internal and external factors forecasts a standstill in the political reforms and greater concentration on economic reforms in order to maximise growth rates and create jobs.

ECONOMIC TRENDS: OLD BURDENS AND FRESH OPPORTUNITIES

The Barcelona Process, through the Association Agreements the EU signed with Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, has given impetus to a trade

liberalisation endeavour that has deeply transformed these countries' positioning with respect to globalisation by creating positive dynamics linked to the opening up of these economies to the outside world. However, the substantial increase in European investments, the expected effect of this opening of trade, has yet to take place and FDI from EU countries remains at a low five per cent. Although other sources of investment from Gulf States and Asia have emerged in recent years, the investment rates of all the Maghreb economies are insufficient to achieve the necessary economic growth. It is worth comparing investment as a percentage of GDP for this region, 21, with the 30 per cent recorded by the Asian economies during their take-off period.

The result is insufficient economic growth, but even when this growth has been at its greatest it has proved incapable of creating jobs at a rate proportional to the large increase in the number of young people who join the job market every year. Indeed, this is the decisive factor in the development of the Maghreb countries over the next few years: they are all in the process of demographic transition and have progressively lowered their fertility rates significantly, but the sharp rise in births in the past will lead to the emergence of a young generation who will have a determining influence on the social and political trends in these societies in the coming 20 or 30 years.

However, in recent years, certain dynamics of globalisation have been creating opportunities in the region that are opening up new expectations for the countries capable of taking advantage of them. The following paragraph deals with some of them.

First, the strong impetus of investment from the Gulf States. Over the past year the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council have become the main holders of currency in the world, exceeding even China with 1.6 trillion dollars in 2007. Unlike in the past, investment is no longer limited to deposits in Western banks or acquiring US treasury bonds; rather, a marked diversification is taking place with respect to the destination of these capital flows. Investments by Gulf States in the Mediterranean area accounted for 36 per cent of the total in 2006, above the United States (31 per cent) and the European Union itself (25 per cent). To cite an example, the United Arab Emirates were the main foreign investor in Tunisia in 2006, accounting for 76 per cent of the total, and also in Morocco, with 30 percent of investments received. However, this is not the case in Algeria and Libya, where these flows were much scarcer. These investments are directed chiefly at high value-added sectors such as telecommunications,

major real estate and tourist projects, and infrastructures, whereas industry and agriculture have attracted much less interest in relative terms.

Second, the substantial world growth in container shipping, which has been calculated at 9 per cent in recent years, has aroused the interest of the Southern Mediterranean countries, which are keen to attract to their ports part of the shipping that has been concentrated on the Northern shore up until now. This interest is matched by the attention that the major shipowning companies have been paying to the Mediterranean in recent years. For example, the Danish company Maersk made Malta a key distribution centre in the Western Mediterranean and, in alliance with Sea Land, has made the port of Algeciras a fundamental platform for the transfer of East-West and North-South traffic. Now Maersk is focusing on the new Tangier-Med port, for terminal 1 of which it secured a concession as container operator. The Moroccan authorities have granted the concession for the second terminal to another major European shipping company, the joint venture between the Compagnie des Messageries Maritimes and the Compagnie Générale Maritime. For its part, the Algerian government, which wishes to convert the port under construction in Jenjen into a major container terminal based in part on the traffic generated by its own imports, is negotiating a concession with Dubai Ports World, the third largest operator in the world in this sector.

Third, the announcement by the multinational Renault-Nissan of the opening of a factory in the duty-free area of Tangier to produce 200,000 cars per year, and double the number of units from 2011 onwards, marks a qualitative leap in foreign investment in the Maghreb. This is not only because of the actual size of the project and the degree of confidence this entails in the country's possibilities, but also because it marks the beginning of an industrial culture geared to exporting high value-added products in relation to the usual patterns witnessed up until now in Moroccan overseas sales (agricultural products, phosphates, textiles...).

Fourth, the high prices of hydrocarbons are multiplying the income of the region's producer countries (Algeria, Libya and to an extent Mauritania), creating a wealth that may serve to modernise these economies but may also exacerbate their already excessive dependence on these resources.

All these opportunities spring from the external environment and, in order to gauge their potential, it is necessary to examine in depth the domestic circumstances of each country, distinguishing between those that produce hydrocarbons and those that do not.

Algeria is experiencing one of its most buoyant economic periods of the last few decades. Over the past five years, its GDP has grown at an average of 4.9 per cent annually and *The Economist* reckons it will continue to increase to 6.3 per cent in 2010-12. Foreign currency reserves amounted to 70 billion dollars last year and are expected to rise to 80 billion during the current year. Unemployment, which stood at 27.3 per cent in 2001, was gradually whittled down to 12.3 per cent by 2006. Algeria has also improved its social indicators in recent years. The poverty index dropped from 14.1 to 12.1 between 1995 and 2000 and illiteracy decreased between 1998 and 2005 from 25 to 16 per cent for men and from 46 to 40 per cent for women. Even so, Algeria ranks 104th out of 177 countries in the human development index compiled by the UNDP.

The huge wealth generated over these past years is being used to reduce external debt, which was lowered to 6.4 billion dollars in 2006, and also to finance an ambitious programme of infrastructures that attaches special priority to housing, for which investments of around 60 billion dollars are envisaged between now and 2009. This programme is aimed at slashing the unemployment rate and providing a response to the housing crisis, the seriousness of which is reflected in the fact that Algeria is the country with the largest number of inhabitants per household, an average of 7.6 people.

However, the state is incapable of implementing this investment plan by itself, the public construction companies are snowed under and shortages of supplies and even labour are beginning to be witnessed in many large-scale projects. There is an obvious need to build up the private sector, which would result in the necessary diversification of the economy. Two sectors in particular could benefit from this opening up to private enterprise, as Algeria holds competitive advantages in both owing to the abundance of energy and closeness of the European markets: iron and steel and the chemicals industry. However, this strengthening of the private sector entails primarily a far-reaching reform of financial services, which have proved to be the Achilles heel of the Algerian economy.

Libya's rich hydrocarbon resources have created a monoculture economy, but in return have provided funding for social programmes that place the country's indicators in this field among the best in the region. High oil prices are underpinning a growth that amounted to 5.7 per cent in 2007 and, according to the predictions of *The Economist*, could reach 6.2 per cent in 2012. In the past months the government has set its sights on attracting foreign investment in the hydrocarbon sector, which is in need of a major overhaul following the limitations imposed by the international

sanctions, and also in other fields like banking, aircraft and tourism. The government reformists would attempt to allow private enterprise to join in the game, but there is much resistance from the sectors that are against the state giving up its dominant role in the economy.

In Mauritania economic growth, which had amounted to 5.4 per cent in 2005, soared to 11.4 per cent in 2006 as a result of the start of oil production. However, the non-oil sector of the economy has grown by a mere 4.4 per cent and the yields of the oilfields under exploitation have proven lower than expected; indeed, the Chinguetti oilfield is producing 30,000 barrels per day, considerably less than the 75,000 originally envisaged. Mauritania ranks 153rd out of the 177 countries in the human development index, over 50 per cent of its population lives beneath the poverty line and its health and education indicators are very low.

Of the countries that do not export hydrocarbons, Tunisia is an outstanding case in the region, owing both to its government's determination to implement economic liberalisation measures and to the quality of its social indicators, which place it at the head of the Maghreb countries and in 91st place in the human development index. Its income per capita has tripled over the past 30 years, amounting to \$2,600 in 2005. The poverty rate has slumped from 40 to 10 per cent during the same period, the infant mortality rate has dropped from 70 to 21 (per 1,000 live born infants) and 98 per cent of children receive primary education.

As for economic reforms, Tunisia will be the first country in the region to fully dismantle its customs tariffs with the European Union for manufactured goods. However, this liberalisation effort and the administrative measures adopted to facilitate the establishment of foreign companies have not attracted the desired influx of investments—or at least not on the scale envisaged. This relative lethargy is going to maintain the economic growth rate at an average of 5.4 per cent, below the 6.1 per cent recorded in 2007, according to the projections of *The Economist*. These rates, although considerable, are insufficient to reduce unemployment, which currently stands at around 15 per cent.

In the case of Morocco, a marked contrast may be observed between the country's two faces: one largely urban with a dynamic economy and social indicators that are currently improving and the other rural, which affects 40 percent of the population, with an agricultural economy subject to cycles determined by droughts, and with social indicators well below those of a country with an average income. This explains why Morocco

ranks 126th in the human development index and its economic growth is influenced very decisively by whether harvests are good and bad; this growth rose from 1.7 per cent in 2005 to 9.4 per cent in 2006 and slumped again to 3.1 per cent in 2007. The predictions published by *The Economist* point to steadier growth of between 4 and 6 per cent over the next five years, well below the rates of 7 to 10 per cent required in order to have an impact on current poverty and unemployment levels. Awareness of these shortcomings, evidenced in the report on «50 years of human development and prospects for 2025» drafted under the auspices of the Crown, and the serious warning of the attacks in Casablanca in 2003, have made social policy a government priority through the National Human Development Initiative.

In relation to the productive economy, a noteworthy effort has been made over the past years in infrastructure and transport, namely the network of highways and the major project for the port of Tangiers, the first terminal of which was opened in 2007. In this connection, it is important to stress the priority attached to the development of the northern provinces, which until only recently were marginalised from the rest of the national economy with a considerable percentage of the region earning a living from illegal trafficking (drugs, contraband and clandestine immigration). In the tourist sector, the north has also benefited from the launch of major projects both in the Tangiers region and in Saidia, along with the investments made in Marrakech and Agadir.

A characteristic shared by all the Maghreb economies is the fact that their growth rates are insufficient to allow their labour markets to absorb the substantial influx of young labour resulting from the high birth rates two decades ago. Experience in other regions of the world shows that economic and regional integration adds growth to the effort of each country when considered separately from the rest. However, the fact is that the Maghreb region is going in the opposite direction, giving rise to the «cost of the non-Maghreb» which the IEMed and other institutions such as the FEMISE and the World Bank have studied extensively. Indeed, between 1990 and 2004 interregional trade dropped from 2 per cent of total goods trade to 1.2 per cent. This trend compares unfavourably with the Andean Pact, whose growth rate has risen from 5.1 to 12.1 per cent; MERCOSUR, up 14.8 per cent from 11.1; ASEAN, which has increased from 16.1 to 21.6 per cent: and NAFTA, from 37 to 43.5 per cent. There are economic causes that partly explain this phenomenon, such as the low degree of complementarity in trade, the scant diversification of exports

and equally scant integration of global production lines. But on top of this there is a clear lack of political will—the border between Morocco and Algeria remains closed and the regional organisation, the AMU, remains gripped by lethargy.

Energy could have been—and could still be—a field that is particularly conducive to regional integration, given the existing complementary factors, had mistrust and political rivalry between Algeria and Morocco not interfered. Indeed, Algeria has always shown more interest in establishing energy connections with the European countries than with its neighbours. It has never felt comfortable about Morocco being a transit country for the Durán Farrell gas pipeline, a fact that explains the priority it attaches to laying a new gas pipeline (Medgaz) linking it directly to Spain.

For its part, Morocco imports most of the energy it consumes. As a result, the rise in gas and oil prices in recent years has added a huge amount to its energy bill. However, imports of Algerian gas have been limited by reluctance to depend on a country with which relations are very poor. Indeed, Morocco did not begin to be paid its royalty on the Algerian pipeline in gas instead of currency until six years after it came into service.

Now the Moroccan government is setting a goal of increasing the portion of natural gas in its energy mix to 23 per cent between now and 2020, although it is not specifying who the suppliers will be.

The entry into service of Medgaz will boost the available supply and could lead Morocco to draw on Algerian gas. Granted, the political circumstances are not very favourable, but ultimately gas is the only product that legally crosses the closed border between the two countries. An alternative would be the project to build a liquefied gas terminal. However, this option has the disadvantage of requiring a hefty investment that is beyond the country's possibilities.

A sector in which modest but real progress in integration has been witnessed is electrical interconnections. The entry into service of a second submarine line a few months ago has increased the transmission capacity of the electrical connection between Morocco and Spain from 700 to 1,400 Mw. This has not had much of an impact on Spain's energy security, as the flow is from north to south for most of the year. However, it may come to account for nearly 20 per cent of Morocco's energy consumption. The interconnection is important for the latter, as on the one hand it affords the system stability by linking it up with a power grid of European

standard. On the other, it is a cheaper electricity than that produced by its fuel power stations.

There is a project to build a submarine cable with a 2,000-Mw capacity linking Spain and Algeria. However, the cost of the cable is doubling the total cost of the project (including the combined-cycle power plants), and the Spanish side is therefore demanding that the price of the gas assigned to the project should ensure profitability. This matter is still being assessed by Algeria.

While exchanges of gas are largely determined by mutual distrust, in the field of electricity we are witnessing the beginning of cooperation among the countries of the Maghreb region. The interconnection lines between Algeria and Tunisia have existed since the 50s and between Algeria and Morocco since the 80s; and the Maghreb electricity committee was set up in 1991. New 400-Kw connections will come into operation between Morocco and Algeria and between Algeria and Tunisia over the next few years.

All in all, electricity connections are making a silent but significant contribution to the progressive integration of the Maghreb countries and to their incorporation into the European networks through Spain and Italy. In fact, electricity is a neutral energy with less political visibility. Indeed, the electricity Morocco is receiving from Spain is largely generated from Algerian gas.

SAHARA: THE RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE

Despite the modest progress that may be achieved in a few specific sectors such as electricity, regional integration—both economic and political—is at an almost total standstill. The lingering of the Sahara conflict and the wedge it is driving between Morocco and Algeria is undoubtedly one of the main causes of this negative tendency.

Developments in the Sahara issue in 2007 have been marked by the start-up of negotiations between the parties under Resolution 1754, approved by the Security Council on 30 April 2007. This Resolution establishes that negotiations will take place under the aegis of the United Nations Secretary General, thereby reaffirming the central role played by the UN in efforts to settle the conflict. Indeed, this role had been questioned by the previous Secretary General, Kofi Annan, who had

suggested in his report to the Security Council in April 2006 that, following the abandonment of the Baker Plan II, the dispute should be referred to the parties in order that they attempt to settle it by means of direct negotiations conducted without preconditions.

Resolution 1754 takes note of the proposal presented by Morocco on 11 April 2007 to the new Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, to negotiate an autonomous status for Sahara. It also takes note of the proposal submitted by the Polisario Front the previous day for «a mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara». This Resolution expressly takes note of the «serious and credible» efforts of Morocco, a fact which amounts to a positive political recognition that is limited but not minor in scope, as a result of its intense demarches and, above all, the support of the United States.

The Moroccan initiative proposes establishing an autonomous region in the Sahara with competences in a broad array of sectors (local administration, industry, agriculture, tourism, infrastructures, housing, education, health and culture, among others), exercised through its own executive, legislative and judicial powers. The state, for its part, would retain exclusive jurisdiction over the attributes of sovereignty (flag, anthem, currency) and over national defence, foreign relations, national security, the legal system of the kingdom and the religious powers vested in the king as Commander of the Faithful. The Moroccan initiative conveys in its title, «*Proposal for negotiation*», the message of seeking compromises, albeit safeguarding the «red line» of sovereignty over the territory. The underlying idea is that a referendum, following a negotiated pact, could represent a manner of exercising self-determination although not including the option of independence.

For its part, the initiative of Polisario Front reiterates its traditional position on exercise of the right to self-determination through a referendum that provides for the option of independence. This basic proposal also includes a number of guarantees designed to preserve certain Moroccan interests in the Saharan territory, should the referendum give victory to the option of independence.

It is evident that the two proposals are based on contradictory principles: whereas Morocco's plan takes for granted its sovereignty over the territory, to which it is willing to grant autonomy, the Polisario initiative is centred on self-determination as an immovable principle so that in its

exercise the option of independence is preserved. However, both proposals share some common ground, autonomy, although Morocco regards it as a permanent status and the Polisario Front as a temporary pre-referendum phase.

The three rounds of talks held so far at Manhasset, near New York, have yet to tackle these substantive issues which are driving a wedge between the parties. In these initial stages of negotiation, Morocco's strategy has been aimed at burying all the UN's previous plans, including the last Baker Plan, which envisaged independence as an option in the exercise of self-determination by means of a referendum. Its intention is therefore for negotiations to focus on its proposal for autonomy, if not as the sole reference at least as a preferable basis for the talks. In this respect it has the backing of France and the USA, which have been working closely towards this aim. Indeed, one of the most significant novelties witnessed over this past year is the United States' firm commitment towards the Moroccan initiative for self-government; some representatives of the Administration have even gone so far as to threaten to recognise the Sahara as Moroccan unless an agreement is reached in the current negotiation process. For its part, France has not budged from its traditional pro-Moroccan stance regarding this matter since Nicolas Sarkozy was elected president of the Republic.

This support is strengthening the diplomatic position of Morocco, which nonetheless has been unable to prevent there being two proposals on the table as far as the UN is concerned. What is more, if they want to afford credibility to their proposal for autonomy, the Moroccan authorities will find themselves under increasing pressure to be more specific.

In parallel to its action on the diplomatic front, the Moroccan government has developed a line of work that tends to question the exclusiveness of the Polisario Front as representative of the Sahrawi people. An example of the latter is the establishment of the CORCAS (Royal Advisory Council for Moroccan Affairs), a joint body made up of elected representatives and members of the main tribes. Its involvement, as part of the Moroccan delegation, in the rounds of negotiations held over the past months has been a constant source of irritation to the Polisario Front. However, Morocco is unlikely to yield in this area and relinquish affording visibility to this sector of the Sahrawi population that supports it.

For its part, the Polisario Front held its 12th Congress on 14-18 December with a reaffirmation of its traditional positions, the threat to

resort to war if no progress were made and the re-election of M. Abdelaziz as the party's secretary general.

As for the current state of the negotiations, Polisario does not reject outright the idea of autonomy, as it implies recognition of the Sahrawi people as a political entity. What it does not accept is that this be the sole possible expression of self-determination with the exclusion of the option of independence. It is therefore difficult to anticipate whether Polisario is going to agree to negotiate the substantive aspects of the solution of autonomy without having previously ensured the holding of a referendum open to all options. Polisario's leaders are aware that they are going to be under much pressure in the coming months to enter into in-depth talks on autonomy without further guarantees, but are confident of the strength of their backing on the Security Council, particularly that of Russia, Italy, South Africa and Panama, to prevent the passing of resolutions that go against its interests. It is generally comfortable with a process led by the UN and accordingly with a framework conducive to preserving the principle of free determination. Its short-term expectations are centred on the US elections giving way to a Democrat Administration that would reconsider the current, pro-Moroccan position and it is confident of achieving this through its good contacts with the Democratic Party.

What are the possible scenarios for the coming months? The first would be the breaking-off of the current negotiations. However, neither of the sides is now willing to assume the cost of causing the crisis, and therefore both Morocco and the Polisario Front would attempt, when the time came, to attribute a possible rift to the other party. Whatever the case, this would lead to a period of deadlock, though it is unlikely that Polisario would carry out its threat of returning to arms. Indeed, such a course of action would be unimaginable without substantial support from Algeria, which would pay a huge international price and also run the risk of escalation—which is what the Algerian authorities wish to avoid, particularly as they are immersed in a transition towards the post-Bouteflika era.

A second hypothesis would be if Morocco imposed autonomy unilaterally. However, this has many stumbling blocks, chiefly the fact that the Saharan interlocutor could only be the CORCAS, which does not yet enjoy sufficient credibility among the Sahrawi population and, furthermore, its mixed model of electoral and tribal representation would be difficult to apply in practice. In any event, the current deterioration in the economic situation and sharp rise in the cost of living, which is common to the whole

of Morocco, is leading to an increase in popular discontent that could be politicised more easily in Sahara.

The third scenario would be progress in the negotiating process on the basis of a solution of autonomy. Today Morocco has leeway to make concessions, but it will not want to show all its cards unless Polisario proves it is willing to play this game. But if this were the case, Morocco would be faced with the dilemma of carrying the logic of its approach to the very end, even if this involved legalising Polisario as a political party with a programme focused on Saharan independence.

The last hypothesis would be the partitioning of the territory, an option Morocco initially favoured but later abandoned; indeed, Rabat has not showed the slightest sign of wishing to consider this possibility in recent years.

All in all, the current situation is conducive to maintenance of the status quo, which is not satisfactory for either of the parties but is less costly for both compared to a possible solution contrary to their interests. In this connection, the factors that determine the current relationship of forces are as follows:

The first is the fact that Morocco has effectively possessed most of the territory for 31 years. Its army controls 85 per cent of Western Sahara, including the most economically significant areas, and the war actions conducted by Polisario ended over 15 years ago.

Second, vis-à-vis this advantage Morocco holds over the land, the Polisario Front has preserved two significant trump cards that strengthen its claim: on the one hand, it has maintained the affective support of a considerable part of the Sahrawi population and, on the other, it has been legitimised by the UN doctrine applicable to the decolonisation processes, which is based on the principle of self-determination.

Third, neither the Security Council as such nor any of the Western powers most involved in this issue—USA, France and Spain—has wished to pressure Morocco into accepting a solution, such as a referendum open to all the options, that could destabilise the monarchy, which is deeply involved in the cause of Morocco's claim to Sahara. The succession of a new king in 1999 and his consolidation on the throne were powerful reasons for those powers abstaining from forcing Morocco to accept the Baker Plan in 2003, and the argument of Moroccan stability continues to weigh decisively in the diplomatic equation.

Fourth, the Sahara conflict is the main—but not the only—expression of the strategic rivalry between Morocco and Algeria in their historical struggle for regional hegemony. Morocco's aim since the beginning of the conflict has been to negotiate directly with Algeria, going over the head of a Polisario which it considered little more than an Algerian pawn. However, Algeria has always been reluctant to accept this viewpoint and has rejected any bilateral approach, which it considers incompatible with the application of the principle of self-determination, which is not at stake for the Algerian population but it is for the Sahrawi. However, nor has there been a completely unanimous approach to this question among Algerian leaders—indeed, on occasions Saharan policy has become yet another aspect of the periodic quarrels between the army and the presidency. Analysts currently reckon that the Algerian authorities are not particularly interested in a prompt solution to the dispute and prefer Morocco to remain occupied with this problem until the unknown factors concerning Mr Bouteflika's transition are resolved and a new leadership of the country is consolidated.

Indeed, bilateral relations are particularly chilly, as evidenced by the fact that Algerian ministers have not visited Morocco in the past 30 months. And the frontier between the two countries remains closed, despite the fact that its closure was decided upon for reasons unrelated to the Sahara issue, as a permanent testimony to the deep mistrust that has been brewing between the two states and their ruling classes. Not even the common threat of the re-emergence of Jihadist terrorism has been conducive to the beginning of a process of détente and cooperation built on the perception of shared risks and interests. In fact, the Moroccan government is using the establishment of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb as an argument against the creation of a new state in the region which, in its opinion, would be fragile and easily parasitised by Jihadist groups.

THE FIRST YEAR OF AL-QAEDA IN THE MAGHREB

On 11 September 2006, al-Qaeda's second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, publicly announced the organisation's affiliation with the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), the main Algerian terrorist group. In January 2007, GSPC's leader, Abu Murad Abdel Wadoud, announced the organisation's change of name to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

With this coup de theatre al-Qaeda aimed to group together, under a prestigious brand name and under the leadership of the GSPC all the

Maghrebi Jihadist groups—such as the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group and its Libyan equivalent—in a region of strategic interest on account of its closeness to Europe. The salient features of the nascent organisation are as follows:

First, particular attention to propaganda, with the creation of a communication department that coordinates these activities and a constantly updated website.

Second, an improvement in organisational, technical and logistic capabilities as a result of the transmission of knowledge and the training provided by an experienced group like GSPC to activists from other countries in the region who hitherto lacked operational capabilities.

Third, extensive links to the Jihadist circles of the communities of Maghreb immigrants living in Europe.

Fourth, the adoption of the global objectives of al-Qaeda, which have taken precedence over national aspects of the agenda of the pre-existing groups. This attention granted to the priorities of the global Jihad has been expressed both in the mobilisation of the Maghreb networks—in the region itself and also in Europe—to recruit activists for combat in Iraq, and in the selection of Western targets for many of the attacks perpetrated in recent months.

Lastly, the establishment of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is providing the organisation with geographical contiguousness. Indeed, the vast, poorly guarded Sahel area lends itself particularly well to being used by these groups as a logistic base and training ground.

The outcome of this organisation's first year in action is cause for growing concern. The Jihadists have succeeded in turning around the widespread impression that the Algerian government was winning the battle against terrorism and that these groups were doomed to play an increasingly residual role. Terrorism has claimed over 500 lives in this country in 2007 and mass-scale attacks have been staged, such as those in Algiers in April and December. Al-Qaeda's hallmark is visible not only in the use of suicide bombers—unusual for Algeria—and the organisation of multiple, chain attacks but also in the choice of foreign targets, be they company employees or UN officials. The fact that some of the perpetrators of the recent attacks had benefited from the pardon measures implemented by the government has furthermore questioned the reconciliation policy promoted by President Bouteflika, a factor that will undoubtedly be addressed in the domestic debate on his succession.

What is more, attacks on employees of foreign companies are threatening to dissuade foreign investors precisely when they were beginning to regain the confidence lost in the previous decade.

Two attacks were perpetrated in Mauritania in December 2007, the first against a family of French tourists which claimed four lives and the second an ambush against a military vehicle in which three soldiers died. The alarm triggered by these events led the French authorities to advise its nationals not to visit the country, making it necessary to cancel the Paris-Dakar rally, a harsh blow for Mauritania's international image and also for its emerging tourist economy. The first of February witnessed an attack on the Israeli Embassy in Nouakchott in which several clients of an adjacent restaurant were injured.

In Morocco the serious social and political alarm unleashed by the attacks of May 2003 in Casablanca has remained very much alive in recent years owing to the evidence of new terrorist plots, most of which were aborted before they could be implemented. One of the individuals convicted for his implication in the Casablanca attacks, who was released two years later, turned out to be the leader of the Ansar el Mahdi cell that was dismantled by the police in July 2006 with the arrest of 56 people. A cause for particular concern in relation to this group was the discovery of its ramifications in the army, leading to the subsequent abolishment of compulsory military service and an in-depth overhaul of the security services. However, during the year that has elapsed since the establishment of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the Moroccan Jihadist groups affiliated with this organisation have not yet succeeded in carrying off any operation. This fact may be attributed both to the poor preparation of their activists—some of whom committed suicide without managing to cause mass-scale damage in the events that occurred in March and April 2007—and to the priority al-Qaeda's leaders attach to recruiting for Iraq rather than preparing attacks against Moroccan targets.

In Tunisia twelve activists from Jihadist groups died in two clashes with the police in late 2006 and early 2007; no further significant occurrences have been recorded in this field.

In Europe the first year of activity of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has not led to any attacks, although activists have continued to be arrested in several countries, often in connection with recruitment networks for Iraq. This flow of Maghrebi citizens from their countries of origin—or of residence in the case of immigrants—is arousing concern,

not only on account of the mobilisation capacity that the cause of international Jihadism is displaying, but also owing to the scenario of a return from Iraq of hundreds of fighters trained in advanced terrorism techniques and urban guerrilla warfare.

The levels of alert are particularly high for French and Spanish citizens residing in or visiting the Maghreb countries following the threats al-Zawahiri levelled against them in September 2007. There is also a specific concern about the situation in Spain in general and in Ceuta and Melilla in particular as a result of the systematic inclusion of al-Andalus (the name for the parts of Spain once under Muslim rule) and these cities on the list of unredeemed Islamic territories in al-Qaeda's communiqués.

GROWING INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION IN THE REGION

It is early days yet to know whether this terrorist offensive and the resulting increase in risk levels in these countries are going to have serious consequences on the economic interest the region has aroused in recent years. For the time being, it may be stated that the Maghreb has become one of the scenes of fiercest competition between the major players of globalisation. The previous pages examine how the Gulf States have become the leading investors in the Mediterranean region, ahead of the United States and the European Union countries. But China's economic presence in the Maghreb has also grown spectacularly in recent years. With an average annual increase in trade of 40 per cent, China has become Algeria's third biggest supplier after France and the United States. Chinese companies are furthermore driving a major trend for investment in the country, not only in the hydrocarbon sector but also in that of infrastructures. This progression has been accompanied by a visible increase in Chinese workers, who now number more than 10,000. China is also Morocco's third largest supplier after France and Spain, with an annual increase in trade of around 23 per cent in the past five years. Chinese companies have also secured significant public tenders worth 500 million dollars in 2005. This new economic interest has had political repercussions and both countries have been visited by President Hu Jintao in recent years.

As for the United States, its economic presence in the region received considerable impetus as a result of the Eizenstat initiative of 1999, from which emerged the American Economic Programme for North Africa. The

United States is the leading investor in Algeria's hydrocarbon sector with 4.1 billion dollars and was Algeria's biggest customer and third largest supplier in 2005. The US-Moroccan Free-Trade Agreement that was signed in 2004 and entered into force two years later has given major impetus to trade between the two countries. From a political viewpoint, the United States has developed close cooperation relations in counterterrorism in all the region's countries and it is even being speculated that the headquarters of the new, recently established military command, AFRICOM, could be located in one of them.

Russia has notably pursued an energy diplomacy aimed at forging an alliance with Algeria and the other major gas producers in order to create a gas OPEC. It is true that the gas markets, which are highly regionalised and lack international benchmark prices, unlike oil, do not currently lend themselves to an initiative of these characteristics, but things might change in future. Russia, together with China, is the country's main supplier of military equipment and has also offered to cooperate with several countries in the region, the latest being Morocco, to begin to develop nuclear programmes for civilian use.

This environment of growing competition was the backdrop to President Sarkozy's initiative to create a Union for the Mediterranean, which had the merit of reopening the European debate on policies towards the region. The outcome of the Barcelona Process, the framework for relations between the European Union and southern Mediterranean, now complemented by the Neighbourhood Policy, may be summed up briefly as follows:

- The reforms that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has promoted in these countries have enabled them to restructure their financial systems, re-establishing the main macroeconomic balances.
- Through the Association Agreements, the Barcelona Process has also fostered the opening up of these economies through gradual trade liberalisation in the framework of establishing a Free Trade Area.
- It has also brought a direct injection of 8.7 billion euros worth of capital between 1995 and 2006, through the MEDA programme, and 15 billion euros worth of loans granted by the EIB.

These changes have in turn paved the way for institutional and trade changes leading to an improvement in the region's business climate. However, paradoxically, this positive development has translated into an

increase in investment from the Gulf States, China and the United States, while European FDI has grown less in relative terms (less than 5 per cent of Europe's total FDI goes to the Mediterranean countries).

The current debate on European policies towards the Mediterranean is developing in two directions. First of all, there is an impression that the European countries are not taking full advantage of the economic opportunities created largely by the dynamics of the Barcelona Process. Second, it is evident that, despite these economies' higher growth, the increase in jobs is far from sufficient to cater to the substantial rise in the number of young people who join the labour market each year.

Both shortcomings could begin to be addressed if Europe now takes the initiative to encourage the expansion of its companies so that the southern Mediterranean and the Maghreb in particular progressively replace Eastern Europe as a low-cost platform in the Euro-Mediterranean area. In return for this greater European commitment, the region's countries should overcome the existing stumbling blocks in terms of governance, transparency and the working of institutions. This goal is served by the instruments of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the Neighbourhood Policy for countries that accept it (this is not Algeria's case), specific agreements such as those envisaged in the Advanced Status with Morocco and regional integration projects in the framework of the Union for the Mediterranean.

Only a truly ambitious economic and industrial strategy on both sides of the Mediterranean will have any effective impact on creating jobs and curbing the high migratory potential of the southern societies. These states have furthermore become transit countries for immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa, a fact which has boosted their willingness to cooperate with Europe on the basis of shared interests. This transpired from the EU-Africa Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development held in Rabat in June 2006, on Spain's initiative.

Spain, as a neighbour of the Maghreb, views this region as a priority area for defending its national interests, be they energy, immigration, markets for our companies or prevention of terrorism. A combination of active bilateral policies towards each of the countries in the area, together with regional initiatives in the framework of the European Union, in close cooperation with France and Italy, continues to be the most effective manner of promoting and defending our fundamental interests.

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CHAPTER FOUR

THE END OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUAGMIRE: NEW LEADERS, NEW INSTRUMENTS, PENDING CHALLENGES

THE END OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUAGMIRE: NEW LEADERS, NEW INSTRUMENTS, PENDING CHALLENGES

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INTRODUCTION

With the signing of the Lisbon Treaty on 13 December 2007 (save for last-minute surprises during the ratification stage), the European Union ought to give a new turn to over ten years of institutional reforms and put an end to more than two years of constitutional crisis. Irrespective of the merits and shortcomings of the text in question (which are numerous and complex to analyse and weigh against each other), the agreement reached at the 2007 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) should serve, at least, to restore the original logic that spurred the whole process: the wish to equip the enlarged European Union with suitable instruments for governing itself (inwardly but also outwardly) in an efficient and democratic manner.

The old, twelve-strong European Community, which was taken by surprise eighteen years ago by the fall of the Berlin wall, should therefore now at last be able to put behind it what is indubitably a contradictory legacy characterised on the one hand by an almost total inability to complete institutional reforms (as proven by the negotiations on the so-called «division of power» on the occasion of the treaties of Amsterdam, Nice, Rome and, more recently, Lisbon), but on the other by an astonishing ability to progressively reach seemingly unattainable milestones via the de facto route (Monetary Union, enlargement to 27 members, the drafting of a European Security Strategy and the opening of negotiations with Turkey, among others). From now on the EU should be able to project itself much more decisively towards the future and, in particular, beyond its borders.

Granted, as Timothy Garton Ash has pointed out with his usual irony, the Lisbon Treaty, compared to the brilliant simplicity and elegance of the

American constitution, is about as exciting and inspiring as a manual for a forklift truck. (1) Even so, it is evident that the crux of the matter does not lie so much in the aesthetic beauty of the European version (which will always fall victim to compromises, adjustments and exchanges and, therefore, to sacrifices for the sake of consensus) as in elucidating an essential question: whether the Constitutional Treaty, signed at Rome in October 2004, established the ceiling for European integration and, as a result, the tide of integration is doomed to ebb or, on the contrary, whether the European universe will continue to expand following the big bang unleashed by the combination of monetary union and enlargement.

No doubt it is too soon to issue a firm diagnosis: on the one hand, the text agreed on at Lisbon is practically identical to the failed constitutional text, a fact which should lead us to be optimistic; on the other, the damage the constitutional crisis has inflicted on the European edifice is only too evident both in citizens' indifference to European affairs in a few key countries and also with respect to the guarantees of control and qualifications some Member States have incorporated into the new text, which on occasions make it a treaty «of suspicion» more than a treaty of reform.

The other major decisive factor in European integration, leadership, also has contradictory facets. The longed-for renewal in European leadership has been completed: the leaders of the six largest member States (Mssrs. Schröder, Chirac, Blair, Aznar, Berlusconi, and the Kaczynski twins), who set in motion the project to go further than the Treaty of Nice, only to later fall victim to the biggest rifts in European opinion over the Iraq war and subsequently fail to set in motion the Constitutional Treaty, have been replaced by a new generation (Mrs Merkel and Mssrs. Sarkozy, Brown, Prodi, Zapatero and Tusk). However, this generation, despite still having a long way to go, displays a few important unknown factors as regards the compatibility of the visions of Europe these leaders may entertain and, above all, their willingness to complete a political union that oversteps the well-known limits of the intergovernmental method.

We will most likely run into a further paradox, since the available European leadership potential of this combination of leaders (much greater than that of those who ushered in the new decade) will find itself

(1) Timothy Garton Ash, *The Guardian*, 13 December, 2007 (published in Spanish as «Bati-burrillo en Lisboa», *El País*, 16 December 2007).

significantly limited as to the degree of popular support for the integration process, which is likely to be feeble at best and will probably be halfway between indifference and hostility in a good many countries. As a result, although in many respects (as shown by the Eurobarometers that measure citizens' preferences and concerns) the problems the EU suffers from resemble a supply crisis (when installed capacity is insufficient to meet demand) more than a demand crisis (when there is insufficient demand for the installed capacity), the fact is that even in traditionally Europeanist countries like Spain, the «more Europe» slogan of the past is progressively being replaced by «better Europe».

Therefore it seems clear that the Union should prepare itself for a context in which bursts of integration, whether from leaders or citizens, will be considered untimely and grating. This should not necessarily be regarded as catastrophic if the energies available, once reflection on the *finalité politique* (to which Europe has quite frankly devoted too much time), ends are employed in seeking, negotiating and agreeing on responses to the new challenges.

Given this outlook—which is indeed vague or even blurred as regards the strength of its means (the treaties) and the wishes of its leaders (but also of European public opinion)—the challenges the European Union faces are startlingly clear. On the one hand, the rise of China and Russia, along with the resounding failure of the United States neoconservatives to forge a «New American Century», (2) make for a very disjointed international order without clear leaders and with weak guiding principles; an order in which the classical parameters of international relations (military power, competition for raw materials, demographic potential, ability to build strategic alliances, etc.) again roam freely. This order, based on a combination of maximum economic interdependence and maximum political independence, bears too much of a resemblance to Europe just before 1914 (highly inflammable, as readers will recall) and can only be considered an indubitable threat to the European supranational project, which is essentially open in nature and based above all on the soundness of law, the legitimacy of democracy and market capacity and is therefore by no means prepared (with its current resources) to survive in a world shaped by these parameters. (3)

(2) See the statement of principles of the «Project for the New American Century» at <http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm>.

(3) For a broader view of the worldwide trends in security, economy and demography, see the chapter by Emilio Lamo de Espinosa in this book.

The fact is that the challenges linked to European security, such as climate change, migratory movements, energy security, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, failed states, pandemics and international civilian protection, are either closely related to the depth of global inequity or else pose dilemmas of collective action that can only be resolved in the global sphere. Therefore, whereas during the previous 50 years Europe, despite its institutional limitations and shortcomings in military capabilities, was in a position to provide the public goods essential to its security without having to equip itself with an integrated foreign policy and a global presence and capacity for action, nowadays (and increasingly so) its security can only be provided in a global context. Therefore the EU, whose *raison d'être* had always been to provide public goods in a strictly European environment, is now finding that these same public goods can only be provided globally.

As a result, the EU that has emerged from the Lisbon Treaty will be forged at the intersection of the global challenges that act as pull forces and the endogenous factors that constitute its push forces (its leaders, citizens' support and its instruments). The problem is that, on the one hand, the global challenges we face are very sharply defined but require responses that are extremely complex and varied both technically and politically (the solutions called for are centralised, decentralised, unilateral provision of public goods, etc.), whereas, on the other hand, the attitude displayed by leaders is one of calculated ambiguity (as although the challenges are global, the electorates are national); the populations of the various countries are disconcerted by the existence of contradictory arguments about European integration, the nation-state, democracy and globalisation; and the legal instruments—pertaining to budgets or diplomatic and military power—the EU has at its disposal are extremely limited.

Given this state of affairs, the European Union's push capacity will be limited, while the pull factors do not point in a very clear direction. It is obvious, then, that the challenges Europe faces will be resolved not in a technical or functionalistic manner but politically. Therefore, *vis-à-vis* the discourse most frequently employed in today's Europe, which relies on external challenges to provide its political drive, it should be recalled that these challenges will by no means in themselves constitute a cause for greater integration: as economists often remind us in connection with monetary policy, a rope cannot be used to push a car. Europe will inevitably have to push itself forward, and we may therefore expect to

witness a process characterised more by vacillation, backward steps, faux pas and fits and starts than by clear linear progress in which instruments, wishes and ends are perfectly defined and interlinked. Europe will gradually forge its position in the world from these vacillations (called Kosovo, Afghanistan, Russia and Iran) and from the lessons learned from them. It is unlikely to be any other way.

A LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL?

The essential features of the European constitutional crisis have been dealt with extensively in the related chapters of the 2005/2006 and 2006/2007 editions of the *Strategic Panorama*, particularly the domino effect of the double French and Dutch «no» to European policies and, more specifically, the legacy of weaknesses it left in its wake. Skipping over the build-up and climax, it is therefore appropriate to focus on the denouement of the European crisis, which began with the German chancellor Angela Merkel's firm wish to proceed to rescue substantive parts of the Constitutional Treaty during Germany's six-month presidency of the Council (first half of 2007), continued with Mr Sarkozy's election as president of the French republic in May 2007 and finally materialised during the Portuguese presidency (second half of 2007) with the signing of the so-called «Reform Treaty» or Lisbon Treaty on 13 December 2007.

The rescue operation was by no means easy nor could it be taken for granted. It should be remembered that, at the start of the German presidency (that is, as of 1 January 2007), the EU was divided into two irreconcilable blocs. On the one hand, eighteen States had successfully ratified the European Constitution signed at Rome on 29 October 2004, while the other nine had either failed in their attempt (France and the Netherlands) or had simply refrained from trying (Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom). Given the need for unanimity in ratification and the absence of a Plan B, the impasse was total and the solution or solutions as legally difficult as they were politically and, in many cases frankly worrying (such as the proposal put forward in October 2006 by the then candidate Mr Sarkozy to replace the Constitutional Treaty with a mini-Treaty). (4)

(4) For a more detailed analysis see: G. C. Rodríguez Iglesias and J. I. Torreblanca (coords.), "El futuro de la Constitución Europea: opciones para España", *Informe Elcano* 8/2007. Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos.

In addition to the technical impasse, the political rifts called into question not only whether the Union would overcome the crisis but whether it would emerge united or with thoughts of an agreed split that would result in its more Eurosceptic members being left behind. These rifts were exemplified outstandingly in the discrepancies over the analysis of the causes of and solutions to the crisis (particularly with respect to the attempt to saddle enlargement and the Turkish issue with responsibility for the double «no»); were highly visible at the meeting of the «friends of the Constitution» in Madrid in January 2007; and later surfaced with a vengeance in the extremely arduous negotiations on the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome and drafting of the resulting Berlin declaration. (5)

Under such circumstances, the German presidency adopted a strategy and method consisting of forcing the holding of a new intergovernmental conference with an extremely narrow mandate that was supposedly technical and at the same time totally watertight. The idea was to slice up the Constitutional Treaty and repackage it in such a way that the Member States could choose how to present it to their public opinions: the same text could be presented to some as just another treaty (a sort of Nice II) to which they need not pay much attention as all the supposedly threatening elements had been weeded out, and to others as a text that, being substantially identical to the previous one, was not worthy of much attention either.

Therefore the mandate (6) in question, approved by the European Council of 21-22 June 2007, had an undeniable virtue, namely that of enabling the contents of the new treaty to be perfectly accepted in advance. And so, much to the relief of the eighteen Member States that had ratified the European Constitution, the little more than fifteen pages into which the mandate of the 2007 IGC was condensed contained, with minor modifications, the full text of the failed European Constitution, albeit enveloped in a number of major concessions to the euphemistically called «countries which had experienced difficulties during the ratification process». How were these concessions to national parliaments and public opinions expressed?

(5) See: «Tiempo de aniversario, tiempo de trincheras, riesgo de ruptura», *Análisis del Real Instituto Elcano* ARI No. 16/2007, 12.02.2007; «España toma la iniciativa europea», *Análisis del Real Instituto Elcano* ARI No. 8/2007, 23.01.2007 and «Ampliar o no ampliar, esa no es la cuestión», *Análisis del Real Instituto Elcano* ARI no. 67/2006, 6.06.2006.

(6) European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels 21/22 June 2007, Annex 1, IGC Mandate, pp.15-30.

First and foremost, in the discarding of constitutional rhetoric. Indeed, instead of merging all the existing treaties into a single text—as the European Constitution had intended for the sake of simplicity and logic—the 2007 ICG would produce a Reform Treaty amending both the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC). Thenceforward, the EU would have two essential texts: on the one hand, a Treaty on European Union, basically containing the novelties agreed on at the 2004 IGC and enshrined in the Constitutional Treaty and, on the other, a second text, also called «Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union», which would include all the provisions on common policies inherited from the Treaty establishing the European Community.

Similarly, the mandate called for the removal of references to symbols (flag, anthem or motto) from the new text (even though the European institutions would continue to use them); demoting the symbolic rank of the «Union Minister for Foreign Affairs» envisaged in the Constitution to «High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy» (even though their functions were the same); abandoning the denominations of «laws» for European legislation, retaining the technocratic terms «directives» and «regulations» (even if their legal nature remained unchanged); affording the primacy of EU law less political visibility (however much it were to continue to be regarded unanimously by States as the immovable pillar on which the community edifice rests); and making national parliaments more visible in the community decision-making process. To complete the cosmetic operation, the articles of the Charter of Fundamental Rights were also banished from the new treaty, although the same mandate announced that this would not affect their legal binding value. (7)

The political aim behind all these changes was crystal clear: as stated categorically in point 3 of the mandate, [the new Treaty or Treaties] «will not have a constitutional character». In practice, this statement, like so many others incorporated into the mandate, had no legal meaning (given that the existence of a «material» constitution in the European environment has long been established from the legal, political and economic point of view). In other words, what the Twenty-Seven wanted to convey to the Member States and more Eurosceptic opinions is that European integration (that is, the Treaties in which it is expressed) by no means takes the place of the

(7) For a detailed analysis of the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty with respect to the failed Constitutional Treaty, see the study by Prof. José Martín y Pérez de Nanclares, at www.realinstitutoelcano.org.

national constitutions but emanates from them (as could not be otherwise), and it therefore cannot be considered to erode national sovereignties or to aim to replace the nation-state. Given the obviousness of these messages (which reflect not only political common sense but also the doctrine of all the constitutional courts of the Member States), the 2007 IGC mandate could only be interpreted as a sort of political exorcism designed to put the sovereigntists' minds at rest.

Aside from these changes aimed at reinforcing the possibilities of ratifying the text, the IGC mandate also reflected the opportunism of some Member States (particularly the British and Polish governments), which took advantage of the occasion to introduce new demands or go back on concessions made in 2004, endangering the fragile institutional and political balances on which the agreement on the Constitutional Treaty was based. The Polish government, caught up in the nationalistic rhetoric of the Kaczynski twins, insisted on preventing the consolidation of the shift from the voting system in force at Nice to the system of a double-majority of states/population envisaged in the Constitutional Treaty, while for its part, the British government laid out new «red lines» everywhere in matters such as fundamental rights, the area of freedom, security and justice, and the foreign, security and defence policy.

Aside from the details, the fact is that this operation to rescue the substance of the Constitutional Treaty must be considered extremely risky from whatever angle it is viewed. On the one hand, choosing to maintain a text rejected in France and the Netherlands and making only minimal changes to the content, but stripping it of all constitutional rhetoric, amounts to exposing it to stronger criticism from Eurosceptics concerning the intrinsically deficient nature of democracy in the EU environment; and on the other, it paves the way for alienating the Europeanists, who will have to accept not only the sacrifice of the symbols of European unity and their political purpose but also an evident backward step in democratic and procedural standards and the transparency of the treaty reform process. (8)

Given the state of affairs, however much the European leaders agreed behind the scenes that the new text should not be submitted to referendum in order to prevent fresh surprises, the new procedure does not guarantee that ratification would be completely successful, as neither has the requisite for unanimity been modified nor does the new treaty provide any escape

(8) For a substantive criticism, see José María de Areilza, «Mito y realidad del Tratado de Lisboa», *ABC* 14 December 2007.

clause at all in the event of failure, nor can the political dynamics of the most problematic Member States be controlled with such precision. Therefore, it became clear very early on that the operation designed by Germany with the blessing of the Member States can only be legitimated by its success—hardly through substantive or procedural aspects, which point to a very negative outcome with respect to the return of the apparently technocratic, legal and depoliticised logic of the process of European integration.

The fact is that after negotiations conducted in an extremely opaque manner, eventually, in late October, the 2007 IGC reached an agreement on the contents of the new Reform Treaty. The new text therefore meets the demands both of the States that had ratified the Constitutional Treaty and of those that had failed to do so. In addition to the ditching of the constitutional symbols and strengthening of the intergovernmental and national mechanisms for controlling the European institutions, the Polish government has succeeded in delaying for a further term (until 2014) the entry into force in the Council of the new double-majority voting system (and has even managed to keep an escape clause until 2017), while for its part the British government has been granted (yet again) all its demands, thereby achieving a new lot of opt-outs, revocations and provisos regarding its participation in the European integration process.

Nevertheless, as Chancellor Merkel had promised, the material «substance» of the Constitutional Treaty has been left intact: the Lisbon Treaty includes all the institutional and political advances achieved by the Constitutional Treaty, and although for many it resembles a Nice II or reformed Nice Treaty more than the European Constitution in its jargon, the fact is that the material coincidences are beyond all doubt, and this is a point of agreement between its Eurosceptic opponents and staunchest supporters and in the rulings of parliamentary institutions with notably clashing perspectives and views in European matters, such as the Chamber of Commons and the European Parliament. (9)

(9) For an openly Eurosceptic vision, see Jens Peter Bonde, «The EU Reform Treaty: a badly written version of the new Constitution» *Euobserver.com* 26.09.2007. Also, Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons, «Foreign Policy Aspects of the Lisbon Treaty», 16 January de 2008 and House of Common Research Papers, *The Treaty of Lisbon: amendments to the Treaty on European Union, 2008/09*, 24 January 2008. For the opposite extreme, see Francisco Aldecoa, «Regreso al futuro: el Tratado de Reforma», *El PAIS*, Opinión, 19 October 2007, Andrew Duff, «The True Guide of the Lisbon Treaty», www.andrewduffmep.org.uk, and the Report of the European Parliament Constitutional Affairs Committee on the Lisbon Treaty, adopted on 23 January 2008 with 20 votes to 6 (Méndez Vigo, Corbett Report).

The EU, treaty in hand, will pursue new policies (especially in the field of security, defence and justice and home affairs), with new legal and institutional instruments (the permanent Presidency of the Council, double majority), greater agility (as unanimity is no longer required in many areas) and the extended participation of the European Parliament (which enjoys considerably greater powers in the EU's legislative process, particularly with respect to budgetary issues). In addition, for States that wish to move forward more rapidly, the rules for establishing the so-called «enhanced cooperation» are considerably more flexible, while in the field of security and defence, all the envisaged innovations regarding the possibility of a number of States establishing permanent «structured cooperation» have been retained. (10) Lastly, and more importantly, the extent of the changes the figure of High Representative for Foreign Policy has undergone is such (he is both a member of the Council and of the European Commission, as Vice-president) that it undoubtedly provides a very significant opportunity to boost the coherence and visibility of the EU's external action.

The breaking of the deadlock and resulting emergence from the constitutional crisis can be attributed almost exclusively to the Merkel-Sarkozy team: because the chancellor, despite criticism of the evident backward step the method entailed for democracy, mapped out a clear route and managed to stick to it despite the pressure; and because Mr Sarkozy, whose initial stance, as a candidate, towards the Constitutional Treaty was practically irreconcilable with that of the countries that had ratified it, ended up accepting a text substantially identical to that which the French rejected in a referendum of 29 May 2005, thanks to his wide presidential victory. The combination of German rigidity and French flexibility thus proved crucial to finding a way out of the constitutional predicament.

Evidently it will only be possible to consider the solution to this predicament permanent when the ratification process is completed satisfactorily, enabling the treaty to enter into force as envisaged on 1 January 2009. From then onwards the Union's governments will have two primordial responsibilities to see to.

The first involves implementing effectively, without delay, the innovations set out in the Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty is extremely complex and will require notable adaptation efforts from the governments and

(10) For a more detailed vision, see pages 83-85 of the 2004-2005 edition of the *Strategic Panorama*.

Member States. In the field of foreign and security policy alone, the introduction of the institutional innovations relating to the permanent President of the Council and the incorporation of the High Representative into the European Commission require complex negotiations that could easily fall victim to rivalry, be it personal, between the President of the Council and the High Representative, or bureaucratic, between Council and Commission.

Mr Sarkozy's intention to offer Tony Blair the post of President of the Council is perhaps not the most encouraging indication of how easily these innovations will fit into the EU's political and institutional web. Given that the High Representative will sit on the European Commission as Vice-president, but will also preside over the Foreign Affairs Council, he will exert considerable control over the Union's foreign agenda, a fact which will most likely expose him to the crossfire of the Member States, the European Parliament and the European Commission itself. The first brushes over the design of the foreign service envisaged in the treaty highlight the very secondary role to which the Commission is relegated: although it would provide its very extensive network of offices throughout the world, the Member States would complete the staff with national diplomats and its management would fall to the High Representative (appointed by the Council), meaning in practice that the Member States would absorb the Commission's resources. As a result, it does not seem difficult to anticipate that the implementation of the institutional innovations in foreign policy matters will be more problematic than expected.

The second set of challenges related to the development of the Treaty refers to the question of whether the Member States will make the most of the instruments, flexibility and integration potential the Treaty provides. This goes hand-in-hand with progress in coordinating monetary and fiscal policy and policies, energy and climate change, the area of freedom, security and justice and, very especially, with structured cooperation in defence matters and the possibility of proceeding to flexible or differentiated forms of integration. (11) In all these areas, the Lisbon Treaty provides an extremely powerful instrument: whether or not the most is made of it will depend largely on leadership, but also on perceptions on the state of public opinion.

(11) «From threat to opportunity: Making flexible integration work», Sebastian Kurpas, Julia De Clerck-Sachsse, José I. Torreblanca and Gaëtane Ricard Nihoul. *EPIN Working Papers*, no.15, September 2006.

NEW LEADERS, YES BUT...

The institutions establish the game rules and set the limits that the players cannot overstep. Their mission is to map out the possibilities: the choice of whether to preserve or risk is a personal one. And so, with the same game rules, we can witness very different developments as to creativity or innovation. Therefore, there is no doubt that political will is the major driving force behind European integration and that the combination or succession of leaders prepared to move the boundaries of what is possible and desirable beyond the status quo is fundamental.

The question is, as pointed out in the introduction, whether the renewal in European leadership we have witnessed in the past two years (especially in France and Germany, but also in the United Kingdom, Poland and Italy) is conducive to shaping a team capable of giving the European project an impetus comparable to that experienced in the eighties under Mssrs. Delors, Kohl, González and Mitterrand.

Beginning with Germany, Chancellor Merkel has so far proved to have very sound credentials. Her handling of the constitutional tangle has been skilful, as also was in general her management of the EU's international agenda during the German presidency. In all the tricky problems she has encountered, Mrs Merkel has found an appropriate intermediate tone: in the United States she managed to criticise the Bush Administration for its disastrous human rights record but at the same time extended a hand to the restoration of the transatlantic spirit which has presided over Germany's post-war foreign policy. Similarly, in Iran, Germany has managed to be consistent with Europe's desire to shy away from the military option by supporting the work of the High Representative and lending credibility to the threat of sanctions as a means of reinforcing negotiation as a channel.

In the same way, with respect to Mr Putin's Russia, Mrs Merkel has displayed firmness when necessary but without allowing the essential strategic core of relations with Moscow to deteriorate. All this contrasts very vividly with Chancellor Schröder, whose policy towards the USA, although, so he claimed, based on sound principles, was undoubtedly toughened artificially by domestic electoral considerations, while his relationship with Russia was cloaked in excessive cynicism and realism and he failed to notice the warning signals time and time again. This ultimately conveyed to Moscow the message that it could systematically ignore the EU and make bilateral arrangements with the Member States by handing out an energy cheque. With Donald Tusk's victory in Poland, Mrs

Merkel furthermore has an unbeatable opportunity to restore the EU's policy towards Russia and, in doing so, again earn the confidence of the new Member States of Central and Eastern Europe by putting an end to the pitiful legacy left in the region by the Chirac-Schröder partnership. (12)

What is more, Mrs Merkel is helping reinforce Europe's leadership and Germany's position in the EU in the appropriate manner, that is, by assuming the political costs and effectively managing a series of far-reaching economic reforms that will enable Germany to boost its competitiveness, create jobs and comply with the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). It should not be forgotten that all this is going on in an extremely difficult political context dominated by a very tight election victory and a broad coalition government that is extremely complex to manage. However, despite all its virtues and ideological affinities, there is a huge distance between Mr Kohl's Germany and that of Mrs Merkel. Eighteen years on from the fall of the wall, today's Germany is a «normal» partner, meaning that it establishes its priorities with greater freedom and defines its interests more pragmatically. Therefore, although its European vocation and identity remain unchanged, this is compatible with a more intergovernmental than federal approach to foreign policy (see the position on the reform of the United Nations Security Council) and a more belligerent view with the respect to the difficulty of fitting its system of division of powers between state and *länder* into the logic of the internal market and community regulations.

Compared to this Germany which has now cruising at a stable altitude and speed, having consolidated its reforms, and is displaying an enormously coherent attitude both internally and externally, we find a France dominated by Mr Sarkozy's hyperactivity which is sending out signs that are notably contradictory on occasions, apart from the constant political and media spin. It may therefore be said that France's return to the European and international stage has been long awaited but is proving rather abrupt and is showing two sides: one hugely positive, which the country's partners should make the most of in order to give impetus to the European project; and one more problematic, which will no doubt spark (in fact it already has) a few major tensions that it would be unwise to ignore. (13)

(12) Poland's Second Return to Europe? Pawel Swieboda. ECFR Policy Brief /03 December 2007.

(13) I have developed these ideas in somewhat greater detail in «España, Francia y Europa, percepciones, sintonías y desajustes», a paper delivered at the Foro Hispano-Francés organised by CIDOB in Paris on 10-11 January 2008.

Perhaps there is no better gauge of Mr Sarkozy's leadership than the speech he delivered on 27 August 2007 to the ambassadors of the French diplomatic corps. (14) It shows, first of all, the transforming (almost revolutionary) nature of Mr Sarkozy's foreign policy. It amounts to a systematic attempt to completely rethink the foundations of French foreign policy of the past fifty years, probably to reinterpret and adapt it to the 21st century—in short to reinvent Gaullism (taken, aside from ideological connotations, to mean an ambitious view of France's presence and role in the world). From this perspective, Mssrs. Giscard and Mitterrand or Chirac could all be considered to have pursued the same foreign policy, a policy in which France acted as world leader «by default», an actor that is certainly influential but rather passive or defensive in its approaches, obsessively focused on balancing the USA's role in Europe and in the world, and more ready to criticise the USA from a position of counter-power than to take its own initiatives. In contrast, it may be deduced clearly from Mr Sarkozy's discourse that the France he has in mind does not wish to exert influence as a mere counter-power to the USA, in line with the legacy left by Mr de Gaulle for the French presidents to administer; rather, it wishes to actively shape an international order marked by huge challenges, which would require a new discourse on security and, very especially, on transatlantic relations and Europe's role in the world.

Second, in combination with the foregoing, the foreign policy Mr Sarkozy is proposing is inseparable from his very clear-cut view of his personal leadership. As Mr Sarkozy himself pointed out in his speech on 27 August, «the mark of a statesman is determination to change the course of events, not just to describe them, and not simply to explain them». As is only natural, there are two sides to this element of leadership: on the one hand, it can facilitate enormously the process of taking initiatives and decisions; on the other, it can distort the normal channel for formulating foreign policy in a democratic country, which consists in seeking and negotiating a balance between different visions, institutions, social sectors, priorities and actors, etc. Ultimately, a foreign policy that relies solely on personal leadership, failing to build a broad political and social support base, will be difficult to sustain, as it will be exposed to the fluctuations of the leadership that promotes it.

(14) Allocution de M. Nicolas SARKOZY, Président de la République, à l'occasion de la conférence des Ambassadeurs. Palais de l'Élysée, Paris, le 27 août 2007 http://elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/francais/interventions/2007/aout/allocution_a_l_occasion_de_la_conference_des_ambassadeurs.79272.html.

Therefore, in September 2006, when Mr Sarkozy proposed that the European Constitution be replaced by a mini-treaty, forced the reopening of the issue of Turkey's accession, imposed a Mediterranean Union, demanded that a Comité des Sages reflect on the Union's borders or unilaterally set about reviewing the European Security Strategy, the European perspective—in the sense of seeking compatibility between European and national interests—was obscured or relegated to the background. This bottom-up approach to European interests, based on discourse and failure to previously seek out consensus, considerably diminishes Europe's options, which are reduced to attempting to accommodate national interests if not to being ignored and marginalised if they pose a hindrance.

The exposition, development and outcome of the Comité des Sages, which was eventually converted into a Reflection Group, may exemplify very well this phenomenon, as no doubt does also the creation and development of the project for a Mediterranean Union, over which tension with Germany sent verbal sparks flying—a situation not witnessed for some time between the partners of the Franco-German axis. (15) As a result, as long as Mr Sarkozy continues to follow his own agenda and coordination with Berlin takes place a posteriori as opposed to a priori, the pace of the Franco-German axis will be marked by fits and starts rather than steady progress.

Nor can it be said that things are going well on the British side, as Mr Brown's disdain for Europe is well known; added to a congenital internal weakness in European policy affairs, the result is, once again, a stand-by European policy concerned solely with surviving the parliamentary procedure of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. But even if ratification proves successful, Mr Brown's pending task (to win elections) will place him in a straitjacket so tight that he will have even less room for manoeuvre than Mr Blair in matters in which the United Kingdom, despite the frailty of popular support for European integration, has managed to take the initiative in the past.

And so, although in the past the United Kingdom was able to achieve consensus with France on relaunching the European defence policy (St Malo agreements) and with Germany on reformist economic policies (Lisbon Agenda), its ability to complement the Franco-German axis in

(15) See Merkel's harsh statements on the issue. «Merkel sure Mediterranean Union will not happen». AFP, 7 December 2007, <http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1197048725.87/> and «Merkel criticises Sarkozy's Mediterrean Plans», Euobserver.com, 6.12.2007.

these two areas (defence and economic reforms) in which Paris and Berlin need London is questionable. The tentative headway made in this area by David Miliband's Foreign Office has been brought to an abrupt halt by the Prime Minister's office. (16) It therefore seems obvious that Mr Brown's political survival is closely tied to Europe flying so low that it cannot be detected by the radars of the conservatives, press and Eurosceptic public opinion. And so it remains to be seen what Mr Brown will do when Mr Sarkozy, during the French presidency of the Union in the second half of 2008, comes up with a double proposal for the reform of the European Security Strategy and, at the same time, of the Atlantic Alliance, in order to strengthen the synergy between the EU and NATO and the position of French defence policy in both. It is therefore reasonable to expect that the United Kingdom's position will continue to be markedly eccentric and more inhibiting than facilitating, even in matters of clear national interest to London.

It remains to mention the two other large states, Mr Zapatero's Spain and Mr Prodi's Italy, which always tend to be counted among those that will support and facilitate integration initiatives but are rarely their promoters, and their visibility as leaders therefore tends to be reduced or limited to sectorial aspects.

In the negotiations of the Constitutional Treaty, Spain has saved many institutional policies and reforms of great interest from the viewpoint of its European priorities (from the foreign, security and defence policy to energy and all aspects of the area of freedom, security and justice). However, Mr Zapatero's four years of European politics cannot but leave an aftertaste of dissatisfaction with respect to the gap between the depth and extension of demand for Europe formulated in 2004 under the heading «return to Europe» and the difficulties this return came up against, first in the form of an exhausted Franco-German leadership, and later the frustration triggered by the French and Dutch rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, which Spain decided to submit to a referendum, convinced that its contents and aims marked a definitive leap forward in political integration.

Aside from institutional aspects, the fact is that over these past four years Spain has too frequently faced situations and problems for which the

(16) See for example the tension between Downing Street and the Foreign Office over D. Miliband's speech delivered at Bruges on 15 November 2007. «No.10 admits PM changed Miliband speech», *The Guardian*, 16 November 2007. http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,,2212320,00.html.

EU could only provide partial or unsatisfactory responses. In major issues of interest to Spain (energy security, migratory flows and the security of Spanish investments in Latin America), Europe has proven incapable of measuring up to the standard required by Madrid's ambitions or needs. However, conversely, it is only fair to point out that in other issues that affect Europe's future in a decisive manner, such as Kosovo and Afghanistan, Spain has not always measured up to Europe's needs. In the case of Kosovo, because Spain has yet to find a way of reconciling its European interests, which should place it on the side of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy, with its domestic interests, which have ended up placing it on the side of Greece, Cyprus, Slovakia and Bulgaria. In the same respect, Spain has shown itself to be shackled by its public opinion over Afghanistan, and this has limited its ability to contribute to reinforcing the European security pillar when the need was greatest.

All this is related to an evident phenomenon that affects Spain's position within the EU and the future of its European policy and should be given thought: the fact that over the past decade Spain's growth has secured it a hitherto unseen position in the world, in Latin America but also in the European Union, the Mediterranean and Africa. Whereas in the past Spain tended to view its presence in these areas of the world in terms of its membership of the European Union, attempting to get the European Union to reinforce the capabilities and aims of our foreign policy and totally incapable of considering the European and national planes as independent concerns, the situation has progressively developed in a different direction than expected. To put it another way, it is Spain, not the European Union, that has become globalised in Latin America, and this is forcing Spain to strengthen its national assets and capabilities—in short, to build a Spanish presence. Therefore, whereas in the past Spain tended to think that the first step should be to Europeanise Spanish foreign policy, that is to build a European presence in Latin America or the Maghreb as a channel for Spanish interests, today we should probably stop and consider to what extent Europeanisation will occur inversely, that is, as a result of Spain's very intense presence in both areas. Spain is therefore most likely to arrive at the same conclusion (through conviction or imitation) that its French, German and British neighbours appear to have reached on the unavoidable need to reinforce its own capacity for action and projecting power (soft or hard), as these capabilities will be useful in both the national and European contexts—that is, independently of how and in what direction the European Union evolves.

Therefore, as mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, despite the emergence of a new galaxy of European leaders, the European Union is failing to achieve its potential, as it is being weighed down by imbalances and lack of unison. These problems are not insuperable, but they will substantially curb its ability to provide a rapid and coherent response to the challenges it faces. Let us now examine these challenges.

EUROPE IN THE WORLD. WANING OR WAXING?

Until very recently, progress in European integration could be assessed in endogenous terms. That is, in a *continuum* of integration marked at one end by the Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and at the other by political union, it was possible to locate fairly precisely the exact position of the European ship. After all, in accordance with integration theories, the EU was based on a perfectly linear and functionalist scheme whereby coal and steel would be followed by the internal market, the customs union, economic and monetary union and then political union. As the time factor was of relatively little importance because the EU was competing with itself, what mattered was not whether the EU was behind or ahead of some historical clock but whether it progressed or advanced, which led to endless discussions on whether the bottle was «half full» or «half empty».

However, when we introduce exogenous factors into our analysis, the problem begins to turn into what size is the bottle in relation to the other bottles beside it. As has been aptly pointed out, «in a world order defined by extra large powers—China on the rise, Russia re-emerging, plus a unilateral USA—[not to mention India and Brazil] and XXL problems like climate change, terrorism and global pandemics, size matters». (17) In other words, it is evident from world demographic and economic trends [see chapter 6 of this edition of the *Panorama*] that, in relative terms, the European bottle is small and will become increasingly so. This should be a stimulus to the Member States because only by pooling its economic, demographic and military assets does Europe stand a chance of achieving visibility at world level. This does not mean that the European states are doomed to extinction, but they are to diminishing political significance and a necessarily shrinking ability to exert influence. The geological or Hegelian vision that Europeans tend to have of their integration project, in the sense that time is on the side of their idea of the world, is therefore far from realistic.

(17) «El efecto Europa», by Mark Leonard and Richard Youngs. *Foreign Policy*, Spanish edition, October-November 2007, pp.34-39.

Let us take, for example, the ambit of «soft power», which is based on the appeal a country holds for others and sums up well the type of power in which Europe has traditionally placed its trust as a means of influencing the world. If we examine world surveys, we find that the European Union continues to enjoy considerable worldwide approval. (18) However, if we go to our most immediate periphery, like Egypt or Turkey we also see how this approval is being eroded. (19) In Croatia and Bosnia but also Turkey, the EU's doubts about its enlargement capacity are costing it dearly and the EU is beginning to be perceived as a power that is more imperial than benevolent (which creates protectorates and governs them through omnipotent proconsuls). (20) More or less the same is true of the Middle East, where the EU has enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy in the past, but is now coming across as too passive compared to the United States. This deterioration in the EU's image is also linked to how it conveys an image of bloody-mindedness towards both the goods and the people of third countries and to how it appears obsessively focused on its own security (energy, against terrorism, of its welfare states, etc.) vis-à-vis its neighbours' needs in terms of economic development, political governance and human security.

It does not appear to fare any better as regards the most classic indicators of «hard» power. In this respect, Europe's inability to make the most of its resources and harness its potential is simply astonishing. In the United Nations, for example, despite contributing over 40 per cent of the organisation's budget, being the leading donor of development assistance, having five seats on the Security Council (two with right of veto) and being the biggest contributor to peacekeeping operations, Europe is becoming increasingly less successful at forming broad-based blocs and is often overwhelmed by coalitions led by China.

Similarly, despite the fact that the twenty-seven strong EU's aggregate GDP is now greater than that of the USA, and although the EU is the world's leading trade bloc, it is incapable of making its principles and viewpoints heard in the main multilateral institutions. Therefore, although

(18) See the results of a worldwide survey conducted jointly by Gallup and the European Council on Foreign Relations, for which 52,000 people in 52 countries were interviewed, showing the worldwide appeal of the European Union. «New World Order: The balance of soft power and the rise of herbivorous powers» (by Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard), European Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Brief, 24 October, 2007.

(19) See World Publics See European Union as a «Positive Influence», <http://worldpublicopinion.org> 21 March 2007.

(20) Gerald Knaus and Marcus Cox, «The Helsinki moment in South Eastern Europe», *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 16, no. 1, January 2002.

its economic and market clout is considerable—for example the European Union accounts for 37 per cent of Iran's foreign trade (which should in theory afford it significant scope for action)—the truth is that its negotiating power is quite another matter.

Similarly, when the twenty-one EU Member States that also belong to NATO prove incapable of contributing more than a dozen of their 16,000 helicopters to the mission in Afghanistan, when they confess that only 2.8 percent of their forces (66,000 troops) are deployable overseas, or when, despite the United Nations' giving the go-ahead to the establishment of a peace mission for Chad-Darfur, they take months to agree on the distribution of costs and efforts, there can be no doubt that the problem lies not in the volume of the Twenty-Seven's aggregate military expenditure but in the scant returns it yields for European security.

Therefore, although the EU could evidently do much more to reinforce its capabilities and build a global presence for the world of the 2020s and 2030s, coherent and efficient use of the resources it has would in itself be undeniable progress and would furthermore allow it to respond, think and act for itself to effectively face the challenges it has currently set itself.

Let us take, for example, the case of the USA. It is true that the foreign policy pursued by the Bush Administration has been very negative from the point of view of European interests and that Europe is failing to sustain the multilateral order of the Cold War and post-Cold War in the face of the blows dealt by the USA, Russia and China. The problem is that Europe has grown accustomed to seeing the world through the USA, either expressing unconditional support for US policies but backing them as a free-rider—that is, without contributing to them, or criticising them unconditionally—but without being prepared to come up with alternative proposals and visions. However, from the International Criminal Court to the reform of the United Nations, to climate change and the intervention in Iraq, it can be argued that the USA has acted in accordance with its own interests, asserting itself wherever possible, negotiating when there was no choice. Why can't Europe do the same? Surely, that would be a better option than waiting for a change of administration in Washington—a change that, first of all, may not happen and, second, even if it does would not give rise to a foreign policy fully consonant with European interests, given the reluctance of the Senate but also of the Democrats to establish multilateral commitments in foreign policy. Europe evidently needs to think and act for itself, not in opposition to or at the service of the United States.

The best proof that Washington is not the source of Europe's problems (and therefore nor is it the solution) is found in Europe's immediate periphery. In the case of relations with Russia, for example, a report by the European Council on Foreign Relations states that, for the European Union, «Russia has emerged as the most divisive issue in the European Union since [the former US defence secretary] Donald Rumsfeld split the Member States into 'new' and 'old'». (21) The report identifies as many as five groups of Member States (from the most pacifying to the supporters of a new cold war) depending on their preferences in their dealings with Moscow. On account of these splits, the report comments, although the EU is a much bigger power than Russia (its population is three and a half times Russia's, its military expenditure 10 times greater and its economy over 15 times more), Mr Putin's Russia is succeeding in imposing its trade, energy and security views on Europe's. The report points out to what extent the EU is divided between those who regard Russia as a potential partner that can be lured into the Union's orbit through a process of «gradual integration» (by binding Russia to as many institutions as possible and by encouraging its investments in the EU energy sector, even if Moscow sometimes breaks the rules) and those who see Russia as a threat and wish to treat it as such by curbing Russia's expansionism and its scorn for democracy through a policy of «soft containment» that would entail excluding the country from the G-8, including Georgia in NATO, supporting anti-Russian regimes in the vicinity, the development of missile shields and of an «energy NATO» and putting a brake on any Russia investments in the European energy sector.

Nor can it be said that the EU is acting brilliantly in Kosovo, Serbia and Bosnia, countries where, despite all the triumphs achieved (diplomatic, military, political and economic), the European rifts are substantially wearing down the huge political capital accumulated after over a decade of active presence in the region. Here again it is difficult to put the blame on third parties.

In Kosovo, the EU is on the defensive, incapable not only of adopting a firm stance towards Belgrade and Pristina but in particular of setting clear limits on both the United States and Russia. In the current situation in which the four aforementioned parties are attempting to draw the EU towards their positions, which causes the EU to come across as weak and malleable, the EU ought to be capable of persuading the parties that only it can guarantee a stable, lasting and equitable solution. Paradoxically, the EU has furthermore shown itself to be firmer and more demanding with the Kosovars, making them see (rightly so) that a

(21) Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, «A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations». European Council on Foreign Relations, ECFR, Report 1/2007.

unilateral declaration of independence would be incompatible with the European commitment to assist Pristina with Belgrade. The problem is that, as in the case of Russia (also with respect to the controversial decision to lift the visa restriction on President Mugabe), the EU too often shows itself inclined to respond to each fresh difficulty by bending its principles rather than acting in accordance with them. In this respect the relaxation of the requirements imposed on Belgrade regarding the handing over of Mssrs Mladic and Karadzic to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia as a prerequisite for the signing of a partnership and stabilisation agreement hardly serves the EU's interests or indeed those of Serbian civil society, which the EU should help forge a mortgage-free future. At this stage in the game, the EU should have come to terms with the fact that the Kosovo knot will not be unravelled with the enthusiastic concourse of Serbia and Russia and should have acted in consequence, accommodating the interests of Belgrade and Moscow a posteriori, not incorporating them ex ante to the process which, as has been proven, leads to impasse.

Bosnia is another setting where the European Union's doubts and manner of proceeding sometimes erodes its own policy, without the need for a concourse of third parties. In the past, the prospect of accession accounted for the fact that candidate countries accepted impositions of considerable scope and depth. Even so, although the EU was a central element in the governance of the candidate countries, this was conducted from a distance via the community acquis, the pre-accession instruments and accession negotiations. However, in the Balkans, particularly Bosnia, the EU has governed without intermediaries in a protectorate system only acceptable insofar as the countries concerned were war ravaged and lacked future prospects. But when the prospect of accession weakened (owing in part to the «enlargement fatigue» that has gripped many Member States since the French and Dutch referendums of 2005), the protectorate regime has become increasingly untenable, especially as until very recently the EU has been incapable of compensating for the lack of accession prospects with generous agreements on the free movement of people and goods. And so, with its epicentre in Bosnia (as an extreme case) but extending to the EU's whole neighbourhood policy (from Ukraine to Morocco), the EU has run into the difficulty of finding the keys of a successful post-enlargement. As the surveys show, it is paradoxically in the country where the EU has done the most (in Bosnia) that its image has deteriorated the worst. In the view of some of its neighbours, the EU is only interested in controlling flows of people, fighting organised crime

and guaranteeing its energy security, sidestepping issues that are essential to these countries' future. (22)

Along the same lines, the daily messages that are undermining Europe's policy towards Turkey amount to an unprecedented squandering of political capital, which is probably offset very slimly by minor increases in the popularity of some leaders in some countries. In the particular case of France, it does not appear to make much sense to initiate a new Mediterranean policy, as Sarkozy has done, by going against our most willing neighbour and ally (Turkey). Opposing Turkey's accession is undoubtedly a legitimate option, but given that all the French governments (like those of the other twenty-seven Member States) are responsible for, and cosignatories to, the current policy (which considers unequivocally, and has therefore crossed the threshold some time ago, that Turkey *can* be a member of the EU), the change of direction cannot be made on the basis of a unilateral veto and threats but in a gradual, responsible and long-term manner.

Without enlargement there is no «spell of Europe». But the EU lacks a post-enlargement policy, and that is something that should be the subject of a political debate over the next few years. (23) A few years ago the then President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, came up with the motto of «everything but the institutions» in relation to Russia's European prospects. A policy of this type would probably have done the job with respect to the Mediterranean or Central and Eastern Europe in the nineties. Now, however, the EU could be as outwardly flexible as it is inwardly and the institutions could therefore be (at least partially) part and parcel of the European offer, should a renewed neighbourhood policy be formulated in issues like energy, Schengen, trade, etc. The EU of the future will be much more variable in geometry, and also in its policies: it seems logical for it to exploit this flexibility to give greater depth to its foreign policy.

CONCLUSION

Europe needs to carry on developing its project. The idea would be to reconsider institutional reforms as means of achieving aims, not as ends in themselves, a phenomenon we have witnessed too frequently in recent years. This call for pragmatism should not be interpreted as a vindication of the old functionalism or, indeed, as support for the highly criticisable

(22) «The worst in class. How the international protectorate hurts the European future of Bosnia and Herzegovina». *European Stability Initiative*. Discussion Paper, 8 November 2007.

(23) European Commission. «A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy». COM(2007) 774 final. 5/12/2007.

process of obscuring democracy whereby the constitutional text was rescued, or even as a plea for technocracy and depoliticisation, but as a need to diminish the polarisation to which the integration process has given rise over the past two years. In democracy, the means are always imperfect, the ends incomplete, and both are always challengeable; in such circumstances, the task of the political process is to facilitate the quest not for truth but for agreement. And this agreement needs to be made over a number of substantive matters that will make it possible to define the nature and lay the foundations of a European power. This calls for continuing to think about how to handle frontiers flexibly, but also about institutions and policies, and variable geometries, and also of course about how to rescue the democratic procedures and citizenship, etc.

Nonetheless, having previously rescued the European ship from the lethargy into which it was plunged by the French «no» of May 2005, a check for damage could only be expected to point to some worrying signs of tension.

The first relates to deepening. The Lisbon Treaty marks an obvious backward step with respect to the Constitutional Treaty, in both substantive terms (new red lines) and as regards the feeling of a shared aim (dismantling of identity). Whatever the case, it seems clear that the Constitutional Treaty set the integration ceiling at twenty-seven, meaning that in future we will see more variable geometry, sectorial specialisation and enhanced cooperation. Flexibility provides major practical possibilities but also entails a very significant risk: that the European Union (like the Mediterranean Union) might become a «union of projects» instead of a «project for union». It would certainly be curious, now that Mr Rumsfeld is out of the picture, to see the Union replace its motto («united in diversity» with Mr Rumsfeld's favourite slogan («the mission determines the coalition»).

Second, enlargement policy. Another of the consequences of the French referendum and subsequent crisis relates to the spread of a negative (and unfounded) retrospective judgement on the effects of the 2004 enlargement. On the one hand, this negative view of enlargement has considerably damaged France's image and influence in Central and Eastern Europe. On the other, Mr Sarkozy's volte-face with respect to Turkey, which fully contradicts the decisions adopted by Chirac for over a decade, is also sparking huge tension within the EU (especially with Spain, which has always defended Turkey's eligibility as promoter of the «Alliance of Civilisations»).

The challenge for the future no doubt seems to lie in steering these two engines (enlargement and integration) back on track, albeit necessarily with new formats and ambitions (surely more flexible and heterogeneous).

CHAPTER FIVE

A SPANISH VIEW OF A NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE ALLIANCE

A SPANISH VIEW OF A NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE ALLIANCE

FERNANDO DEL POZO

The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact, non-Westerners never do.
Samuel P. Huntington

Only a disturbed mind could believe that the Roman legions created more conflicts than they avoided through their very existence.
José Ortega y Gasset.

BACKGROUND

In the tree diagram of the basic NATO documents, the Strategic Concept (SC) does not appear to occupy a very significant position, mixed up as it is with a considerable corpus of Communiqués, Statements and other contingent or short-lived documents. This impression of scant importance is accentuated by the observation that there are only two SCs in the public domain, that of 1991 and the current one dated April 1999, a fact which would seem to indicate that during the most brilliant period in NATO's history—the years in which it achieved its clear-cut goal of protecting Europe from the Soviet threat—the organisation felt no need for a conceptual document of this kind.

The fact is, however, that the importance of such a document is much greater than it seems. First of all, even ignoring other documents that bear the same name but are classified, being exclusively military in scope, it is necessary to hang from the same branch as the Strategic Concepts of 1991 and 1999 the far-reaching *Harmel Report* of December 1967, which went down in history for enshrining the allied consensus on the principle of flexible response and, although differently structured to the SCs, had a similar objective that cannot be expressed more clearly and succinctly than by the sentence between quotation marks in its first paragraph:

Study the future tasks which face the Alliance, and its procedures for fulfilling them in order to strengthen the Alliance as a factor for durable peace.

Let us compare this with the preamble to the 1991 SC:

While reaffirming the basic principles on which the Alliance has rested since its inception, [NATO Heads of State or Government] recognised that the developments taking place in Europe would have a far-reaching impact on the way in which its aims would be met in future. In particular, they set in hand a fundamental strategic review.

and with the 1999 SC which, after stating that it is merely an adaptation of the 1991 SC to the many subsequent changes in the strategic landscape, expresses its aim as follows:

This new SC will guide the Alliance as it pursues this agenda. It expresses NATO's enduring purpose and nature and its fundamental security tasks, identifies the central features of the new security environment, specifies the elements of the Alliance's broad approach to security, and provides guidelines for the further adaptation of its military forces..

It seems clear that all three documents are predominantly political and aimed at establishing a new point of departure that is increasingly ambitious and detailed, owing either implicitly or explicitly to a new situation, while professing to maintain as a reference the basic principles enshrined in the Washington Treaty.

At this point it is appropriate to ask whether, in each case, it would not have been more practical and expeditious to negotiate a new treaty. Indeed, the all but forgotten Article 12 states that:

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

However, despite the numerous factors that have influenced peace in the North Atlantic area since then and the development of new global and regional organisations under the Charter of the United Nations, not only has no Ally presented the formal application required in order to carry out a review but there is a palpable reluctance to do so. And there is good reason for this, since the difficulties of reaching a consensus on this would not only be insurmountable but would also give rise to a bitter

debate on mutual defence as the bedrock of the Alliance, which would be very hard to settle. This is largely why matters of such substance have been entrusted to mere SCs since the end of the Cold War. It should be added that, while the possibility of a partial abandonment of mutual defence has always been a source of friction, misgivings have increased with the advent to NATO of nations on the immediate periphery of Russia, towards which they continue to profess great mistrust. Such feelings stem from the memory of the years of direct domination or at least a subordinate position in the Warsaw Pact; from Russia's unconcealed and almost possessive interest in its near abroad; and furthermore, in some cases, from the complicated presence of large, disgruntled Russian minorities in their territories.

It should be pointed out that a similar reasoning to that which is preventing a thorough reform of the NATO Treaty has also been applied at SC level, resulting in the document called *Comprehensive Political Guidance* (CPG), on which consensus was reached at the Riga summit of 29 November 2006. Its aim is undoubtedly much more modest than that of a SC, as it merely aspires to provide political guidelines for the Alliance's ongoing transformation in matters of capability, planning and intelligence for the next 10 to 15 years, on the basis established by the 1999 SC, which it amazingly refers to as describing an environment in terms that remain valid.

THE NEW SITUATION

Accepting, then, that a reform of the Treaty of Washington should not be attempted, the question arises of whether it is actually necessary or merely convenient to set about drafting a new version of the Strategic Concept, bearing in mind that the document currently in force was adopted eight years ago, and also whether it should continue to be increasingly ambitious and whether considerations of vital importance to the Alliance's future should be included in the apparently humble SC. If the answer is yes, it will be necessary to set limits on the desire for change stemming from the decision not to negotiate a new treaty.

Events since 1999

The first point to consider is what has happened since April 1999 to make the 1999 SC obsolete. The answer is manifold and glaringly obvious in some cases: it would almost suffice to mention the terrorist attack of 11

September 2001—and the subsequent attacks in Madrid and London—to indicate the extent of the before and after in the concepts of security and defence. But it should also be remembered that the adoption of the SC (23/24 April 1999) took place at the height of the Kosovo campaign (24 March to 11 June 1999), the first ever military campaign NATO had conducted and a highly controversial decision precisely because it involved attacking a country that was not threatening NATO itself—far removed from the principle of self-defence enshrined in the treaty, and furthermore without the legal backing of a mandate of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). A NATO document was ill equipped to settle the basic dilemma between mere self-defence on the one hand and the defence of interests or «humanitarian intervention» (1) on the other, when it had to be negotiated in such conditions, amid a campaign that sparked some allies' misgivings, was dragging on for longer than expected, was of questioned effectiveness and proved to be far from ending promptly and happily. Indeed, tasks other than collective defence are mentioned only once in the 1999 SC, in paragraph 12, (2) and even then elliptically.

Perhaps no less important in this connection is the fact that the building of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) is mentioned repeatedly in the 1999 SC as an internal task of the Alliance, yet only months later, when the posts of secretary general of the Western European Union (WEU) and the European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy were merged (20 November 1999), the European Union began to absorb the WEU's functions, the WEU became relegated to a dormant position and, in short, the ESDI ceased to be a NATO task and the ESDP emerged within the EU, ushering in a dynamic period of major decisions of far-reaching significance to the Union's relationship with NATO and, accordingly, to the Alliance itself.

But not only has the strategic environment changed: NATO itself has changed substantially. Whereas in April 1999 the allies had just increased from 16 to 19, they now number 26. Partnership for Peace (PfP), then scarcely more than an incipient organisation, has witnessed new

(1) The use of «humanitarian intervention» and other similar terms does not imply that the debate begun by the then UN SG Kofi Annan in 2000 is considered to have been settled, even though at the time it was interpreted as an *ex post facto* justification of the operation conducted the previous spring. Whatever the case, it is a universal debate on the philosophical and moral aspects of such intervention and as such is independent of its being contrasted with mutual defence in NATO.

(2) [...] *its commitment, exemplified in the Balkans, to conflict prevention and crisis management, including through peace support operations* [...]

incorporations during this period which, culminating with the accession of Serbia and Montenegro in 2007, have succeeded in covering the map of Europe—that is, the goal of including the whole Euro-Atlantic space in the Treaty’s most important subsidiary organisation has been achieved. (3) This period also saw the consolidation of the Mediterranean Dialogue which, then at its embryonic stage, soon evolved from a «NATO+1» dialogue with five members into the current «NATO + 7». This and the offer extended to these Mediterranean coastal nations for them to use the *Partnership Coordination Cell* (PCC) brings this forum closer to the most desirable and proven structure of the PfP. (4) And lastly, during this period relations with Russia, which were established in the *Founding Act* with a structure—the *Permanent Joint Council*—that was complicated and unsatisfactory as it was based on mistrust, with a system whereby Russia was merely informed of what the Allies had previously agreed on, evolved into a more mature organisation that was much more acceptable to both sides (the NATO-Russia Council with its subordinate NRC-Military Representatives and the respective Preparatory Committees), in which Russia is treated on an equal footing though, naturally, there are limits on the matters addressed and decision-making and regulatory powers of the decisions adopted.

The psychological moment

On a more subjective note than the foregoing facts, there is a widespread perception that the Alliance is currently somewhat lacking in «drive». An observation shared by the numerous comments made by analysts and observers is the already lengthy but above all indefinite

(3) The Euro-Atlantic area is not formally defined in any document; however it is widely taken to refer to Europe, Canada and the United States. The inclusion of a number of Asian nations in the PfP, which clearly distorts this interpretation, has been forced by the fact that these are former republics of the USSR, which cannot be denied equal treatment to that of the European nations of the same provenance.

(4) However, in contrast to what has been stated of the Asian nations belonging to the PfP, for the nations of North Africa, Israel and Jordan, whose geographical circumstances are comparable but their political origin is different, it was necessary to create the Mediterranean Dialogue given most Allies’ reluctance to enter into a formal union with non-European nations. The use of the PCC and other PfP instruments does not alter the basic divide between the two organisations. This should be remembered when it is proposed at some fora to extend the invitation to non-European countries but with sound democratic credentials such as Australia, New Zealand and Japan. Cf. also Article 10 of the Treaty of Washington: *The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.*

duration of the mission in Afghanistan, «donor fatigue»—which translates, for example, into the impossibility of generating four additional battalions and 16 helicopters among forces that are equipped with 3,600 of the latter and have deployed (excluding those of the USA) only 2.8 per cent of their forces to all current missions; the growing disparity of the allies' goals; and, partly as a result of these last two factors, the perception that operations are increasingly conducted by *coalitions of the willing*, which, ironically, is especially irritating to nations whose *willingness* is scant. All this is crying out for a serious debate in which these factors are not merely rumoured or drawn attention to by channels of social dissemination but actually laid on the Council's table to be discussed, agreed on and reflected in a sufficiently authoritative text. This would give new impetus to the Alliance at this crucial time without posing an excessive risk, as the possible harm would be limited to a second-level document.

TIME FACTORS

Accepting that the changes witnessed since April 1999 have been sufficiently significant to justify a new SC, it is now appropriate to ask whether this is the most convenient time to undertake the task or whether there are other factors that would make it advisable to postpone it.

The first of these factors that comes to mind is the operation in Afghanistan. NATO's acceptance of the responsibility of the ISAF, and, the ISAF's subsequent expansion across the whole Afghan territory, are relatively recent. More importantly, there is still no clear time frame for the operation, nor has a withdrawal strategy yet been put forward other than in the form of general statements about transferring responsibility to the Afghan government when it is ready. However, it is widely recognised that ISAF is the largest-scale undertaking in which NATO has ever engaged and that its success or failure will largely determine NATO's own future. In such circumstances, is it timely to debate on the more general and essential aspects of NATO's purpose and strategy, when the main practical application of all this is currently under way and its results dubious?

We could answer by citing the parallel with the 1999 SC, the negotiation and approval of which was not prevented by the fact of its coincidence with the Kosovo war, but this would amount to using as a positive argument something that has been identified as a shortcoming, as indeed this brought conceptual limitations. It is more straightforward simply to recognise that we will probably remain in Afghanistan for a long period that is unpredictable but

will most likely be a few years. It would not be wise to postpone *sine die* such a fundamental intellectual exercise. In other respects, to regard the fact that there is an operation under way as grounds for not initiating a strategic debate could bring things to a continuous standstill, as it is likely that there will always be *some* operation running for many years to come. (5)

The calendar

There are other factors that are apparently minor but actually of primary importance because they affect nations' willingness to reach consensus. These are the NATO Council's schedule of meetings and nations' own electoral calendars.

The promulgation of a document of this significance requires the due pomp and circumstances, which are generally provided by the Summits of Heads of State or Government (HOSG), even though it has actually been negotiated at ambassador level down to the last detail. Two summits are currently slated to be held in the first halves of 2008 and 2009 respectively, the latter to coincide with NATO's sixtieth anniversary. Having ruled out 2008 owing to shortage of time, it appears that the goal should be to have a SC ready for approval by early 2009.

As for the electoral calendars, a Head of State or Government, particularly those of the leading nations, will consider his or her ability to influence the drafting of the future SC in the direction that suits them. As a result, any SC negotiations conducted too close to elections with the potential or certainty of resulting in a change of government will be regarded negatively by the incumbent. Such is the case of President George W. Bush, who will constitutionally step down from his post in January 2009, and no doubt would rather have begun work earlier to ensure a new SC that he could consider his legacy. What is more, the new tenant of the White House is unlikely to easily agree to continue with whatever has been negotiated so far or to begin a new one at the start of their mandate. Therefore, if President Bush cannot be persuaded to begin immediately—and perhaps his successor to accept the work performed up until January 2009—the delay in producing a new SC, what with the German elections in 2009 which would in turn lead to another delay, could take us to 2010 at least. (6)

(5) It is impossible not to recall in this connection the gates of the temple of Janus in Rome, which were closed as a sign of absence of war only four times in eight centuries.

(6) Chancellor Angela Merkel has publicly backed the launch of a new SC since 2006.

Other leading nations not affected by elections in this period, such as France, may consider the same factor but for the opposite reason—that is, their diminishing capacity to influence in relation to the United States' reluctance to produce a document with a genuine vision of the future. (7)

A common background to all this is the NATO secretary general's own calendar. The current SG, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, who has expressed a clear wish to undertake the task, will end his mandate, already extended, shortly after the 2009 summit. For reasons similar to those stated earlier, his successor cannot be expected to place the SC among his immediate priorities and, therefore, if it cannot be presented at the summit, it may be delayed for two years.

In short, there is no time to lose. Hesitations need to be overcome and work started as soon as possible. Perhaps the Bucharest summit would be the time—with appropriate preparation—to achieve consensus on launching the project, with the commitment of having it ready by the following summit of 2009.

STRUCTURE

If there is an objective defect for which the 1999 SC can be blamed it is lack of originality. Its structure, after an introduction devoted practically entirely to explaining why it was necessary to draft a new one so soon despite the fact that the «dramatic changes» brought about by the end of the Cold War had been duly taken into account by the 1991 SC, was a very faithful reproduction of that of the previous SC. The table in figure 1 is intended to show the parallels, for which the order of some of the chapters has been changed.

(7) However, France might consider the present circumstances to be favourable to President Nicolas Sarkozy's wish to seek ways of diminishing or putting an end to the peculiarities of its membership of the Alliance. Indeed, he has given several indications of this, such as in an interview granted to the *New York Times* and *International Herald Tribune* on 23 September 2007. Jacques Chirac's failed attempt at this in 1997 would undoubtedly have been reflected in the SC of 1999, a fact which confirms that a new SC would be the appropriate and acceptable document for France if such intentions prove to be true. But France's plans are more complex since, in addition to making appropriate political preparations at home to «return to the fold» without national pride taking a battering, France wishes to implement a new European Security Strategy within the EU during his presidency in the second half of this year and only then, with the priority path of the ESDP firmly mapped out, address the NATO SC in order to organise the rest of the strategic field. A white paper on national defence, currently being studied in Paris and due to be published in March 2008, will presumably lay new foundations for the French strategy and accordingly establish the goals France pursues in the EU and NATO.

1991 SC	1999 SC
	Introduction
Part I: The Strategic Concept The New Strategic Environment Security Challenges & Risks	Part II: Strategic Perspectives The Evolving Strategic Environment Security Challenges and Risks
Part II: Alliance Objectives & Security Functions The Purpose of the Alliance The Nature of the Alliance The Fundamental Tasks of the Alliance	Part I: The Purpose and Tasks of the Alliance
Part III: A Broad Approach to Security Protecting Peace in Europe Dialogue Cooperation Collective Defence Management of Crises & Conflict Prevention	Part III: The Approach to Security in the 21 st Century The Transatlantic Link The Maintenance of Alliance Military Capabilities The European Security & Defence Identity Conflict Prevention & Crisis Management Partnership, Cooperation & Dialogue Enlargement Arms Control, Disarmament & Non-proliferation
Part IV: Guidance for Defence Principles of Alliance Strategy The Alliance New Force Posture The Missions of Alliance Military Forces Guidelines for the Alliance Force Posture Characteristics of Conventional Forces Characteristics of Nuclear Forces	Part IV: Guidelines for the Alliance's Forces Principles of Alliance Strategy The Alliance's Force Posture
Part V: Conclusion	Conclusion

Figure 1

In addition to the obvious similarity between the two SCs, the table attests to the simple, albeit logical and classical, structure: after the exposition of the current circumstances, which is also a justification of the task, comes the vision or statement of the objective; both make up the most purely political part of the SC. Lastly, as a logical consequence of the foregoing, the guidelines for action are established to cover the ground separating the two previous statements, that is, the strategic part so to speak. In short, situation, objective and plan of action. Without going so far as to attempt to outline the hypothetical 2009 SC—a futile task as the result

depends on achieving the necessary consensus—we can use this simple scheme to list the elements and factors that ought to be included.

SITUATION

The main justifications of the need for a new SC have been expressed above. However, it would be necessary to conduct a thorough analysis of the strategic situation and outlook for a timeframe commensurable with the expected duration of the SC. Most prospective studies establish horizons of between 10 and 20 years. If consensus were achieved on a commitment to renew the SC every 10 years, the envisaged horizon could be 20, as this would ensure continuity and would mean that long-term programmes, particularly those related to armaments, would not be affected by changes and uncertainties of each new version. The document produced by the NATO Supreme Allied Command Transformation (SACT) entitled *Future Security Environment* (FSE), for which the time horizon extends to 2025, could, duly trimmed and adapted, serve as a basis for this section of the SC.

But whether or not the FSE is used, the strategic situation should include variables that have never been considered until now and should be dealt with explicitly instead of making general observations that add little value. For example, the uneven distribution of water, exacerbated by climate change, and of energy are sources of instability which, combined with the artificiality and consequent fragility of the frontiers that have emerged from the disintegration of the USSR and from decolonisation and secession in Africa, will eventually translate into failed states and classic or asymmetric conflicts that will affect the allied nations' interests in any event. The uneven distribution of wealth, stemming from the latter and other causes, will continue to be the growing source of mass, uncontrolled migratory flows of particular importance to Spain, whose southern frontier marks the biggest per capita income difference in the world between two adjacent nations. The current redistribution of energy consumption brought about by the growing economic might of demographic giants like India and China should also be regarded as a principal strategic factor. Energy security, the apple of discord in the NATO Council owing chiefly to France's opposition to addressing it—as it does not consider it a responsibility of an organisation that France has traditionally held to be exclusively military—should be dealt with in this part of the SC as an immediate consequence of the foregoing and as a factor clearly linked to the terrorism that should be addressed with the rigour and depth that its seriousness deserves. Both factors, together with organised crime, were

covered in the 1999 SC with astonishing indifference (8) that contrasts markedly with the consideration given in the paragraphs immediately before it to the risks in the Euro-Atlantic area—the geographical reference taking priority over the nature of the risk—nuclear weapons and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. A Strategic Concept worthy of its name cannot afford to address matters as crucial as terrorism and energy security with just a casual mention, failing to tackle them in depth.

Relations with the European Union

A primordial component of the strategic situation, already mentioned among the factors that have changed since 1999, is the European Union and its relations with NATO. Each side's respective view of the other—as a political and economic giant but without comparable military capability and as an exclusively military power without real possibilities of political or economic power—are not going to change. But these two exaggerations contain more than a grain of truth, if only because perceptions generate their own reality, and the consequence is, in addition to a mutually destructive clash, that neither organisation will end up being the actor we need to defend Western interests, let alone the combination of both through either coordination or role sharing.

Although much of what is unsatisfactory about these relations stems from the so-called *participation issue*, (9) there are also sources of friction in the nations' different visions of the future of the EU, whose vocation for supranationality affords it a certain sense of superiority over the limited,

(8) *Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources.* (Part II, para. 24)

(9) Term used to refer to the fact that NATO and the EU share 21 members out of 26 and 27, respectively. The interests of the five non-EU Allies (Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey and the US) and the six non-Allied EU members (Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden) are at least partially divergent from those of the shared members, and in some cases the six use their position in the organisation to support their particular objectives which unfortunately sometimes find their mirror image in the other group (the paradigmatic example is Turkey-Cyprus). The provision that sparks the most discussion on this matter is found in the letter from the NATO SG to the EU High Representative for CFSP of 13 December 2002, which states as follows: *We are now in a position to give the EU ready access to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily. To that end, we have today taken the following decisions: NATO-EU strategic cooperation and the implementation of Berlin Plus arrangements will be confined to NATO members and those non-NATO EU members that have subscribed to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Framework Document, thus becoming a party to the PfP, and that have concluded bilateral security agreements with NATO.*

merely international organisations. In particular, relative to the purpose of this discussion, the foregoing would logically lead to the European Union being represented as such on the NATO Council, and there are bound to be suggestions that this be discussed and eventually reflected in the SC. But such a representation on top of those of the European partners cannot be welcomed with equanimity by the USA, which would regard its leadership as being disputed or diminished, and it would not be conceivable for most partners for this hypothetical representation to replace wholly or partially the individual representation of the nations. Even the (relatively) more timid suggestion that the European nations could form a caucus, thereby ensuring a common position in significant matters, has been fiercely rejected in American political circles. It is necessary to ensure that this debate—so far fortunately restricted to newspaper articles and opinions expressed in seminars—does not creep into discussion of the SC, lest the project should fail before even getting off the ground.

The problem is not so much the possible demise of the concept of the two pillars of NATO as whether it is possible to find a formula satisfactory to both sides of the Atlantic allowing cooperation—currently almost non-existent—between NATO and the EU. The feasibility of going further than the paralysing Berlin Plus accords—a possibility that has already been dubbed informally «Berlin Plus-Plus» or «Berlin Plus in reverse»—to solve the consequences of the participation issue and to allow, as a logical counterpart to the EU's having recourse to NATO planning and assets, NATO's having recourse to the EU's now not so insignificant assets such as the European Union Satellite Centre and its ability to analyse satellite images, should certainly be debated. This would reduce the asymmetry between them, at least in theory, and accordingly the harmful perception mentioned at the beginning of this section.

The problem of whether NATO can or should make use of non-military instruments to achieve its objectives has been a more philosophical and general aspect of the same bone of contention that surfaces in connection with energy security. The *Comprehensive Political Guidance* deals with the problem by requiring the development of the capability to lead operations (implicitly military) in circumstances in which other actors—political, economic, etc.—also come into play. (10) But the wording of the

(10) Para. 16.h.: *The ability and flexibility to conduct operations in circumstances where the various efforts of several authorities, institutions and nations need to be coordinated in a comprehensive manner to achieve the desired results, and where these various actors may be undertaking combat, stabilisation, reconstruction, reconciliation and humanitarian activities simultaneously.*

paragraph is somewhat ambiguous concerning the essential dilemma of whether this means conducting operations in a multi-actor environment with external coordination, an option favoured by the nations that consider that only the UN or EU has at its disposal the political mechanisms for exercising such coordination, or whether this coordination is exercised by NATO itself as an essential part of the planning and conduction of the operations, which is not exclusively military but multifaceted; this latter option is more in line with the origin of the concept of *Effects Based Approach to Operations*, which it turn is founded on the American concept of *Effects Based Operations*, relatively easy to introduce at merely national level. This debate cannot be avoided, and a Strategic Concept should be the document with sufficient status to handle it in an authoritative manner.

OBJECTIVE

The vision of the future of NATO is, indeed, the part with greatest potential for disagreement. The dilemma between common defence and peacekeeping operations, to put it simply, is still too far from being settled for this aspect to be able to be tackled without risking failure. In addition to the difficulty stemming from Allies' different perceptions, it is also necessary to bear in mind the opinion held by the outside world, which is not unanimous either. Suffice it to recall that we cannot design a future NATO that arouses even greater hostility from Russia or China than their current mistrust, or offer, should this be the case, peacekeeping support services that are ignored by the United Nations.

This latter aspect deserves to be treated differently. It is surprising at the least that an organisation which has rendered important services to the UN in Europe, Asia and, to a lesser extent, Africa and has three of the five permanent Security Council members among its most influential Allies should be systematically scorned when it has attempted to formalise agreements that could provide a formal framework for possible—and unfortunately likely—future humanitarian interventions modelled, for example, on that which prevented a mass-scale genocide of the Albanian population of Kosovo. The declaration to this effect in paragraph 31 of the 1999 SC is the expression of a unilateral desire thwarted by the disdainful inaction of the party on the receiving end of the offer. (11) However, lack of

(11) NATO recalls its offer, made in Brussels in 1994, to support on a case-by-case basis in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise.

acceptance of these desires for collaboration reflected in the 1999 SC and also expressed on other occasions, formal and informal, earlier and later, should not prevent a fresh attempt in a new SC. Support for NATO action by the UN Security Council, although objectively unnecessarily—and at times of dubious quality as it can be obtained with a qualified majority (including the five «big») as opposed to the more laborious but sounder system of consensus whereby the NATO Council decisions are made—provides a psychological stamp of legitimacy that is greatly appreciated by public opinion. This could be a key factor to obtaining and maintaining public support for intervention in conflicts that are often difficult for the uninitiated public to understand.

Paradoxically, however, the elements for settling the dilemma between the two visions of NATO—purely defensive v. more pro-active—have already been used in practice: the day after the attacks of 11 September 2001, the NATO Council declared at a special meeting that Article 5 of the Treaty was applicable on the grounds of the evidence that one of the Allies had been attacked on its own territory. But with this decision, which was formally well supported by the essence of the treaty and consistent with the literal wording of the text, two pillars of NATO's strategic thought were shattered: the presumption that the hostile agent would be one or several states and the tacit principle that the reaction would take place at the site of the hostile action, that is, on NATO territory, as this reaction would entail—in the allied imaginary—applying defence, reinstating the territorial integrity of the attacked Ally and restoring the situation to its original state, all of which is in keeping with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

As it was, the underlying conceptual leap in the decision to take the reaction to the east Mediterranean and subsequently to the Hindu Kush, a good way away from New York, and with an intention very different to re-establishing the *status quo*, is that mutual defence no longer necessarily refers to territory but to citizens, extending the asset protected by Article 5 to a scope that could eventually go beyond territory and citizenship to encompass the interests of the allied nations. It is therefore necessary to codify this new philosophy, using the SC to reinterpret the clause on the collective *defence* of allied territory in Article 5 of the Treaty as a collective *response* to an attack on the territory, *population or interests* of the allied nations which, on account of its magnitude or scope, requires concerted action with the contribution of the capabilities of all or several of the Allies.

The literal wording of Articles 4 and 5 of the treaty could be a hindrance to this reinterpretation. Article 4 recognises that the threat can be not only to territorial integrity but also to the parties' «political independence» or «security»; however, it only envisages consultations between Allies as a result. And Article 5, which envisages an armed response, does so in the hypothesis of an armed attack in Europe, North America, the North Atlantic or the Mediterranean. A considerable dialectical capacity will be necessary, by developing articles 4 and 5 jointly, in order to overcome the most conservative nations' reluctance to leave the treaty as a source of inspiration and make the more humble SC the text to be applied in practice in the event of a crisis. (12)

But the chief merit of a hypothetical consensus on this matter would not only be that, in the event a new crisis triggered by a terrorist attack of the magnitude of that of 11 September, NATO would have a handbook to follow instead of having to improvise. Perhaps the greatest advantage would be that it would lay the foundations for settling one of the most substantial problems that paralyse or significantly reduce NATO's action, even in semi-permanent operations such as the *International Security Assistance Force* (ISAF) in Afghanistan or *Active Endeavour* in the Mediterranean, and jeopardise the survival of the best force concept ever achieved, the *NATO Response Force* (NRF)—that is, scant willingness to contribute forces. The current bidding system employed at force contribution conferences does not respond well to operations or forces that are not firmly anchored to the «contract» that the nations sign when joining the Alliance: the different degree of urgency or necessity—or local political convenience—with which the problem is viewed by the various capitals, in the absence of a common reference reflected in a shared text, causes reluctance to prevail, and even leads the palliatives which are periodically decided on with varying degrees of consensual success, such as extending the application of common funding to cases such as strategic transport or theatre communications, to be of little or no practical effect. It is not unreasonable to assume that a firm

(12) Article 4 of the treaty: *The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.*

Article 5: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and [...] each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith [...] such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.[...]

commitment, through a new SC based on broad consensus, towards a flexible interpretation of Article 5 as regards its application in the event that the Allies' interests are threatened and a collective response—rather than just defence—to these cases would stimulate force contribution or, if preferred, would make it more imperative. (13)

Another aspect that has been considered only marginally up until now and would steer things in the same direction is the establishment of multinational forces, if the SC could include a firm stimulus, or even create the need in some way. Collective defence had no need for such mechanisms, and in any case it was not considered that integrating ground forces from different nations beyond division level was worthwhile or even practicable. Nowadays the new means of command and control, the experience gained and the practical universality of the system of professional recruitment have made it possible to fulfil a requirement stemming both from the size of the operations conducted—sometimes modest battalion level—and from the need to allow the involvement of some of the new nations with very small armed forces, that is, the setting up of multinational forces at brigade level or even lower. This, by linking participation in an operation to that of other Allies, hinders reluctance, as proven by the experience of the Eurocorps (EC), the longest standing multinational ground force, none of whose components has omitted to participate when it has been the EC's turn, even when their individual national contributions through other channels have failed.

An aspect of interest on many occasions, particularly as a crucial element of the exit strategy of all the operations conducted, is assistance in teaching and training the armed forces of the country in whose peacekeeping operation we are involved and, more generally, in the *security sector reform*. Principles such as subordination of the armed forces to political power, respect for democracy and individual rights, so often subordinated to fancied rights of peoples, which are fallaciously invoked by secessionist movements. These are non-strictly military issues in which NATO can make a positive contribution of its well-earned prestige and in which an indoctrination carried out by precisely by NATO military of recognised professional efficiency and directed at military of failed states or nations at risk of becoming so—where it is not uncommon for the military to be one of the causes of instability—exerts disproportionately significant

(13) This reasoning is no doubt behind an American position in principle favourable to the reinterpretation of Article 5, although the aforementioned time factors make the USA circumstantially reluctant to undertake the task.

influence. It is certainly true that education cannot in itself be the sole aim of NATO's activity, as teaching is worth little unless accompanied by the prestige provided by previous success in that field, but NATO can still pride itself on this prestige, and accordingly reap the dividends it brings in order to apply them in the crucial *security sector reform*.

SPAIN AND THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT: OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS

Spanish interests are similar in scope and importance to those of our European allies. In short, although not global—an adjective applicable to the United States and perhaps to the European Union as such—they are nonetheless scattered and potentially remote. Furthermore, Spain's late accession to the Alliance and the lengthy period that elapsed until normal membership was attained are at least a partial reflection that the Soviet threat, for which collective defence was conceived, was never felt very to be close by Spanish public opinion. Whether this was a consequence primarily of Spain's geographical distance from the area where this menace could first surface or another more political or ideological reason is irrelevant. The fact is that after the fall of the Soviet empire, the Coordination Agreements, which were designed to give a certain amount of substance to its membership but without being part of the integrated military structure, enshrined the principle that whereas the Allies were obliged to come to Spain's defence, this obligation was not reciprocal but limited to defending Spain's own territory, as this, according to the concept thus established, was Spain's true contribution—to give depth to European defence vis-à-vis a hypothetical Soviet invasion southwestwards across Europe's flatlands. It is important to recall those now defunct agreements of scant solidarity because they underline Spain's indifference to the principle of collective defence. (14) This

(14) A recent analysis by the Real Instituto Elcano (ARI no. 48, December 2007) presents data garnered from a survey about the sending of Spanish troops to missions. Circumstances in which this is justified in Spanish people's view, in ascending order, are: intervention in civil war (considerable disagreement, 45% find little or no justification); NATO missions (not much better); helping a friend, genocide, international terrorism, protecting Spaniards, territorial defence and finally, meeting with almost universal approval, for humanitarian assistance (apparently perceived as not entailing combat actions; this would be fairly or greatly justified for 89%). This is not the place to analyse this opinion structure (and its inconsistencies, for example NATO missions can involve any of the other tasks listed, a fact which ought to put this section in a different category), though it gives a sufficiently clear picture of Spaniards' scant enthusiasm for military risks in this century — when the system of compulsory military service, the main theoretic justification for anti-militarism was abolished some time ago — particularly if altruistic.

ought to make Spain a fervent advocate of the transformation of the Alliance in the sense of giving priority to the other aforementioned principles of collective defence.

The opportunity that the launch of a new SC would provide to Spain lies in joining the group of nations that lead the movement, unfettered by any political burdens. Neither the opposition parties nor public opinion will question a hypothetical government that pursues this path, while the initiative would enable it to exert greater influence on the concept than nations with a more passive or reluctant attitude.

This influence should help correct a problem that is not exclusive to Spain. «Donor fatigue», mentioned earlier, is a problem that runs deeper than the impossibility of generating forces, however crucial this may be. When a shortcoming that has been addressed after lengthy, laborious petitions from the operational commands has proven to be associated with greater risks, the reproaches, stirred by the media, that the donor nation levels at the more reluctant allies may poison the climate between allies. Pressure to withdraw or not renew the forces allocated under such conditions can become irresistible. The nations with forces currently in southern Afghanistan (Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom) are openly reproaching their northern and western neighbours (Germany, Spain and Italy) for taking the soft option and, very especially, for the caveats (15) that prevent their use in support of the latter. We will not go into whether or not such reproaches are justified, but the fact is that perceptions lead to decisions, and only with great difficulty have those countries' governments so far withstood—commendably—the powerful pressure from the media to pull out. If any of them were to yield to the temptation a chain reaction would be inevitable and all, we should remember, because of the perception of unequal effort. Now, a new SC provides the opportunity to address this problem frankly by defining with precision the expected extent of allied solidarity in cases like Afghanistan, where mutual defence is not at risk but common interests are extremely important. The bidding system of force generation ought to be equipped with mechanisms that somehow take into account risks and expenses as factors which increase or diminish the value of the contribution, which so far is measured solely in terms of men; the caveats should

(15) A caveat is a limitation or restriction, imposed by a nation on its military forces under NATO command and control, that does not allow the commander of the operation to deploy and use them in full accordance with the operational plan. They may typically take the form of a prohibition on acting outside the assigned province except *in extremis* (a condition that provides the exegetes with a chance to show off their skills).

abandon their discreditable, almost secret stance and be dealt with in this context as one of various factors, as their existence is undisputable, but freedom to include them ought somehow to be limited, for example to only when they are required by constitutional or equipment limitations or to cases where they cannot be overruled simply by a decision of the executive.

The risk inherent in this project for Spain is that which may stem from new requirements of size and quality of military forces. A characteristic of the operations we will be dealing with, which has not yet been sufficiently reflected in the structure of the armed forces and less so in the defence budgets, is the decidedly expeditionary nature of them all, which stems not so much from the perhaps dubious globality of our interests as from the deterrent nature they should have—replacing the former nuclear component—*vis-à-vis* an enemy that often does not feel responsible for a territory and a population but should fear the *longa manus* that allows it no haven. The often repeated mantra of «swifter, lighter, more expeditionary forces» frequently elicits from politicians and public opinion the idea of «smaller, cheaper», but in fact the opposite is true. Expeditionary operations require, as the recent experience of NATO itself has shown, deployable forces that are at least five times larger than those actually deployed at a particular time (which NATO calculated, by consensus, at an attainable maximum of eight per cent of all troops, (16) for ground forces, (17) and their requirements in terms of strategic transport and command, control and communications assets are greatly superior to those of conventional defence forces. It follows from this that a firm Spanish commitment to a new SC enshrining the principle of collective response to threats to national interests must be underpinned by an increase in defence expenditure to get us to budge from the bottom of the list of allies and push us up to the warmer zone inhabited by nations that spend at least two per cent of GDP on defence—a commitment Spain has also assumed but never put into practice (no doubt as a result of the political parties' reluctance to annoy a public opinion at the least indifferent if not hostile to everything that defence stands for). This would be the ideal situation, but the risk is that we could be defending the principle without this spurring the government to dip into its purse, resulting in discredit.

Lastly, although the debate springing from the drafting of a new SC will

(16) Comprehensive Political Guidance, 29 Nov 2006, Part 3, para. 13.

(17) The air forces and above all naval forces do not lend themselves easily to the distinction between deployable and non-deployable and have therefore been deliberately excluded from these requirements.

be largely restricted to the NATO Council, either the International Secretariat or an *ad-hoc* group of drafters based on the Harmel model, its most salient aspects can be expected to become public domain. This can only be beneficial in Spain, where it would mark a healthy change from the permanent absence from public debate of foreign policy. While it is true that all politics is ultimately local, this axiom should not be taken to the extremes that prevail in this country. The risks that the Strategic Concept of 2009 sets out to prevent are of a quality and magnitude that could seriously affect the well-being of Spanish society for years to come.

CONCLUSIONS

The strategic landscape has changed substantially since the fall of the Berlin wall; however the instruments that NATO has used to adapt to the changing situation—two Strategic Concepts in 1991 and 1999 and a *Comprehensive Political Guidance* in 2006—have proven to be timid and insufficient. This is due in part to the political hazards of attempting to undertake the reform of the Washington Treaty, which should be the natural vehicle for addressing changes of the scope of those that have forced NATO to intervene in the Balkans and in the Hindu Kush, far from the principle of collective defence of the North Atlantic space, and more in consonance with an interpretation of the actions derived from the application of the Treaty as a collective response to an attack on the population or interests of the allied nations—without detriment to a classic but increasingly implausible attack on their territory.

Given the insufficient consensus to implement it in a reform of the treaty, the only possible vehicle for this reinterpretation is a new Strategic Concept, for which there is no lack of arguments, particularly the age of the current document. But time is pressing and steps need to be taken in order to be able to present one at the 2009 summit, despite certain political disadvantages stemming from the calendars of at least two of the most influential allied nations, France and the United States.

Spain ought to join the group of nations that leads the effort to set about negotiating a new SC. If this is successfully accomplished it will not be difficult to play an important role in its drafting, with the assurance that the logic of the strategic situation and its likely evolution will be conducive to an analysis and solutions akin to our interests, and that this should promote a very healthy and badly needed debate on Spain's foreign policy.

CHAPTER SIX

EMERGING POWERS AND A NEW GLOBAL STRATEGIC GAME

EMERGING POWERS AND A NEW GLOBAL STRATEGIC GAME

EMILIO LAMO DE ESPINOSA

INTRODUCTION

The world is witnessing the reappearance of old, particularistic and ethnocentric temptations while, paradoxically, the pace of globalisation is quickening. The new temptation of indigenism in Latin America, the return to the imaginary origins of failed Islam, the aggressive and even purge-oriented nationalism that is cropping up in certain parts of Eastern and Northern Europe, and the anti-globalisation, alter-globalisation and anti-American discourse that is powerfully present in major European countries, all tied in with outbursts of xenophobia and the re-emergence of particularist ideologies, are symptoms of the same syndrome: fear of the future, fear of the emerging world and, as a reaction, the return to a past of untouched mythical essences, to protectionism and economic nationalism, and to the defence of culture.

This is also happening at home. After a period of over thirty years in which Spain warded off the temptations of historicism, locking away the tomb of the 11th-century hero known as «El Cid» (as the leader of the 19th-century «regenerationist» movement, Joaquin Costa, put it) in order to direct its gaze forwards and outwards in pursuit of the country's yearned-for Europeanisation and normalisation, it seems that the old spectres of the past are returning—the temptation of self-engrossment and delving into the past in order to reconstruct not recent history, in a «second transition» that is totally unnecessary, but rather more remote history (no less than sixty years on from the civil war!). And together with this backward looking we are also witnessing inward looking in endless, trivial discussions on the essence of Spain, on whether it is a Nation, a national reality, a Nation of nations or some other device.

It is therefore important to understand the huge changes the world is undergoing, which are of course not without their problems but are largely positive. What will be argued in this chapter is that rather than protecting ourselves from this new world we should leap into it. And that Spain (and Europe), rather than gazing at the past and inwards, should look at the future and outwards, since the future of Spain lies chiefly beyond Spain, beyond our frontiers.

THE SECOND MAJOR TRANSFORMATION

«China is a sleeping giant. Let her sleep for when she wakes she will shake the world.» Such was the well-known reply given by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1793 to Lord McCartney, ambassador of George III of England in China, when asked about French interests in Asia. Lord McCartney himself was dumbfounded when the Chinese emperor Chen Long told him abruptly that the Chinese did not have «the slightest need for your country's manufactures».

It so happens that both statements are turning out to be true. Who would have thought that China, India, Brazil, Mexico and a fair number of other countries would awaken at the same time? Who would have thought that it would be China that would fill Great Britain with its manufactured goods and not the other way round? Or that it would be India that would keep the Britons' accounts and not the other way round?

I have been researching national stereotypes for many years and am well aware that they say more about the speaker than about the object referred to. And I believe that the quote about Napoleon is a perfect expression of Western prejudice about China (which can also be applied to India and the whole of the East, (1) a prejudice comprised of three main ideas: they are giants; fortunately they are sleeping; and it is dangerous for them to awaken. Of these three ideas, one is true, one is not at all true, and the third might or might not be. Let us examine which is which.

What Napoleon's stereotype does indicate is how difficult it is for us to view the East without bias or «Orientalism», as Edward Said called it. My first idea is therefore as follows: let us attempt to lift the veil of the huge prejudices that prevent us from seeing reality and cause us to see ghosts, as in Napoleon's case.

(1) For stereotypes on India, see Amartya Sen, *The Argumentative Indian*, Penguin, 2006.

For never has this been more necessary.

A fact that should not be forgotten and is just as or even more important than the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 is that in 2005 the output of the emerging economies (2) surpassed that of the developing countries—a turning point that dates back over two hundred years. This is not a cyclical or volatile fluke but the result of a clear trend: the emerging economies grew by just under 3 per cent in the 80s, by 4 per cent in the 90s and by nearly 6 per cent in the new century. China has been growing at a furious pace of 10 per cent annually for nearly thirty years. (3) India grew at 3 or 3.5 per cent—the ironically termed «Hindu rate of growth»—until the reforms of the 90s, a rate that was exceeded and absorbed by the growth of the population, but it is now growing at 9.4 per cent annually for the financial year ended March 2007. It is not just Russia (growing at 7 per cent) or America Latina (Brazil is growing by 4.4 per cent) or of course Asia; even Africa is growing at a rate of over 5 per cent and is expected to do so at close to 7 per cent in 2008, while Angola, Sudan and Mauritania are already growing at 10 per cent. The Far East is growing at 10 per cent; South East Asia at over 8 per cent; and Eastern Europe at 7 per cent. In fact Western Europe, which continues to account for nearly 30 per cent of the world's GDP, is the region of the world that is recording the least growth, 1.3 per cent, versus a world average of 4 per cent for the past five years.

In addition, the emerging economies already account for 45 per cent of total world exports, consume half of the world's energy but represent four-fifths of the increase in oil demand and possess 75 per cent of foreign currency reserves. In 2007, for the fourth year running, according to *The Economist*, all 32 emerging economies monitored are showing positive signs of growth, more than triple the rate of the developed economies (8.1 per cent versus 2.5 per cent).

All this has two very significant consequences. The first is that the new economies are contributing to generating two-thirds of world growth,

(2) The term «emerging countries (or economies/markets)», introduced around 1980 by World Bank economist Antoine van Agtmael, is employed repeatedly in these pages and the various sources drawn from do not always use it with the same referent. It usually refers to countries that were previously called «developing» and is often identified with «underdeveloped countries». To cite an example, Morgan Stanley's list of emerging markets includes 25 countries; that of *The Economist* 28.

(3) A striking piece of data: 80 per cent of construction cranes in the world are in China, one quarter in the city of Shanghai alone. Federico Steinber, *El impacto de las potencias emergentes en la economía mundial*, Real Instituto Elcano, ARI, 4, 2008.

Illustration 1

WORLD GDP GROWTH: CONTRIBUTIONS BY COUNTRIES AND REGIONS (As a percentage of the world total)									
	Contribution to growth							Share in world GDP, 2005	
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Current dollars	Purchasing power parity
United States	13.4	14.5	16	17.7	17.2	15.9	16.7	28.1	20.1
European Union	19.9	13.8	11.8	13.6	12	12.5	13.1	30.3	20.3
Japan	3.7	2.1	3.7	4.4	4.1	3.8	3.2	10.3	6.4
Latin America & Caribbean	7.0	4.5	2.5	5.0	7.8	7.0	6.5	5.5	7.4
Asian developing countries	39.9	44.7	43.6	37.2	41.7	42.3	42.5	8.9	27.1
China	27.1	30	27.7	23.7	27.2	28.1	27.8	5.0	15.4
India	6.9	7.4	8.9	7.3	8.2	7.7	7.9	1.7	5.9
Annual GDP growth	1.6	1.9	2.8	4.1	3.6	3.6	–	–	–
Annual GDP growth (PPP)	2.6	3.1	4.1	5.3	4.8	5.1	4.9	–	–

Source: UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on data from the International Monetary Fund and the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA).


whereas the United States provides only 17 per cent and the EU 13 per cent. China alone contributes to generating almost one-third of world growth. And adding India and Russia to China gives us 50 per cent of world growth, which appears to be driven less by its traditional locomotives (USA, the EU and Japan). Indeed, if the mortgage crisis of August 2007 in the United States had scant repercussions (none in India or Latin America, for example), it is precisely for this reason. In fact, economists are wondering if the «decoupling» of the world economies from that of the United States has not already taken place. (4)

The second consequence is more relevant to us as it defines the economic weight of the countries: China’s GDP, in purchasing power parity terms, now accounts for 14 per cent of total world GDP and ranks second in the world, more than double that of the next country down on the list, Japan. Japan’s GDP (also in PPP terms) is now similar to that of the fourth

(4) A paradoxical decoupling, as China’s foreign currency reserves are now close to one and a half trillion dollars—double the foreign investment stock—but 70 per cent are in US treasury bills. This means that emerging, poor China is financing the consumption of the American middle class. See E.Bregolat, *El billón de dólares de China*, *El Imparcial* 28 January 2008.

country in the list, India, whose GDP is double that of the United Kingdom and France. And Brazil is now the world's ninth largest economy, and Russia the tenth. Only a few years ago Goldman Sachs coined the acronym BRIC for these four emerging countries, Brazil, Russia, India and China. (5) And here they are now, in the lead group of the world economy.

Illustration 2. World GDP 2005



What is happening?

In 1944 Austrian economist and sociologist (actually Hungarian) Karl Polanyi published a book whose impact and significance were huge, *The Great Transformation. The Economic and Political Origins of Our Time*. In it he argued that the Western modern order was underpinned by four crucial institutions: the balance of power of sovereign states (the Westphalian international order), the gold standard, the liberal state and, above all, self-regulated markets that were «the fount and matrix of the system», the «innovation that gave rise to a specific civilisation». (6) That same model of a state and market is now spreading beyond the Atlantic West to the whole world at a dizzy pace.

(5) *Global Economics Paper No. 99: Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050*, at <http://www2.goldmansachs.com/insight/research/reports/report6.html>

(6) Polanyi, Karl, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1944, p. 3.

We are thus witnessing a social transformation that has been unprecedented since the Industrial Revolution, the second major world political and economic revolution following that of the 18th and 19th centuries. Except that this one is much more widespread, intense and fast-moving. More widespread, as the previous one involved no more than one-third of the world's population, whereas the current one is affecting the whole world. It is much more intense and profound, as it alters more aspects of life and more products, processes, habits and institutions; for example, in 2007 the world's urban population would have outnumbered the rural population for the first time in the history of mankind (another date to remember) and nothing causes society to change more than the shift from rural to urban. And above all, the current Great Transformation is much faster: it began with globalisation, around 1989, and will take no more than fifteen or twenty years to be completed, whereas the Industrial Revolution lasted a century or a century and a half. The following comparison illustrates this speed: at the beginning of the industrial revolution England and the United States took nearly fifty years to double their per capita GDP. China and India do so every nine or ten years.

WHY?

The question that immediately springs to mind is why. What has caused this abrupt change in the world landscape? For only if we know the causes will we be able to analyse the future.

The answer is that the process has manifold causes, as is always the case when something important happens, although I will venture to underline four out of many other causes: demographic, political, economic and, lastly, technological.

The easing of the weight of the population as a result of medical birth control technology is undoubtedly one of them. Between 1950 and 2000 the population of the emerging countries multiplied by 3.5. This was the initial stage of what demographers have called the epidemiological transition: a sharp decrease in mortality caused by pandemics (famine and infectious diseases), while the birth rates remains high. (7) But we have now entered the down phase of the cycle and the birth rate is offsetting the low mortality rate (the urban shift and women's education are key factors in this result). Naturally the population is continuing to grow, but at a much slower

(7) Abdel Omtan, *The Epidemiological Transition. A Theory of Epidemiology of Population Change*, *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 1971, p.509.

pace, from the current 6.6 billion to some 7.5 billion, seven times lower. China is the country where the most women use modern contraceptives (over 80 per cent) and has succeeded in keeping its population growth in check; in fact it is decreasing and rapidly ageing—a factor almost unique to a country whose population is ageing before achieving development. India, as we shall see, is demographically much healthier and its population will continue to grow powerfully until it exceeds that of China with 1.6 billion. The worldwide fertility rate (8) has dropped from 4.8 to 2.6 in one generation (but has fallen from 6 to 3.1 in South East Asia).

This transition furthermore has a very beneficial short-term effect: the *baby boom*. For a generation the population is comprised of few elderly people (the mortality rate has been high), few children (the birth rate is falling) but a large proportion of active population, as occurred in Europe and the United States between the 1960s and 1990s. This advantage of course will end up becoming a burden when the few children have to support the retirement of the many adults.

A second cause is the macroeconomic stability derived from policies of adjustment and balance which are in turn linked to deregulation and privatisation process and, above all, to the free movement of capital, Polany's «self-regulated markets». Marx is no longer quoted nor is the word «capitalism» used; it is not fashionable and there is even talk (Peter Drucker) of «post-capitalism». Nothing further from the truth. For it was Marx who spoke enthusiastically of the «great civilising influence of capital», which sweeps over particularism, provincialism and traditions in order to impose modernity and progress. (9) But contrary to his forecasts, it is not public control of means of production but liberalisation which has spurred growth. The maxim of state ownership of means of production was put into practice

(8) Fertility rate = average number of children expected to be born per woman throughout her lifetime.

(9) Capital, states Marx in the *Grundrisse*, drives beyond «national boundaries and prejudices and, equally, beyond nature worship, as well as beyond the traditional satisfaction of existing needs and the reproduction of old ways of life confined within long-established and complacently accepted limits. Capital is destructive towards, and *constantly revolutionizes*, all this, tearing down all barriers which impede the development of the productive forces, the extension of the range of needs, the differentiation of production, and the exploitation and exchange of all natural and spiritual powers". This explains what he calls the «great civilising influence of capital», that is, its «production of a stage of society compared with which all earlier stages appear to be merely local developments of humanity and idolatry of nature". Is he not describing globalisation? See K. Marx, *Grundrisse*, Trans. Ernst Wangerman, vols 28-29 of Karl Marx-Frederick Engels Collected Works. Ed. Lev Golman and Vladimir Brusklinsky. 50 vols. International Publishers, New York, 1986.

around 1982, with nationalisations in Asia, Latin America and Europe (Mitterrand's France, for example). The whole Chinese economy and almost the entire Indian economy were state owned; at the time nearly one-third of the world's GDP was public-sector driven. But the result was disastrous and the 80s and 90s saw the beginning of the privatisation process which extended to over 100 countries, so that by 2000 state-owned companies were producing less than 4 per cent of GDP in the developed countries and around 15 per cent in the rest. China is growing because it has liberalised its economy, not because it is a totalitarian state (or authoritarian, as Bregolat argues): «China has a market economy that is increasingly difficult to distinguish from capitalism». (10) The same is true of India; it is growing as it shifts away from a directed, state-managed and «Sovietised» economy. (11) As Jagdish Bhagwati has shown in *In Defense of Globalization*, (12) during the three decades in which India was a closed economy it grew by 4 per cent but the population grew more, so that real growth was 1.3 per cent, the ironically dubbed «Hindu rate of growth». The reforms of 1991 enabling India to be integrated into the world economy, carried out by the current prime minister Singh when finance minister (lowering of tariffs, reduction in taxes, devaluation of the rupee, opening up to foreign investment) gave impetus to the economy. Over the past two decades the economy has grown by over 5 per cent and this rate of growth has recently soared to 9.4 per cent.


But economic freedom cannot bear all its fruit unless accompanied by political freedom. Capitalism without democracy and freedoms equals corruption (as we find in China, Russia and nearly all the petro-states). And certainly, the democratisation of the 90s, the «third wave of democratisation» (Huntington), which has brought economic freedom and development to many countries, is another main cause. 1989, which marked the end of the cold war and the failure of the great communist dream, saw the beginning of a powerful wave of democratisation and now nearly 50 per cent of countries and 50 per cent of the population live under democratic regimes (though there are exceptions, such as Arab Islam). (13)

(10) Eugenio Bregolat, *La segunda revolución china*, Destino, 2007. «China is now on the path to Social Democracy», states Ambassador Bregolat.

(11) On the (false) theory of the economic efficiency of authoritarian regimes, see Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weis, *The Myth of the Authoritarian Model*, *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2008.

(12) Oxford Univ. Press, New York, 2004.

(13) See Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, *Peace and Conflict. A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy*, Center for International Development & Conflict Management, 2005, from where the illustration is taken. It can be seen at <http://www.google.es/search?q=mARSHALL+AND+GURR&hl=es&start=10&sa=N>

Illustration 3. *Third wave of democratisation*


This democratisation, together with the end of the cold war, has led to a considerable decrease in the number of armed conflicts in the world, allowing the «peace dividend» to be cashed in on and cannon to be replaced by butter. Granted, there are quite a few examples of authoritarian countries with strong economic growth, be they right-wing dictatorships (General Pinochet's Chile) or left-wing (today's China). But they are at least states (non-democratic) that guarantee the rule of law, legal certainty and control of corruption. And in the medium term only democracy ensures the rule of law and, above all, control of corruption, one of India's major comparative advantages with respect to China.

Certainly, the correlation between democracy and prosperity is indisputable, although not so the causal relationship, and this issue has been analysed to the point of exhaustion. Perhaps the explanation lies in good institutions and good practices—good governance. For we humans do not only innovate by inventing gadgets, devices, hardware and things. We also innovate by inventing software, organisation, rules, regulations and cultural programmes. Such is the case, for example, of the rule of law or ethics, and also good rules of trade, company laws, audits, accounting, land registries, independent judiciaries and mortgages and a whole host of other institutions or rules and regulations that curb corruption, eliminate transaction costs and boost efficiency. And without good institutions there

is no growth either. The World Bank in particular over the past few years, driven by the new institutional economy (D. North), has shown a very clear correlation between good governance and prosperity, but also between bad governance and poverty.

The third explanation is purely economic, as there is a powerful economic logic behind everything that is happening. In 1986, drawing from the historical data provided by Angus Maddison (which I will go on to discuss), American economist William J. Baumol, in an important article published in the *American Economic Review*, elaborated the theory of the convergence of open economies. (14) And he showed how the post-World War II Euro-American economies (those of what is now G7) had converged towards that of the leader, America, between 1870 and 1970. (15) The United States and Great Britain, which were undoubtedly the leading countries in 1900, had been trapped by Germany, France, Italy and even Japan, and by around 1970 the differences in income per capita between

Illustration 4. GDP per capita in the G7



(14) William J. Baumol, *Productivity Growth, Convergence and Welfare; What the Long-Run Data Show*, *The American Economic Review*, 76, 5, 1986, pp.1072 ss.


(15) Both this graph and the following one are taken from the lecture by Antonio Fatás *World Economic Outlook*, delivered at the Fundación Rafael del Pino on 15 January 2007, available from the foundation's website.

them were minimal. The United States' income per capita had grown from some 5,000 to some 20,000 dollars. But Italy's, which stood at around 2,000 at the beginning of the 20th century, had risen to about 15,000. All this was because, after fifteen centuries of stable productivity, in only a few decades productivity grew by 1,115 per cent in the sixteen countries that led the industrialisation process. In particular, it grew by 300 per cent in the United Kingdom, 800 per cent in Germany and 1,700 per cent in Japan.

Baumol then spoke (recalling Veblen earlier) of the burden or growing difficulty of taking the lead and (recalling Gerschenkron) of the advantages of relative backwardness. His central idea was that it is easier to transfer innovations than to produce them, and by innovations meant (like us earlier on) not only technology but also good practices or good policies. Some innovations were public goods: *successful productivity-enhancing measures have the nature of a public good.* (16) In short, it is easier to copy all kinds of innovations (what classical anthropology called «diffusion»), so that in the long run average productivity per capita becomes homogenised and a country's global wealth eventually depends mainly on the volume of the population. For example, China needs one-fifth of the productivity of the United States to achieve the same volume of production.

The obvious fact is that today other economies, which are also open, are becoming incorporated into this same process of convergence, only

Illustration 5. GDP per capita in various emerging countries



(16) Op.cit., p. 1077.

on a world scale and with huge economies. Korea, China, India, Brazil, Russia and Indonesia appear to be following this same pattern of economic convergence. And although it may seem surprising, China is growing at the same rate as Asian Tigers like Korea and Singapore did earlier. And others at the same pace as Japan long before. Neither faster nor more slowly. The same convergence process is thus occurring, but also at the same pace.

Lastly, the closest causes of the current Great Transformation should be sought, as ever, in technology, which has always been the most independent variable, and above all in means of communication. The Roman Empire is unconceivable without its roads, and the British and Spanish empires without navigation and shipping routes. And it is no coincidence that this increase in world wealth, which is an increase in global productivity, should follow the second scientific and technological revolution that began in the United States in the 50s and became widespread in the 90s, giving rise to what has been called the «knowledge or science revolution», a huge change in both processes and products. (17)

So, on the one hand, we have world trade and cheaper shipping. In a fascinating book entitled *The Box*, and subtitled «How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger», (18) published recently, historian Marc Levinson states that «without the container, there would be no globalisation». In fact, this seemingly trivial object, which was invented by McLean, an American, in 1956 and came to be used as a result of the Vietnam war, has made shipping 36 times cheaper (in 1956 it cost \$5.86 per ton to load a standard ship manually, whereas using containers it cost \$0.16). We furthermore have Internet and the Web, a derivative of the «military-industrial complex» (Eisenhower), of the military technology of the Pentagon (Arpanet's), which reduces to zero not only the cost but above all the transmission time of all kinds of digitalised information and makes telecommuting possible.

The result is the same convergence of which Baumol speaks, but on a worldwide scale. Any job not requiring a direct, face-to-face relationship between producer and consumer can be offshore outsourced to wherever it

(17) See my book [Sociedades de cultura y sociedades de ciencia](#), Ediciones N6bel, Gij6n, 1996, 261 pp. Premio Internacional de Ensayo Jovellanos 1995. And more recently, *La sociedad del conocimiento. El orden del cambio*, in [Libro Homenaje al Profesor Jos6 Jim6nez Blanco](#), Centro de Investigaciones Sociol6gicas, Madrid, 2002, pp.429-450.

(18) *The Box. How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger*, Princeton University Press, 2006.

is more efficient, ultimately cheaper. Hairdressers, concierges, chefs, masseurs and doctors have their work assured. So do mechanics who mend cars and computer technicians. But accountants, programmers, stock market advisors, call-centres and almost all manufacturing work can be offshore outsourced. And this is what is happening, to the benefit of some (generally the world's poorest) and the disadvantage of others. Accordingly:

- shipping makes possible the offshore outsourcing of industry, labour, the old blue-collar workers, and China, now the world's great factory, is making the most of this; the Made in China label is ubiquitous in our homes.
- and the Internet makes possible the offshore outsourcing of office work, employees, the white-collar workers, all of which is taken advantage of by India, now the back office of the English-speaking world.

China generates *hardware*, products; India generates *software*, programmes. It suffices to examine the composition of their economies. China's is based on the manufacture and exportation of products, although it is moving rapidly towards the services sector, which now generates 40 per cent of its GDP. India's is a special case, and shows that it is possible to shift from an agricultural society to one based on services: agriculture provides 60 per cent of the population with jobs, but it is the services sector that produces 54 per cent of GDP, while the industrial sector accounts for less than half (and half that of China). Specifically, exports of services, particularly information technology (ITS) went from 6.3 billion to 22 billion, growing by over 700 per cent over 1994-2003 on account of offshore outsourcing. That of Brazil, another giant, is more balanced, but also with a very big emphasis on services, which account for over 50 per cent. Others, like Russia and Saudi Arabia, as we know, rest on gas or oil and suffer the curse of being petro-states. (19)


However, viewed as a whole, the exports of the emerging countries have not only grown but have become diversified. Thirty years ago manufactured goods accounted for less than 20 per cent of their total exports, agricultural produce for 50 per cent and minerals the rest. Today

(19) See the excellent articles by Pablo Bustelo on the website of the Instituto Elcano. For example (there are quite a few more), *El auge económico de China y su impacto internacional*, ARI, 100, 2007; *El auge económico de China e India y sus implicaciones para España*, DT, 31, 2007. *India, las dos caras del desarrollo económico*, ARI, 73, 2006.

manufactured goods amount to nearly 80 per cent and are varied in nature: machinery and equipment, textiles, chemical and pharmaceutical products and IT. And not only do they export, they also import. In particular, Chinese imports multiplied fivefold between 2000 and 2005, giving a boost to other economies (for example those of Latin America, whose bilateral trade with China has grown by 250 per cent in only four years).

Incidentally, in this huge-scale process of offshore outsourcing, not even those who hold highly skilled posts are safe if there are equally skilled and cheaper workers to be found elsewhere. China and India are beginning to have excellent universities on a par with Europe's and are churning out 1.2 million scientists and engineers every year, as many as the USA, Europe and Japan together. China alone is already producing more than the EU: some 520,000 versus 480,000. And India alone is producing as many engineers capable of working for multinationals as the United Kingdom and more than Germany. Hegel claimed that China is a people without history because it «transmits, but does not innovate». Is that true? Maybe, but China now invests as much as Japan in R&D. And China and India, with nearly 450 million internet users, nearly double the just over 200 million in Europe or the United States. Furthermore, China

Illustration 6. *Diversification of exports in emerging countries*



has just launched its first passenger plane to the media, the «Flying Phoenix», which will compete not only with Airbus (which controls 30 per cent of the world market) and Boeing (which controls a further 30 per cent), but with aircraft produced by other emerging countries: Brazil (Embraer).

What is more, the new countries are becoming the bugbear of Western boardrooms. A recent report by the Boston Consulting Group reminds us that the emerging countries now have no less than one hundred powerful multinationals in cutting-edge sectors: pharmaceuticals, chemicals, aeronautics, IT. China has no less than eight major multinationals capable of competing in the world marketplace—huge companies like China Mobile, Shangai Baosteel, CNOOC, Haier, Hisense and Lenovo. (20) A few months ago the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) was listed on the stock exchange and, naturally, is colossal: the biggest IPO in history giving rise to the fifth largest bank in the world.

The same is true of India, which holds the advantage of its Anglo-American business grounding and, of course, mastery of the English language. Multinationals like Tata Steel, Mittal, Reliance and Infosys are leaders in their sectors, have demonstrated outstanding financial results in recent years, and are implementing plans for international expansion through mergers and acquisitions in order to strengthen their competitive position in the market; these multinationals, which compete at world level, are increasingly feared by their longer established counterparts. Mittal's purchase of Arcelor was a warning that we are seeing repeated time and time again. Indeed, in 2003, 10 per cent of direct foreign investment came from emerging countries, although China purchases natural resources and India manufacturing companies, each what it needs.

A GLANCE AT THE PAST; ANOTHER AT THE FUTURE: THE 21ST-CENTURY WORLD

But before looking forward at the possible future development of these processes, we should step back and ask if what is happening is really so

(20) Marcos Aguiar, Arindam Bhattacharya, Laurent de Vitton, Jim Hemerling, David C. Michael, Harold L. Sirkin, Kevin Waddell, Bernd Waltermann, Kim Wee Ko, *The 2008 BCG 100 New Global Challengers: How Top Companies from Rapidly Developing Economies Are Changing the World*, The Boston Consulting Group, 4 December 2007. See also, by Antoine Van Agtmael, *The Emerging Markets Century: How a New Breed of World-Class Companies Is Overtaking the World*, The Free Press, 2007.

new. Let us then take a look at the past and attempt to distance ourselves in order to situate the present in a wider context before moving forwards.

Now, we should start off by pointing out that these countries, contrary to Napoleon's stereotype, never slept; indeed, they awoke early, long before we did. The Yellow River civilisation is contemporaneous with Mesopotamia and Egypt—we are talking about 5000 BC. China is as if the extremely ancient Egyptian culture remained alive, writing with hieroglyphics. The same is true of India. The civilisation of the Indo River (Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro) is one of the oldest in the world and flourished at the same time as other river civilisations like Egypt, Mesopotamia and the Yellow River, and the precedent of democracy we find there is comparable to that of Greece (A. Sen).

By the 10th century, the then Chinese capital, Cha'ng-an, had no less than one million and probably more than two million inhabitants. Meanwhile, Baghdad, Constantinople and Cordoba all had less than half a million and the capital of Charlemagne's Europe, Aix-la-Chapelle, was equivalent in size to a small district of Ch'ang-an. In the 15th century nobody in their right mind would have believed that Europe would conquer the world. We now know today that China could have discovered America: its shipbuilding and navigational technology were vastly superior to those of the West; they even had compasses. Why it did not wish to do so is a fascinating matter on which I have only hypotheses, but we know it could have.


And it was not just in this area of activity. China surpassed the West in hydraulics, alloys, ceramic ware and textiles and had toothbrushes, umbrellas, matches, gunpowder, paper and ink for writing and had developed the printing press. India is a similar case, though back then it was more oriented towards software. Amartya Sen has shown how the sceptic, agnostic and rationalistic tradition dates back to the *Rigveda*, which was written in 1500 BC. Emperor Ashoka practiced religious tolerance in the 3rd century BC. The world's first printed book was a Hindu treatise in Sanskrit that was translated into Chinese and published in the 5th century. A product of non-Western globalisation, as Sen reminds us, as the translator was a half-Turkish, half-Indian academic who lived in Turkistan and emigrated to China. The decimal system emerged and was developed in India between the 2nd and 6th centuries before being used by Arab mathematicians and later reached the West in the 10th century, and they were perfectly familiar with the number π in the 15th.

They never slept, and what is occurring today is that the whole world is readjusting itself in order to return to a distribution of power and wealth

that was in place before the Industrial Revolution and European expansion across the world. It began with what Toynbee called *Iberian pioneers*, Portuguese and Spaniards, at the end of the 15th century and reached its zenith in the post-World War II period, by which time 80 per cent of the population and 80 per cent of the world's territory were ruled by European powers. It was the peak period of the West's power. But the peak always marks the beginning of decline. The decolonisation that took place after 1945 (but lasted until the 80s) brought independence and political sovereignty to more than half the world; India was one such country in 1947. And now they are gaining economic independence and sovereignty. British historian Geoffrey Barraclough saw this clearly in 1956: «Every age needs its own view of history; and today we need a new view of the European past, adapted to the new perspectives in which the old Europe stands in a new age of global politics and global civilisation [...] which only a universal point of view can elucidate. For «our global age knows neither geographical nor cultural frontiers».

But we should recall that, according to the information provided by economic historian Angus Maddison (available on the web, (21) in 1000 Asia accounted for more than 70 per cent of world GDP and Western Europe less than 10 per cent; these percentages had evened out somewhat (to 67 and 18, respectively) towards 1500 but remained similar


Illustration 7. *World GDP – Year 1500*



(21) <http://www.ggdc.net/Maddison/>

in 1820 (61 and 24 per cent, respectively). Indeed, until approximately 1700, the economies of China, India and Western Europe were very similar. In the 18th century China broke away from Europe and India, but became bogged down in the 19th century, the «century of humiliation». Europe took off around 1850 and the United States around 1900. And the result is that

Illustration 8. *World GDP - Year 1950*



around 1900 Asia accounted for only 30 per cent of world GDP and less still (20 per cent) in 1950.

But at a date as recent as 1820, the so-called emerging economies of today together accounted for 70 per cent of world GDP; China's GDP was the largest in the world, amounting to over 30 per cent of the total, 6.4 times that of Britain; and India's was three times that of Britain. China and India accounted for 50 per cent of world GDP in 1820, but only 10 per cent a century and a half later.

And so the Chinese emperor was not wrong when he told Lord McCartney that his country had no need for British manufactures. And the Chinese are again right when they assure us today that they merely aim to occupy the place that had always been theirs. We are witnessing the end of an exception, of a historical abnormality characterised by a huge imbalance between population, on the one hand, and productivity and wealth, on the other. And this is a good thing, although we are paying the price of offshore outsourcing, unemployment and retraining.

After examining the past, let us now turn to the future. What demographic or economic trends can be discerned?

Let us first take a look at demographic trends, for if demography is destiny (as Auguste Comte stated), we Westerners are staring it in the face. In 1950 four of the world's ten most populated countries were Western and three European: the USA, Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy (France was 11th). By 2000 only one European country remained among the top ten (Germany). But by 2050 there will be no European countries among these ten, not even Russia, but there will be two African, three American (USA, Brazil and Mexico, already the undisputed leader of the Spanish-speaking world) and no less than five Asian countries. India with 1.6 billion inhabitants and China with 1.4 billion will account for between 30 and 40 per cent of the world's population. By then Europe will account for a mere 6 per cent, the United States and Canada together a similar percentage, and the whole of the old West (Europe and the Americas) somewhat less than 20 per cent, half India and China. (22)

A further piece of data: in 1900 six of the ten biggest cities in the world were European. In 1950 three remained among the ten. Today there are no European cities among them and only one Western city: New York. Three of the world's ten most populated cities are Indian: Delhi, Bombay and Calcutta. The first two alone will soon be as big as the whole of Spain.


And what will happen to the economy in the future? Two valuable studies have been conducted, one by Goldman Sachs on the BRIC countries in 2003, which sounded the alarm (mentioned earlier), and one by Price Waterhouse in 2006; they coincide in their findings, though the Price Waterhouse study is more complete as it compares the enlarged G7 (US, Japan, Germany, UK, France, Italy and Canada plus Spain, Australia and South Korea) with the seven largest emerging markets, the E7: BRIC plus Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey. (23)

According to Price Waterhouse, by 2050 the E7 will have surpassed the G7 by nearly 20 per cent. China's GDP will be on a par with that of the United States and India's will amount to 58 per cent of that of the USA, equalling those of Germany, England and France together. I am naturally

(22) See *World Demographic Trends*. Report of the Secretary General, Economic and Social Council, United Nations E/CN.9/2007/6.

(23) John Hawksworth, *The World in 2050. How big will the major emerging market economies get and how can the OECD compete?* Price Waterhouse Coopers, March 2006

Illustration 9. World Population - Year 2050



referring to current dollars, as in PPP terms China’s economy will be 1.5 times that of the United States and India’s as large as that of the United States and double that of the EU. And also in income per capita: in PPP

Illustration 10. GDP in 2050 compared to that of the United States

Table 4: Projected relative size of economies in 2005 and 2050 (US = 100)

Country (indices with US = 100)	GDP at market exchange rates in US \$ terms		GDP in PPP terms	
	2005	2050	2005	2050
US	100	100	100	100
Japan	39	23	32	23
Germany	23	15	20	15
China	18	94	76	143
UK	18	15	16	15
France	17	13	15	13
Italy	14	10	14	10
Spain	9	8	9	8
Canada	8	9	9	9
India	6	58	30	100
Korea	6	8	9	8
Mexico	6	17	9	17
Australia	5	6	5	6
Brazil	5	20	13	25
Russia	5	13	12	14
Turkey	3	10	5	10
Indonesia	2	19	7	19

Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers estimates (rounded to nearest percentage point)

terms China's income in 2050 will be somewhat lower than that of the United States today, and that of India, Mexico and Turkey equivalent to Spain's current income, some 22,000 dollars.

There is no need to add that all this is bringing about abrupt changes in the workforce, consumption and poverty. As for consumption, the middle class of the emerging countries will triple from the current 400 million to some 1.2 billion, nearly twice that of Europe, the USA and Japan together. All with a car, washing machine, television, telephone and other appliances. With respect to workforce, in 1975 there were some 2.2 billion workers in the world, but by 2050 the figure will have doubled to 5.4 billion—the majority, nearly one billion, in India, and a further 800 million in China, more than double those of the United States, Europe and Japan together.

A key factor is poverty, which is falling everywhere except Africa. Nobody seems to notice this; what everyone notices is the inequality. But apart from this nothing is clear (the gap is growing within states but not between states and in the world)—the important point is that dire poverty, destitution and malnutrition, which was and is obscene and inadmissible, is unarguably decreasing. China's greatest achievement is undoubtedly to have reduced poverty. According to Ravallion and Chen, between 1981 and 2001 the proportion of poor people dropped from 53 to 8 per cent, from 650 million to 100 million. More than 500 million people would have abandoned poverty and malnutrition and between 200 and 300 million would be embracing well-being. The data provided by Sala-i-Martin are more spectacular: a reduction of 600 million, meaning that by 2001 China had met the Millennium goals set for 2015, fourteen years in advance.

India is a similar case. According to the World Bank, poverty (measured by daily income of less than 1.08 dollars in PPP terms) more than halved from 55 per cent of the population in 1975 to 26 per cent in 2001, although this proportion is still very high and has fallen much less quickly than in China. Indeed, one of the driving forces of the Indian economy is private consumption, which has greatly increased as a result of the consolidation of a by now large middle class. According to the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER), a prestigious Delhi-based think tank, the number of people with an annual income in the range of 4,000-23,000 dollars has gone from 24 to 87 million.

These are not isolated phenomena. In 1990 approximately 25 per cent of the population of the underdeveloped countries lived on less than a dollar a day; but if the current pace of growth continues the percentage will

be down to 10 by 2015. The income per capita of the poorest 20 per cent has increased everywhere, except perhaps in Latin America. It has grown by 4 per cent in Asia and 2 per cent in Africa.

The almost inevitable consequence is that the gap is also growing. Equality is easy to achieve (indeed, it is almost inevitable) under conditions of extreme poverty, but as wealth increases inequality tends to do the same. China's Gini coefficient grew from 0.30 in 1982 to 0.45 in 2002—50 per cent in two decades—and China ranks 90th out of 131 countries. But let us not exaggerate; if inequality matters it is because there is still much poverty, but less than in the United States. And there is less inequality still in India. Neither China nor India are (yet?) dual societies like Brazil and Mexico, with bimodal income distributions. And although inequality has grown in China and India, globalisation has contributed to closing the gap with the developed countries.

But the main question about the future is as follows: is this pace of world growth, of the emergence of huge powers, sustainable? In less than ten years the steel, aluminium and copper consumption of the BRIC countries has tripled, as a result of which during 2000-2006 the price of copper rose by 171 per cent, that of lead 182 per cent, that of nickel by 180 per cent and so on with rubber, oil, gold and even sugar, cacao, oil, corn and rice. China alone is now the biggest consumer of copper, tin, zinc, platinum, steel and iron and one of the largest importers of aluminium, lead, nickel and gold. In 2003 it consumed 50 per cent of the world's cement, 36 per cent of steel and 30 per cent of iron, zinc, tin, aluminium, lead and copper. Today it accounts for one-third of the increase in world demand for crude oil and is the world's second largest consumer after the USA.

Let us concentrate on energy. Europe holds only 2 per cent of total world oil reserves, but consumes 20 per cent. The Asia-Pacific region's reserves are only slightly higher, 3.5 per cent, but it consumes more than Europe: nearly 30 per cent. And meanwhile, the Middle East, with nearly 62 per cent of reserves, consumes only 7.5 per cent. The gas market is a similar case. How can the energy market be organised without resorting to battles (wars?) over ensuring supply? And what will happen to small countries like Spain, which depends on foreign supplies for over 70 per cent of its energy, and is more heavily dependent than the OECD and even the United States? The pressure of demand also extends to foodstuffs; for example, it is estimated that China's annual meat consumption per capita

has grown from 44 pounds in 1985 to 110 today. This is positive, of course, but it is pushing up prices the world over. It is the dilemmas of prosperity rather than poverty that are threatening us. (24)

The major question today, that which defines the strategic landscape of the 21st century, is thus as follows: will the incorporation of China, India and other great countries like Indonesia, Brazil and Mexico be like the incorporation of Germany following Bismarck's unification, that of Japan after the Meiji restoration and that of the United States after the Civil War in the late 19th century, with their respective rates of growth and demands for resources and raw materials and for what was then called «living space», *lebensraum* (Ratzel)? The more pessimistic support this comparison and even on the European stage the struggle to secure supplies has begun, with Germany engaging in dealings with Russia, behind the EU's back. The incorporation of three new major powers, those that marked the 20th century, cost no less than two world wars. Let us hope that mankind has learnt from its mistakes and that we do a better job of managing this dramatic growth and prosperity crisis.

But how?

THE AGENDA OF MISGOVERNMENT IN THE WORLD-SOCIETY

How can the world be managed?.

Regrettably the UN, which is irreplaceable and indispensable, is an instrument poorly equipped for the task. Established in the post-World War II period and fuelled in the Cold War years, it is out of sorts with a globalised world. And there are three sound reasons for the foregoing.

To start off with, the United Nations are not what their name indicates but rather united states, (25) a Westphalian parliament of 192 sovereign states ranging from Luxembourg and Malta to China and India, absolutely unequal in all aspects except in the United Nations. The number of states has quadrupled since the Second World War on account of decolonisation first and the disintegration of the Soviet Union later. If we consider the organisational difficulties of Europe what with its big, medium-sized and

(24) Michael Bergson, *A Prosperity Dilemma*, *Washington Post*, 16 January 2008.

(25) Paradoxically, as Giovanni Sartori has pointed out on some occasion—it is the United States which are united nations, a nation of nations. See G. Sartori, *La sociedad multiétnica*, Taurus, Madrid, 2001, p.51.

small states, whose diversity is far from comparable with that of the UN members, we will realise that the organisation is inevitably inoperative. The world's large and powerful states will never allow a group of mini-states to take advantage of the UN to map out the path for them to follow. The United States does not allow this but neither does Russia or China. The UN represents countries, not populations; it is not a parliament but an international organisation; it groups together states, not people; and it is not, as the population perceives it, a germ of world democracy.

What is more, the United Nations lacks the strength to support its resolutions unless this strength is provided by those who wield it, who will obviously do so in accordance with their own interests. The United Nations resolutions lack enforcement and have proven to be worthless bits of paper time and time again. Not only Iraq but also Israel and Sudan are able to repeatedly violate its resolutions without fear. It is therefore a powerless machine and we still lack an international law enforcement agency. The UN even depends on states' contributions to finance its budget; these contributions are granted or denied according to changing interests.

Lastly, and more problematical still, is the fact that of the 192 states that make it up, only 46 per cent can be considered true democracies, a further 29 per cent are democracies in name only and a further 25 per cent do not even try to be. Indeed, nearly one out of every three humans lives under some sort of despotic regime. The declaration of the UN Charter of respect for fundamental rights cannot be carried forward by an organisation in which first Syria and later Libya have chaired the Human Rights Commission, which was reformed in 2006 giving rise to the current Human Rights Council, on which Cuba, China, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Russia unabashedly sit. Iraq, when still under Saddam Hussein, was chosen to preside over the disarmament commission; fortunately it declined.

It is therefore evident that the UN requires a radical reform if it is to be of use in promoting world governance. However, a previous attempt (by Kofi Annan) failed and any other would probably fail too. The UN has currently lost much of its prestige and only the Europeans appear to have confidence in it. When citizens of nine large countries were asked whether or not the UN is a «world power» today, 68 per cent of Britons and 67 per cent of Germans replied affirmatively, compared to only 9 per cent of Brazilians, 12 per cent of Russians, 21 per cent of Japanese, 28 per cent of Chinese and 26 per cent of Indians (similar to the percentage of Americans, 23). (26)

(26) See the opinion poll *Who Rules the World*, Berlin, October 2007, conducted for the Berstelmann foundation.

However, in the absence of a true (that is, interstate) international order allowing if not government at least management of the world, what emerges is a global society, a world-society that overrides states and frontiers and renders obsolete international organisations based on the equality of sovereign states. A new society that progressively demands not another international order but something that is qualitatively new: a super-state or a world-democracy.

When the Second World War ended Ernest Jünger wrote: «one might well say that this world has been the first universal work of mankind. The peace that ends it must be the second [...] Human history is tending rapidly towards a planetary order.» Indeed, the bipolar order of the lengthy post-war period was not so much a European as a planetary order in which two ideologies vied for world hegemony, rendering the United Nations ineffective with their vetoes. After 1989 this planetary order came to rest on two legs: a West structured by the Atlantic Alliance, and the United Nations, which had a real opportunity for the first time. The first Gulf War was an exhibition of international logic in which the world's democracies, under the aegis of the UN, made their reasons but also their wishes firmly heard. Some of us believed we were then glimpsing the beginning of the slow emergence of a world democratic state. It was a time of optimism.

But globalisation has altered the picture; today the world has more problems than solutions and new problems that were non-existent or could be tackled by states but now require transnational, planetary solutions are cropping up everywhere—an emerging agenda of problems, which is the agenda of world misgovernment and is the product of unstoppable globalisation that has swept across the world. If we were to attempt to set out this agenda explicitly, it would encompass at least ten dimensions, the first three of which are without a doubt the new «triangle of evil» consisting of (1) the new Islamist-rooted international terrorism, a post-modern form of urban guerrilla warfare, of asymmetric warfare. This is connected with (2) the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction (NBCs). And these in turn are linked to (3) the emergence of failed states, which account for no less than 10 per cent of the 200 states that make up the world. The foregoing is often fuelled by (4) drug trafficking, organised crime and money laundering; we should remember that money laundering (according to the IMF) amounts to over one trillion euros per year, more than the GDP of Spain (the eighth largest economy in the world). And it is ultimately reinforced by (5) the geopolitics of world energy, which depends on the Middle East and Russia and is

subject to growing pressure owing to the emergence of new powers that are sucking up the planet's natural resources.

To this should be added everything that flows through the porous borders of the states into which the world is politically organised, namely:

1. People: 200 million emigrants make up a worldwide wave the likes of which has not been witnessed since the late 19th century and will continue to be unstoppable as demographic and income disparities grow accentuated.
2. Capital, for the volume of daily transactions on the foreign-currency markets alone amounts to 1.3 trillion dollars, rendering the financial markets extremely volatile.
3. Goods: As the basis of the economy and wealth shifts from immovable property (land) to movable property (securities) and from the latter to intangible assets (patents, designs, trademarks and logos), piracy and control of intellectual property are becoming major problems.
4. All kinds of waste, triggering huge environmental problems (seas, atmospheric pollution, global warming, toxic waste) that require urgent solutions.
5. And lastly, something that has always been circulating, causing problems: viruses, which pose risks of epidemics and global health problems (such as AIDS and SARS). It is sufficient to consider that the number of international tourists carrying viruses throughout the world rose from 230 million (1976) to 900 million (2006).

To put it another way, today the economy, politics, security, science, public opinion, the climate and even viruses are global. But governance, democracies, states and political architecture are local. We have a world-economy, as Wallerstein envisioned years ago. (27) But also a world-science and a world-technology, a world-fashion (at least *in statu nascendi*), a world-public-opinion and a world-culture (world cinema; world literature and art). All that is local is democracies, governments and the states in which they are organised.

A globalisation that multiplies risks on account of its very complexity and intertwining. The events of 11 September exemplify, almost masterfully, what German sociologist Ulrich Beck had called the *risikogesellschaft*, the risk society, in 1987 (28): a society in which the

(27) See *El moderno sistema mundial. La agricultura capitalista y los orígenes de la economía-mundo europea en el siglo XVI*, Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1979. 3 vols.

(28) Ulrich Beck: *Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne*. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 1986

network formed by the chain of causalities and intertwined relationships gives rise to situations whereby small variations at one end are magnified and lead to monstrous consequences at the other end, a breeding ground for «butterfly effects». Give me a lever and I shall move the world, the terrorists could say, as armed with only box-cutters they succeeded in toppling the towers that symbolised World Trade and globalisations, using aircraft as fuses to explode the true bombs: the towers themselves. Never had the myth of a poor David against the more powerful Goliath been so powerfully staged. There are plenty more examples, as our societies today are overrun with perverse causalities, multiple risk scenarios (planes, trains, dams, cities, water supplies, computer networks, trade, oil and gas pipelines) that can be simply used to cause huge disasters. Complexity, the logic of networks, which makes us strong, can also be our Achilles' heel. (29)

Never was the Latin poet Terence's statement truer: *humani nihil a me alienum puto*. Nothing is alien to us. But we lack instruments of global governance. And the hiatus between globalisation and emergence of global problems, on the one hand, and instruments of world governance, on the other, is growing daily.

This first half of the 21st century is witnessing the emergence of a new environment—radically global for the first time—marked by two events. One the one hand there is this new terrorism, whose backdrop and greatest risk is the proliferation of NBC weapons not just in failed states but in successful totalitarian states, which can export them to terrorist groups. But on the other hand, occurring at a dizzy pace, is the emergence of the new world powers which, together with the United States, will become the hegemonic powers in less than twenty years. And their rise marks the shrinkage of the relative weight not only of the Hegemon, the United States, but above all of the absolute weight of the West, especially Europe.

OLD AND NEW POWERS IN A WESTPHALIAN PLANETARY ORDER

Whereas the new order (not just international but societal) is the result of a slow, mammoth task that will take decades and involve a painful

(29) See my article *De bruces con la posmodernidad. Ignorancia, poder y comunicación en la sociedad del riesgo*, in *Revista de Política Exterior*, 80, 2001, pp. 11-20

learning process, everyday reality will be based on the increasingly multipolar order of major powers. How many? Which ones?

If we combine the two projections examined earlier, demographic and economic, we could put together an initial provisional list of world, traditional and emerging powers: the USA would undoubtedly be among them, but also the four BRIC countries plus Indonesia and Mexico. Three Asian, three American and no European powers.

But evidently Europe, the European Union, counts. With 500 million inhabitants and a GDP comparable to America's, we cannot dismiss it even though it is currently not at its best. Therefore we can and should be more specific in our analysis of the emerging powers by adding further variables to population and economy, such as the following: 1. territory; 2. political leadership; 3. hard power, military forces; 4. and, very specially, nuclear power; 5. soft-power, legitimacy; and 6. self-assertiveness, nationalism. The list is far from exhaustive but goes further than Joseph Nye's three chessboards (30) (hard power, economy and soft power) and completes the five criteria which Victor Bulmer-Thomas used in a similar exercise in the speech he delivered when stepping down as chairman of Chatham House (military force, political power, economy, soft power and, lastly, self-assertiveness), (31) giving us as many as eight different variables we can attempt to analyse.

If we now try to quantify these «power variables» by granting each of the «subjects» (states) between 1 and 4 points for each variable, we obtain an approximate indicator of emerging power which does not substantially vary from the previous result: the USA and China will compete for world leadership, flanked by Russia and India and followed by the rest, well behind, including the EU, whose significance will greatly depend on whether it is capable of overcoming its current crisis and acting unitarily. (32) We are therefore witnessing a shift from the world bipolarity of the Cold War to the US hegemonic unipolarity of the 90s and to the present, which Chinese analysts subtly describe as «one superpower, several great powers», on the way to a future possible USA-China polarity.

(30) Joseph S. Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Superpower can't go it Alone*. Oxford University Press, York, 2002.

(31) *Living with two megapowers: The world in 2020*, Chatham House Papers, December 2006.

(32) In the public opinion poll for the Berstelmann foundation conducted on a representative sample from nine major countries, when asked about «world powers» in 2020 the result was similar; USA (61%) and China (57%), almost on a par, followed by Russia (37%), the EU (33%), Japan (33%), India (29%) and, lastly, the UN (27%). See *Who Rules the World*, op.cit.

EIGHT POWER CRITERIA*Score from 4 (maximum) to 1 (minimum)*

	USA	EU	CHINA	INDIA	BRAZIL	RUSSIA
1 Population	2	2	3	4	1	1
2 Territory	3	2	3	1	1	4
3 Economy	4	3	3	2	1	1
4 Political leadership	4	1	3	3	2	3
5 Army	4	1	3	3	1	2
6 Soft power	1	3	2	3	1	1
7 Self-assertiveness	3	1	4	3	1	4
8 Nuclear power	4	3	3	2	0	4
TOTAL	25	16	24	21	8	20

If, from this attempt at quantifying emerging power (which I hope not to have oversimplified), we move on to a qualitative analysis, the first thing to stress is that the United States' hegemony will undoubtedly continue at least until well into the 21st century. And it is worth underlining this statement vis-à-vis usual stereotypes.

The United States is the third largest country in the world in terms of territory (after Russia and on a par with China) and population (after China and India); its healthy demography makes it the only Western country among the world's ten most populated by 2050; and (unlike Europe) it has a more than healthy capacity for integrating (and even assimilating) immigrants. Its economy accounts for over 30 per cent of world GDP, nearly three times the GDP of the next highest country in the list (Japan) and equivalent to the sum of the following four countries; and in the 1990s the United States' GDP was greater than that of the EU by a volume equivalent to that of Spain. To cite a striking example, if we compare the 50 American states with those of the formerly 15-strong EU, England or France are equivalent to the sixth poorest state of the United States (and Spain the poorest state of the Union). Its GDP per capita is some 45,000 dollars, while that of the 25-strong EU is some 30,000. America's oil production is the third largest in the world, similar to that of Russia (7.7 million barrels per day) and second only to Saudi Arabia (8.7). (33) And it produces nearly as much natural gas as Russia, ranking second in the

(33) Data taken from the British Petroleum website.

world. It is the biggest donor in absolute terms of development aid, its 27 billion dollars more than doubling the amount contributed by the following country (Japan), although in aid per capita its position is very low (21st in the ranking). The United States' cultural influence, its soft power, is huge—English is the world's lingua franca and Hollywood movies and American TV are watched and imitated everywhere. And when it comes to technology, the Americans invest as much in R&D as the rest of the world and boast 80 per cent of Nobel prize winners and 17 of the 20 best universities in the world, and therefore continue to pay the price of innovation but also to cash in on its dividends.

Lastly, the United States accounts for 43 per cent of world defence expenditure, more than 500 billion dollars—almost equivalent to the rest of the world—but it represents only 4 per cent of its GDP and all analysts agree that it is a sustainable expense. With its 17 bases and 725 installations distributed over 139 countries (whom are constantly expanding), (34) and its 1,400,000 soldiers, of which 150,000 are permanently overseas, no other country is a match for the hard power of the United States. In innovation and capability it is an unbeatable army in a conventional war, prepared and sufficiently large to win on any two battlefronts at the same time. Suffice it to take a look at the Pentagon's website to find a map of the world and its precise distribution into six branches headed by chiefs of staff, high-ranking military officers in charge of supervising the whole world. The map is worth studying, as only a hegemonic power (only an empire) needs to (and can) draw up a similar map. What is more, if a new type of terrorism is emerging today it is because it represents the new art of warfare (urban warfare; «asymmetric») adapted to an international order in which there is no place for conventional («symmetrical») wars, which will be won in advance by the Hegemon. Let us examine something as important as security at sea, a precondition of world trade and transport guaranteed by America's navy, no less than 280 ships in active service in five fleets, with a tonnage that exceeds that of the following 17 countries combined, and two dozen aircraft carriers, twice the amount of the rest of the world combined!

The United States is the only country in the world which, like England in the 19th century, supervises everything that occurs, and since its

(34) Since 11 September they have opened or extended bases in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Philippines, Djibouti, Oman and Qatar. Cited by Robert Kagan, *op.cit.*

interests span the whole world, it is forced to think about the world in its entirety—naturally from the viewpoint of its own interests and at the service of American taxpayers—but anyone who dreams of a USA-EU bipolarity would be well advised to examine the related information. It is not an aggressive neocon but an intelligent French analyst who claims that

A multipolar world less dominated by the sole superiority of the USA would probably constitute a better scenario for the international system. But contrary to what many Europeans assume, a world without a powerful and internationalist USA would be an even more disordered and dangerous place.

Indeed, «Europe could not promote its post-modern vision of history if the USA did not exist». (35) The United States continues to be «the indispensable nation» (36) and the «locomotive at the head of mankind». (37)

But, as Jaime Ojeda writes, «the paradox of America's might at the beginning of the 21st century is that no other country can match its invincible strength and yet it is not strong enough to settle global problems such as terrorism and proliferation». (38) The United States might be the most powerful country in the planet, but it is not omnipotent. It cannot ensure world governance or even guarantee an international order that is fully satisfactory to its interests.

But above all, its hegemony will become increasingly less marked as other large (and some huge) countries emerge.

Russia is undoubtedly a candidate, but this is debatable and its moment may have passed. It is a major military power (over a million men, the fifth largest in the world) and a huge nuclear power (with 28,000 nuclear warheads), but its vast territory, the largest in the world and nearly double that size of China or the USA, is more of a disadvantage than an advantage considering its disastrous demography: its population of 143 million inhabitants is shrinking by 700,000 per year and much of Siberia risks being abandoned (would it be occupied by Chinese emigrants?). What is more, Russia has transformed itself into another petro-state dependant on the sale of gas, and this has heightened old authoritarian

(35) Dominique Moïsi, *Reinventar Occidente*, *Revista de Política Exterior*, 97, 2004, p. 75.

(36) Second inaugural address delivered by William J. Clinton, 20 January 1997.

(37) Dean Acheson, cited by Robert L. Beisner, *Dean Acheson; A Life in the Cold War* (Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 372.

(38) Jaime Ojeda, *Gulliver en Lilliput*, *Revista de Política Exterior*, 93, 2003, p. 133.

temptations as a result of which corruption is rife. It uses this power unashamedly as a means of pressure, and its soft power is therefore scarce if not negative. Its mighty army, still based on compulsory military service, is greatly demoralised owing to lack of resources, though it is being bolstered at top speed by President Putin. Lastly, it still suffers from centrifugal forces in much of its territory, in the Caucasus, in Siberia and in Central Asia. Even if it tries, Russia will have considerable difficulties keeping its huge empire before it can concentrate on the outside world.

If Russia is trapped by its past, the same is not true of India. As with China, we are dealing with a different scale. Countries with more than a billion inhabitants and age-old cultures are not normal countries and their very size require consideration and respect (and also concern, as giants sometimes do harm without intending to). The United States, with 300 million, is an exception. But India and China are something different that I am not sure what to call—perhaps civilisations rather than countries.

The *Asia Times* published a piece of news entitled «India enters the space race». The Indian air force has set up an aerospace command in order to integrate its outer space capabilities. The chief of air staff has described India as «an aerospace power having trans-oceanic reach». India made this announcement a couple of weeks after China proved its satellite missile capability. India plans to put a robot on the moon in 2009, with a budget of 100 million dollars, followed by another in 2012. The dates for a manned mission to the moon will be announced next year. «We are just starting and are conservative but we have a very clear roadmap for lunar exploration", stated Jitendra Goswami, chief scientist of the *Indian Moon Programme*. It is nothing new—India launched two space vehicles in 2003 and a further two during the following two years. India has gone from Gandhian pacifism and a timeless past to the militarisation of space and future in only a couple of decades.

India furthermore has a very well trained army of 1.3 million men, almost the size of America's and the fourth largest in the world after those of China, Russia and the United States. India's navy is now the fifth largest in the world and its air force the fourth biggest. It has been a nuclear power for years, with between 60 and 150 nuclear warheads and missiles with a range of up to 2,000 km. It is rapidly rearming (purchasing armaments from Russia), has entered the space race and its nationalism is growing daily, the so-called «Safonisation» or «Hinduisation». In other respects, «pacifistic» India (a further Western prejudice) is far from doing justice to the stereotype and has engaged in wars with China and Pakistan, was the

creator of Bangladesh, and has intervened in Sri Lanka in support of the Tamils and brought about the disappearance of Sikkim, a small Tibetan Buddhist kingdom. What is more, India is a great source of support to the United Nations, which it has supplied with over 55,000 soldiers in no less than 35 peacekeeping operations. India is not the middle empire, but it is midway between East and West and between two major civilisations (Islamic and Sinic), from which it has benefited and with which it is highly porous in both aspects. As a result, it occupies a key geographical position in the fight against Islamist radicalism and, at the same time, is viewed by Americans, together with Japan, as the counterweight, balance and pincer over China.

Lastly, China is without a doubt the major emerging strategic power and there may be no alternative—it cannot not be on account of its huge size. Nuclearised, with 250 strategic and 150 tactical warheads, it has important territorial claims (Taiwan), the biggest army in the world (2.5 million soldiers), the second largest military budget after that of the USA, and historical grievances not entirely settled with other countries (Japan) and is strongly nationalistic. (39) It also enjoys a highly visible presence provided by its right of veto in the United Nations Security Council (from which India is absent, a situation that is unlikely to change), where it has built a sound lobby thanks to its ability to purchase and invest in Africa. We should recall that in 2006 China called a powerful African summit in Beijing, which was attended by no less than 48 of the 53 heads of state of the African Union, the germ of a powerful lobby in the United Nations.

Its military expenditure increased at an average annual rate of 14 per cent between 1994 and 2004, and it is a major buyer of arms. In 2004 its official figure for military spending was 25.5 billion dollars, but research institutions' estimates put it at 35 or even 75 billion, which is what the US Defense Department thinks (making it the third or second biggest military budget in the world). And it is expected to rise to nearly 400 billion dollars around 2020, approximately half of the US budget, but much more than any other country (Russia's will amount to some 100 billion). Recent reports from the Pentagon and the Japanese defence agency consider that it is becoming a «threat to regional security». Did Deng Xiaoping not speak of the need to «hide our capabilities and bide our time»? According

(39) In the aforementioned study *Who Rules the World*, the Chinese were the interviewees who most frequently mentioned military power among the necessary attributes of a major power: 59 per cent versus an average (of nine major countries) of 25 per cent.

to this negative hypothesis, China is assumed to be gathering strength in order to create in due course its own «Monroe doctrine» for Asia, and even a «Pax Sinica» to replace Pax Americana.

This is not, it seems, what China wants; on the contrary, it upholds the theory of a «peaceful rise» (*heping jueqi*) that was developed by Chinese specialists in international relations. China, say Zheng Bijian and other advocates of this theory, will not only respect the current international order but will furthermore contribute to its development through the opening up of a huge market, assistance to poorer countries, the strengthening of international security, and active participation in collectively addressing transnational challenges. «We only export computers, not revolutions», claims Zheng Bijian. But China not only manufacture computers; it is now the world's leading producer of cereals, meat, fruit, vegetables, corn, rice, tea, cotton, lead, zinc, tin, aluminium and coal.

China, like the EU, is interested (at least for the time being) in bolstering multilateral institutions and a multipolar world and therefore—as Ikenberry recently pointed out—it is likely to develop its strategic game within the established international framework. (40) And it has recently acted in this manner within the UN by supporting sanctions against North Korea, Iran, Sudan (owing to the Darfur conflict) and Burma. (41) China is furthermore a very old country (undisputedly the oldest in the world), from whose history we should take a lesson. And what this shows is that only on rare occasions has it been outwardly aggressive. China is playing within and not outside the international order of rules and institutions established by the West, as it has discovered that this can be very useful.

We have focused on the countries that are largest in size and volume, but there are obviously more on the list of emerging powers, even though the remainder are only regional. The cases of Turkey, Pakistan and Iran in the Middle East, Japan in East Asia and Brazil in the Americas—countries that are already, or aim to be, nuclearised, invest heavily in armaments and have powerful armies—attest to the emergence of regional leaders that need to be taken into consideration. This directly affects Spanish interests: shortly after announcing the discovery of large deposits of crude oil off the

(40) G. John Ikenberry, *The Rise of China and the Future of the West*, *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2008.

(41) See Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Andrew Small, *China's New Dictatorship Diplomacy*, *Foreign Affairs*, January/February, 2008.

Brazilian coast, Lula decided to up the country's armaments budget by 50 per cent, to be spent not on foreign imports but by creating its own defence industry. Not long before that a high-ranking military officer had called for nuclearising the country (the process was interrupted years ago). Brazil has thus joined in the armaments race against Chile and Venezuela, seeking to be the arbiter in armed conflicts in South America. (42)

And so, if the world ceases to be unipolar, with a single hegemonic power, as it has been since 1989 (and this will of course happen at some point; no empire lasts eternally), the EU will not be the alternative to the USA as Mssrs. Chirac and Schröder wished. Without a doubt it will be China. It is already, although the turning-point will be marked by the Chinese economy's *sorpasso* of that of the USA, which will take place at some time between 2030 and 2060, depending on their respective growth paces. Russia was a political competitor of the United States but not an economic competitor. China is playing in both leagues.

Therefore, by 2050, only one Western country will continue to be the world's biggest power, the United States. Europe's weight will depend on its overcoming the disintegrating effects of its current paralysis and equipping itself with political power, a foreign policy and security leverage. For the time being it is not even an economic power; it is the world's largest market, but without the political power to manage this huge economy it has not yet become a genuine economic power. Let us not forget that if the denarius, the British pound and the dollar came to enjoy prevalence as strong currencies it is because they were underpinned, respectively, by the legions, the Royal Navy and the various fleets. The euro has no underpinning of this kind.

EUROPE, SPAIN AND THE WESTPHALIAN WORLD

We have made little mention of Europe, unfortunately. And we should analyse why it will largely be absent from this historical appointment with the future.

Europe, the EU, has certainly been the biggest successful political experiment of the 20th century following the resounding failure of communism and fascism (two other European inventions). Indeed, from the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community

(42) El País, 26 November 2007.

(ECSC) in 1951 to the present day, Europe has chalked up the achievements that are listed below.

To start off with, it has reinforced and spread political orders based on the democratic state, the rule of law, separation of powers, a strong civil society and respect for human rights. In 1945 no more than half a dozen European states were democracies; today they all are as they meet the Copenhagen criteria. And as if this were not enough, beyond the boundaries of the current EU at least a further half-dozen states are preparing to meet them. The «EU model» is spreading eastwards like an oil slick. Never before in European history have so many citizens enjoyed so much freedom.

Second, it has succeeded in reinforcing and extending prosperity to the whole of Europe. Poverty is now a thing of the past for the EU of 15, and we have entered a phase if not of well-being certainly of affluence and on occasions even opulence. Progressively, first the longest-standing members (Germany, France), followed by the newer ones (Spain, Ireland, Greece) and now the newest Central and East European countries have substantially improved their standards of living. Never in the history of Europe have so many people enjoyed such prosperity as now. And as before, the benefits of this prosperity are extending to Europe's neighbours and we may expect them to extend eventually to its neighbours' neighbours. Today the European economy and that of America (to which it is inextricably linked) are the two most powerful in the world.

Lastly, Europe enjoys a hitherto unseen security. After 300 years of Westphalia and 50 of bipolarity—that is, of continual wars, practically one per generation (dynastic wars, wars between peoples or nations, class wars)—the risk of war has completely disappeared. Let us not forget that this was the cause and goal of the European project: to put an end to the horror. Europe has replaced the classical confrontation between state sovereignties in zero-sum games with a pooling of sovereignties (indeed, that is the community method), giving rise to a new, post-Hobbesian international order, (43) a legal order in which recourse to violence has disappeared from international relations. Indeed, Europe has taken a leap from an inter-state international order to something different, an internal, cosmopolitan order, an order of European civil society. And once again, the neighbouring states are preparing to join this international order by

(43) The expression was coined by Sachmitter; Robert Kagan calls it Kantian.

renouncing the use of force in exchange for a place in the sun in the yearned-for Europe.

We may therefore stress that never has Europe been so fair, so prosperous or so secure. It is a success of universal-historical scope (as Weber would say), which explains why all the neighbouring countries wish to be European. Not only this; the excellent image of the EU (a model of society that others wish to imitate and does not prove aggressive or threatening) is kindling desires for a bigger international presence for the EU almost everywhere. A recent poll by Gallup International for the European Council on Foreign Relations, conducted in 52 countries, showed that the EU, with 35 per cent, was the power whose international presence was most greatly missed (followed by India, with 27 per cent). The percentage rose to 51 per cent among Europeans themselves but dipped to 23 in Asia (where India scored a higher 33 per cent). It is the rise of the «herbivorous powers» as opposed to the «carnivores», represented by the cold-war players (USA, Russia and China), perceived as threats. (44)

Those who have argued that the EU possesses a «transforming power» based, on the one hand, on its ability to offer (or exclude) benefits to third countries and, on the other, on its obsession with regulating everything through contracts, rules and regulations—in short on the creation of binding law—are quite right. (45) Military power, it is argued, makes it possible to change regimes, but legislation makes it possible to change societies. The new members of the EU must transpose over 95,000 pages of compulsory regulations into their national legislation and even those who only wish to cooperate with the EU find themselves trapped by regulations pertaining to human rights, the proliferation of arms, emigration and good governance. And it should be recalled how the EU's eastward enlargement has been the biggest programme of peaceful change and democratisation in history. The EU's soft power would be just as effective, if not more so, than the hard power of other countries like the United States.

But even its defenders recognise that the EU is underperforming. (46) There are various reasons for this.

(44) Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, *New World Order: The Balance of Soft Power and the Rise of Herbivorous Powers*, European Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Brief, 2007.

(45) For example, Mark Leonard, *Por qué Europa liderará el siglo XXI*, Taurus, Madrid, 2005. Also John McCormick, *The European Superpower*, Palgrave MacMillan, London, 2007.

(46) See, for example, Mark Leonard and Richard Youngs, *El efecto Europa*, *Foreign Policy*, October/November 2007, p. 34 ss.

The EU is an unidentified political object that has been built through the back door, following the functionalist method: let's put together a market and a monetary union and let the economy take care of politics and politics take care of culture. It was Robert Schumann's strategy: «concrete actions» to generate «de facto solidarities» should define the «first stage of the European federation». It is claimed that Jean Monnet stated at the end of his life that, if given the chance to build Europe again, he would have begun with culture. It is just as well he did not, as if he had we would not have an EU. The functionalist method has proven a success, although the price paid for it is that Europe has been built without the true participation of citizens, without a clear project, almost as a by-product, something that is better achieved the least it is spoken of. And it entails a handling of European politics in terms of enlightened despotism: everything for the people but without the people. The result is a deep democratic deficit: the EU does not answer to citizens, it is not accountable. The EU is deepening and exporting democracy but its own democracy is dubious. As Ulrich comments ironically, if the EU were to apply to join the EU tomorrow, it would be turned down because it fails to meet the Copenhagen criteria.

Precisely to close this gap, a Convention was set up to draft a new Constitution, thereby dragging citizens towards a global European *demos*. The members of the convention were fond of likening themselves to constituent assemblies, but nobody had chosen them to perform such a task and they may be considered only metaphorically to represent Europe's citizens. The resounding failure that followed the French and Dutch referendums has brought to a halt an encouraging structuring dynamic and allowed the re-emergence of all kinds of neo-nationalisms, not only political but even economic and cultural.

However, if we want Europe to continue to make headway (and above all, if we want it to be a prominent international player), it is necessary to move on to a political discourse and cease to rely on the indirect method. Indeed, for this purpose the EU should tackle directly at least five important problems.

First, that of the size of Europe, which is perhaps the most important. Are we dealing with a political union of the western part of the Euro-Asian continent, or rather a new method of structuring international relations and settling conflicts? It may seem paradoxical, but the EU today is the latter: a method of structuring international society through engagement, cooperation and business, through the sum and not the confrontation of sovereignties, which generates de facto solidarities in concentric circles. More than a

federation (or even a confederation), it is an original method of international organisation that can and should spread like an oil slick and, tendentially at least, it could come to encompass the whole world. The other option, of course, is a geographical political union, which would be necessarily limited to a region of the world, but in this case it should have precise and clear territorial frontiers. Which ones? The Balkans? Turkey? But in that case, why not Ukraine and the Caucasus? And if Turkey can, why not further afield, Israel, Morocco or even Argentina, as a fair amount of Spaniards think? It is currently already a union of twenty-seven countries plus three with official candidate status—a total of thirty. To these should be added a further four that firmly intend to join and at least a further five or six which have expressed their intention of doing so (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldavia, Georgia and Armenia). The whole of Europe (including Switzerland and Norway) except Russia. Enlargement may force deepening (though that remains to be seen), but the logic of continuous enlargement hinders deepening.

And this is the second dilemma, deepening: Are we dealing with the United States of Europe, a confederation of states that is progressing towards an eventual federation? So far, as a simple monetary and economic union, Europe has not needed a strong political leadership, but as economic union advances the political deficit is worsening, for how can there be economic union without budgetary control and tax harmonisation, without economic governance? It is often said that the EU is an economic giant. True, if this is taken to mean a huge market and powerful productive machinery. But insofar as this powerful economy cannot be put to the service of a political project as it lacks governance, the economic giant does not control its members, each of which progresses at its own pace. In other respects, if we allow, on the one hand, enhanced cooperation, opting out and differentiated integration (Schengen yes or no; Euro yes or no), which diversify the members' degree of incorporation into a variable geometry, and on the other, differentiated neighbourhood agreements with non-members, the result is blurred boundaries and an increasing lack of definition of what the EU is or what it means to be (or not to be) a member. We are moving not only towards an EU à la carte but also towards a non-EU à la carte. (47)

The third dilemma relates to the socioeconomic model. Is the Bavarian model of a Franco-German welfare state accepted, a model that was of great use in the past but is inefficient today? Or should we opt for a

(47) See Charles Grant, *Europe's Blurred Boundaries*, CER, 2007.

privatised, deregulated Anglo-American model? The former is said to be fairer than the latter. Undeniably, but it is no coincidence that the countries which went the furthest with the welfare state (the United Kingdom and the Northern European countries) have now shifted to the second model without abandoning the first—a fact which evidences that the option is not categorical and perhaps we might find the answer to the dilemma in the Lisbon Agenda and in an economy of knowledge and innovation. In any case the EU, which undoubtedly boasts the most advanced social model in the world, should ask itself how it can foot the cost and compete with the new countries, and this entails boosting its productivity in all areas. (48) In the early 80s the EU accounted for over 30 per cent of world GDP; this figure now stands at scarcely 20 per cent. And Europe's population is ageing and waning, pushing up dependency rates. Of the thirty countries in the world with the largest percentage of over-60s, no less than twenty-nine are European (the list is topped by Japan).

The last two dilemmas affect the EU as an actor on the world stage. To start off with, is «a» common European foreign policy possible and realistic? Considering the diversity of economic and political interests of the European countries (a good many of them former colonial empires to which they remain linked) and the weight of their shared history of wars and varied geographical projection (East-West-South), this does not seem an easy task. Is it reasonable to expect France to communitarise its African or Arab policy? Can Europe take on Spain's Latin American agenda? Would France and England give up their position on the Security Council in exchange for the EU's presence? None of the foregoing is likely to occur in the coming decades. Europe could, on occasions (but only on occasions), shape common policies in specific scenarios (Israel, the Balkans), but it does not seem realistic to think of a merger of foreign services and less of a common representation on international organisations. The EU is unlikely to be capable of coming up with «a» common foreign policy and we will be lucky if it is capable of generating common «policies». Even in issues that affect us Europeans directly and relate to collective security (I am thinking of matters like emigration and energy), we are incapable of achieving common positions.

And this brings us to the fifth and last dilemma, security. Europe has been free riding on American security since 1945. Regardless of whether this

(48) See in this connection the recent book by Anthony Giddens, *Europe in the Global Age*, Cambridge, Polity, 2007.

is because it has been unable, unwilling or not allowed, the result is that its security has depended on a foreign army answerable to foreign taxpayers. And the situation remains largely unchanged, despite the major progress achieved. When the president of the EU's Military Committee, General Henri Bénéteat, was asked how many soldiers he has under his orders, his reply was a categorical «none». He went on to state sincerely that «the EU can manage major crises but it cannot make war» (49). As General Felix Sanz, Chief of Defence Staff, recently pointed out, «unlike NATO [the EU] practically lacks permanent military structures». And for that reason «the first and essential task is to bring closer together NATO and the European Union, organisations which are currently a certain distance apart. If both are working towards the same goals, in the same areas, and are made up by 70 or 80 per cent of the same nations, the most natural thing would seem to be for them to coordinate their peace and security efforts». (50)

In other respects, if the EU were to aim for decoupling security from the United States (a path that would only lead to mutual weakening), this would require it to invest much more in security, in the knowledge that even through this course of action we would take years to be able to guarantee it and meanwhile would need to rely on the umbrella of our American ally. However, this umbrella is becoming increasingly less interesting to America, as since the fall of the Soviet Union Europe's strategic significance has declined in the eyes of the Americans. Once again, do we want a low-cost federal EU? Without force to back it, the EU's foreign policy is hardly credible, as we are witnessing daily in Palestine and other scenarios. Will we have to make good philosopher Ortega y Gasset's prediction and expect «a [Chinaman's] pigtail to appear in the Urals»?

Europe is now as «free and happy as Switzerland», as Churchill wished, but the task has yet to be completed—we are not a significant international actor and our security will continue to depend on the player who is (and on our behalf): the United States. It is therefore not surprising that when polls are conducted outside Europe on the EU as a possible world power the result is disheartening: whereas 81 per cent of Germans and 76 per cent of Britons claim that the EU today is a «world power» comparable to the United States or China, only 32 per cent of Chinese, 26 per cent of Americans, 20 per cent of Japanese, 13 per cent of Russians, 12 per cent of Brazilians and 5 per cent of Indians agree. (51) It seems that

(49) *El País*, 9 October 2007.

(50) *Revista de Defensa*, no. 235, November 2007, p. 9.

(51) Study *Who Rules the World*, op.cit.

the EU exists as an international actor only for Europeans and that we are the only ones who fail to realise that history has changed its course.

Indeed, (as Barraclough argues) we Europeans, who have gone from the Mediterranean era to the European era and subsequently the Atlantic era, are witnessing the emergence of a Pacific era in a «post-modern» history that is forcing us to take a different view of the world. (52) This does not mean, Barraclough goes on to state, «that European history will come to a full stop», of course. But it does mean «that it will cease to have historical significance» and become just another «regional history» and no longer «the history of the world», as it has been for the past centuries.

We should think of the world differently. And to think of the world differently amounts, above all, to representing it differently. Let us conduct an experiment.

The accompanying illustration shows the old map of the world in the manner it is usually represented. The Greenwich Meridian, which indicates the zero point for the coordinates of time and space, passes through London and Spain, the world's two major colonising powers and pioneers

Illustration 11. «Old» map of the world



(52) Barraclough, *History in a Changing World*, op.cit.,pp. 206, 207.

of European expansion (the meridian came to replace that of San Fernando, Cadiz, which had been previously used). To one side lies the so-called «Far East»; to the other the old «far west». And we, of course, are at the centre of the world. Naturally.

Illustration 12. «New» map of the world



Earlier, when discussing the future, we spoke of three Asian and three American powers. But connected via the Pacific, not the Atlantic. And so let us examine a new map of the world. For if we place the Pacific in the centre—and it is time we began conducting this mental exercise—what we now find on the left of the map, at the «far west», is the Euro-Asian continent, the equivalent to the old Far East, only the British Isles now play Japan's role and the Iberian peninsula (with Spain) that of the Korean peninsula. And now the Middle Empire, China, falls precisely in the middle. So what are Far East and far west? Just stereotypes. This metaphor shows that we Spaniards and Europeans may well be shifting from the centre to the edge of the world system without realising, while we passionately debate on goodness knows what banalities.

Is there a solution?. Yes, possible though unlikely. There are currently three responses. The first, to which Europe mainly subscribes, is that the world should be managed through the United Nations by negotiating sovereignties, following a world Westphalian model. The second is mainly upheld in the United States: given the ineffectiveness of the United

Nations, let us trust only in ourselves by imposing a sovereignty, ours, wherever our interests lie; it is the world imperial model that eventually generates, as a by-product, an international order of rules and institutions. There is a third response to be explored, which is spread by the EU model: the pooling of sovereignties, which can only be done by democratising the world and getting democracies to cooperate.

What we currently have is a mixture, in uneven doses, of the first two models, giving rise to a Westphalian world of major sovereign powers that are strongly nationalistic (Russia, China, India), nuclearised, with right of veto in the UN (making it powerless), and with huge needs for resources of all kinds. Powers that spur other countries to become nuclearised in order to protect themselves, but at the same time threatening their neighbours. A world order that is managed in unstable balances of power and fragile alliances (the «great game»), particularly around the emerging China-USA axis, flanked by the EU, India and Russia. It is the order of «one superpower, many great powers» (53) in which the USA closely observes China, China closely observes Russia, and Russia, as always, observes the United States. A multipolar world indeed but one in which unfortunately Europe and the states that make it up count for increasingly little. It is an irony of history that the «new planetary order» looks set to be a large-scale copy of the Westphalian order, the definitive «Europeanisation» of the world. We will have «contained» the hegemon, no doubt, but we will also have ensured our own insignificance and opened the door to a world neo-feudalism. We Europeans should be very careful about supporting a multipolar world lest we should find ourselves saying, after our hopes are fulfilled, «no, this isn't what we meant».

The dilemma is that the UN has legitimacy but not force and represents an ineffective, powerless (for example Palestine) multilateralism that seeks help from a unilateralism that is illegitimate but sometimes effective (for example Kosovo). And the United States has force but not legitimacy and represents a unipolarity that is illegitimate (for example Iraq) but sometimes effective (Balkans). How can we combine the UN's powerless legitimacy with the illegitimate power of the United States, as occurred in the First Gulf War? The EU model could be the answer: by democratising the world in order to be able to manage it as an «alliance of democracies» which share

(53) Rosalie Chen, *China Perceives America*, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 12, 35, May 2003. Quoted by Robert Kagan, *End of Dreams, Return of History*, *Policy Review*, August/September 2007.

sovereignties instead of bringing them into confrontation—an alliance that will be a lobby in the UN, making it effective and, for this purpose, making Europe the glue that fits together the UN and US in pursuit of a new World Democratic Order, which should be the utopia that regulates the process in the long run. Let us not forget that the maximum guarantee of world governance is the democratic state: «the quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states», asserts the European Security Strategy with justified emphasis.

Basically, we need to bring about a shift in the United Nations from inefficient to efficient multilateralism to make it work. And for this purpose, to organise a caucus of the world's democracies, the only reliable and secure regimes, a caucus whose hardcore can only be the central alliance that has formed the West, that which encompasses both sides of the Atlantic (also Latin America), an alliance whose backbone can only be a reformed NATO. Today more than ever the world needs governance and this, which inevitably involves the United Nations, requires something else: a will and a direction. What we urgently need is not an Alliance of Civilisations but an alliance of free and democratic countries. In other respects, as often occurs, we will have to make considerable haste so as not to fall behind, as while we hesitate others are already getting their act together and the aforementioned Beijing meeting of 48 of the 53 countries of the African Union, with the same number of votes at the United Nations, is the embryo of the hardcore of a different caucus that is already taking shape.

In the coming years we will find out whether or not it is possible to shape an alliance of democracies. Following the French elections we will discover whether or not, with Mr Sarkozy, the European Union is capable of coordinating a strong leadership and resuming its path, which so far has been extraordinarily positive but is bogged down by bureaucratic tensions, misgivings and neo-nationalism. The US presidential election will mark a renewal in the country's leadership and also no doubt a new direction for its foreign policy; this will be the chance to resume Atlantic collaboration. There are signs that lead us to suspect that following the Olympic Games of 2008, Hu Jintao and his team of renewers plan to launch a political reform under the cryptic slogan of a «harmonious society». And lastly, 2008 is also election year for Russia, Italy and, of course, Spain. Four of the players of the global chess game and several secondary players will have new leaders precisely when the world, particularly the West, is beginning to be aware of the deep transformations it is undergoing.

CONCLUSION: KANT AND HOBBS

The conclusion of all conclusions, however, is simple. The world needs global governance and this governance is not essentially different from the classic kind, from the internal governance of states. The latter has always been based on two elements: the force of law and the law of force. On the rule of law, on the one hand, of course, in an order (Kantian) of institutions, rules, rights and duties. But also, and to no lesser degree, on the monopoly (Hobbesian-Weberian) of violence at the service of this law. For democracies are first and foremost states, and do not exist if they are incapable of guaranteeing their citizens' physical security, that is, without the monopoly of violence. A Hobbesian, Westphalian world is ungovernable unless equipped with legitimate rules, as nobody can sit on bayonets. But a purely Kantian world of rules, negotiations and pacts, a post-modern world, needs law enforcement, without which law is worth very little. We can build a post-modern order, a world society, but it will never be post-Hobbesian.

The West, its public opinion, should realise that just as daily internal order rapidly becomes anarchic as soon as the police forces, gendarmes or carabinieri disappear, so is the international order anarchic without the threat of legitimate use of force, as there always are and will be delinquent actors in both the internal and international orders. Legitimate force, no doubt, but force all the same. «We want international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security», states the European Security Strategy. But it adds that we must «be ready to act when their rules are broken». To think that force is now unnecessary in today's world is tantamount to believing in the end of history.

There is no order without law, but nor is there without force at the service of this order. There is thus an indubitable complementarity between the force of the United States, on the one hand, and the legitimacy and legality of the United Nations, on the other. This should be Europe's task: to steer the United States along the path of effective and real multilateralism, ensuring that the United Nations is not so insignificant that its decisions are violated time and time again. For soft and ineffective multilateralism seeks help from unilateralism—which may be illegitimate but is often effective. Contrary to what Hegel believed, whatever is real is not necessarily rational and we cannot rely on the astuteness of an alien reason (whether Spirit or the United States) to steer us along the path of freedom. If we desire freedom, we must strive for it with our effort and

personal commitment. Let us recall again Hegel's *The Phenomenology of Mind* when it addresses the dialectic of master and slave: only he who is willing to risk his life to preserve his freedom deserves to be free (is only free de facto). He who is not has already begun to be a slave, even if he does not realise this.

And I cannot help making a final comment about Spain. The past thirty years have been the most brilliant in our history. The most brilliant ever. I feel strongly about this. We Spaniards have never been more free or more prosperous. A country that was the pariah of Europe in 1945 is now the eighth biggest economy in the world and a political model for all the emerging countries.

We achieved this because after General Franco died we decided to do two things: on the one hand, to look ahead at the future, worry about our children, and not repeat our parents' quarrels. And on the other, to incorporate ourselves decisively into the world, first into Europe, then into Latin America and lastly into the world, looking outwards and not inwards. I believe I am not mistaken in recalling that the slogan with which the PSOE secured its resounding victory in the 1982 elections, «For change», expressed this project well: to look ahead, to look outwards. To open windows and doors and expel miasma. And I believe that Spain's business elite is continuing in that same direction, as indeed is most of society.

Not so the political elite, which has decided to turn things around in order to gaze increasingly at the past and increasingly inwards. But the past cannot be changed and is always a zero-sum game: either one or the other wins, never both at once. Stirring up the past amounts to driving wedges and fuelling confrontation. And the worst thing is not the *damnum emergens* caused by these policies, which is considerable. The worst thing is the *lucrum cessans*, lost opportunities, and wasted leadership and time. For Spain's future lies outside Spain, not within it, and is a positive-sum game in which we can all win. Or we can all lose. For while we engage in vehement, trivial discussions about the past and about our essence, the future is steamrolling us.

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